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Chapter 1
Introduction
During the Millennium Summit in 2000, all United Nations member states1 com-
mitted to help achieve the so called Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The
participating countries agreed on achieving the eight main goals, which range from
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, to combat of HIV/AIDS, to the ensuring
of environmental sustainability, until 2015. Especially the first MDG, eradicate ex-
treme poverty and hunger, is intimately connected with economic development and
increasing personal income, particularly in rural areas. These factors on the other
hand go along with democratic development. It is a commonly accepted view that
democracy when compared to other non-democratic systems is a superior political
system promoting economic growth and well-being. However, controlling for demo-
graphic and economic structures a large variance regarding policies, implied growth
and well-being can be observed across democratic countries. Hence, the question
arises how these differences across economically similar democratic countries can be
explained. We assume that inefficient and biased policy outcomes that are often as-
sociated with developing countries result because governments are facing incentive
problems. A possible explanation for missing or suboptimal incentives, involves elec-
tions and voting behavior. In political theory electoral competition is understood as
a fundamental democratic mechanism to guarantee that governmental policies re-
flect society’s interests. In reality, however, electoral competition is often restricted
and hence, leads to biased policy outcomes. Basically, policy biases result from two
major mechanisms: government capture and a lack of governmental accountabil-
ity. The latter corresponds to the fact that elected politicians have not sufficient
electoral incentives to implement policies benefiting socio-economic groups they are
representing, but rather serve their self-interests, while the former corresponds to
the fact that electoral competition is biased in favor of specific interests.
In the present thesis, the relationship between voting behavior and government
performance, especially government accountability and capture, is analyzed empiri-
cally. Therefore, three strands of literature are combined, namely political science,
political economy and development economics. While political scientists analyze
voting behavior to understand the election outcome, why people vote for certain
candidates and which motives determine their vote choice, political economists are
more interested in the implied government behavior. Government behavior is de-
rived from the political equilibrium, which is defined as the policy platform of a
political party or a candidate that maximizes it’s support function. And finally,
development economists analyze economic conditions and processes in developing
countries. Their focus is on the assessment of policy outcomes and the implications
they have on society’s welfare, e.g. people living below the poverty line, general
education level and income differences. Analyzing these fields of research separately
is very interesting on it’s own, and the existing literature has contributed massively
12000 the UN had 189 member states, currently there are 193.
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Figure 1.1: Schematic representation of the outline of this thesis
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to a better understanding of voting behavior and it’s implications on government
performance. Though, only a few scientists have actually combined the analysis of
voting behavior, equilibrium conditions and government performance. Two of them
are Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee, who extended the work of Baron (1994)
and Grossman and Helpman (1996) and perfectly derived theoretical implications of
voting behavior on government performance (extended BGH model). They modeled
an election with two competing political parties and interest group participation,
derived the optimal policy position pi∗ that maximizes a candidate’s vote share and
also drew implications on government capture and government accountability. How-
ever, Bardhan and Mookherjee did not empirically verify their theory, further they
explicitly mention, "We conclude by stressing the need for empirical research. Are
local governments more subject to capture? What are the determinants of absolute
and relative capture? Are assumptions and implications of our model validated by
data? Perceptions of capture by voters may perhaps be elicited from careful design
of voter surveys.", (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002, p. 38). However, the empirical
application of the theory of Bardhan and Mookherjee confronts the researcher with
four major problems. First, they assume a uniform distribution of the voters’ policy
preferences, which allows them to easily determine the equilibrium conditions, as
the maximization problem becomes separable. However, current studies on voting
behavior utilize extreme value distributions for voter’s preferences, which are far
more realistic than the uniform distribution. But the extreme value distribution
leads to equilibrium conditions that do not provide global maxima anymore. The
support functions are usually not globally concave, which is why only local maxima
2
can be achieved. Second, Bardhan and Mookherjee utilize a very reduced model that
only includes policy oriented voting via issue distances and non policy voting via
campaign spending. Retrospective voting, personal characteristics of the candidates
and other valence issues that are important factors explaining vote choice in the
literature of voting behavior, are not included in their theoretic model specification.
Further, the third issue is that voters are either informed or uninformed and vote
policy oriented or non policy oriented respectively. Apart from this differentiation,
all voters are assumed to be identical and their voting behavior is homogeneous.
Differences among voters and heterogeneous voting behavior is not considered. The
fourth issue is that although Bardhan and Mookherjee mention the concepts of cap-
ture and accountability, no indices are derived that actually measure government
performance explicitly. Hence, it is difficult to empirically verify their theory with-
out the corresponding tools.
To overcome these challenges and apply the theory of Bardhan and Mookherjee
empirically, we undertook the following four steps, which are also presented graphi-
cally in Figure 1.1.
1. Collect micro data on voting behavior and estimate a probabilistic voter model
2. Include heterogeneous voting behavior (latent class analysis)
3. Adapt BGH model to modern voter studies (extreme value distributed voter
preferences, LNE)
4. Derive indices from the theoretical framework that measure government per-
formance
Considering the first point, which also corresponds to the left box in Figure 1.1,
voter surveys were conducted in three developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Here we act on the suggestion of Bardhan and Mookherjee and put special emphasis
on the careful design of our voter survey. While voting behavior in industrialized
countries has been studied intensively in the past, the literature on voting behavior
in developing countries is quite rare, especially concerning econometric applications.
Among other things, this is also due to missing data, especially surveys focusing
on elections and voting behavior are scarce in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore,
most of the scientific papers only take non policy voting indicators like ethnicity
or region into account and do not analyze the impact of other voting motives, like
policy voting and retrospective voting.
Ghana, Senegal and Uganda were chosen as case study countries, because they
differ in their democratic consolidation as well as in their economic development.
Hence, they provide optimal requirements for later comparison of the countries and
to draw further conclusions on the relationship of voting behavior, government per-
formance, democratic consolidation and economic development. The data was col-
lected in three surveys in 2012 and 2013. While we collected the data with the help
of our local partners in Ghana and Uganda. In Senegal we collaborated with Afro-
barometer, which is why the sample size in Senegal is twice as big as in the other
countries. With the data at hand, voting behavior was estimated with a multinomial
logit model as well as with a latent class model to further account for heterogeneity
3
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in voting behavior. Heterogeneity in voting behavior is a necessary, although not
sufficient condition for the existence of capture. Hence, it is a crucial factor, which
has hardly been considered in the literature so far. With the latent class approach,
we found an optimal tool that allows to further explore heterogeneity. Latent class
models have been applied in many other fields of research, but are a novel method
in political theory and the analysis of voting behavior.
The aim of the probabilistic voter model is not first and foremost to predict the
outcome of an election, but rather to understand why people voted the way they
did. Hence, we identified three voting motives, policy oriented voting, non policy
oriented voting and retrospective voting to characterize voting behavior. From the
estimation results we calculated the relative importance of the three voting motives
for each country. Further, the estimation results provided us with the necessary
parameters to calculate indices for measuring government performance. However, as
the indices are derived in political equlibrium, we have to assume that the empirical
policy positions correspond to a local Nash equilibrium (LNE). Therefore, we follow
the theory of Schofield (2007), who derives conditions for local Nash equilibria in
probabilistic voter models. Please note that in comparison to Schofield, we do not
verify the existence of the LNEs at the electoral mean, but estimate the parameters
such that the empirical policy positions are in fact LNEs. The equilibrium part in
the middle of Figure 1.1 has to be taken as a black box for the time being.
Finally part three involves the derivation and calculation of government perfor-
mance indices. In the theoretical part of the paper, the indices for government
capture and government accountability are locally derived from the maximized sup-
port function of the candidate. The optimal policy platform of a governmental party
satisfies the necessary condition for maximizing a weighted sum of the average wel-
fare of voters, the aggregated welfare of all interest group members and the intrinsic
policy preferences of the political party. Applying the theoretical model that is de-
rived in this thesis, we are able to analyze empirically how voting behavior affects
government incentives to perform according to societies interest. Please note that
we derive our indicators internally from the theoretical model and apply them em-
pirically. We do not externally validate government performance at this point, but
will leave this important issue for future work.
The main impact of this thesis for the literature on voting behavior is threefold.
First we provide an extension to the BGH model that is based on extreme value dis-
tributed voter preferences and provides theoretically derived indicators measuring
government accountability and capture. Second, we apply our theory to the case of
three Sub-Saharan African countries. The amount of existing studies that economet-
rically estimate voting behavior in theses countries is small, especially the combined
inclusion of policy issues, retrospective voting and non policy factors is novel. Fi-
nally, heterogeneity was explicitly included in the analysis by applying not only a
multinomial logit model but also a latent class model. Considering heterogeneity is
absolutely necessary to measure capture among different groups of voters. Further,
the application of a latent class model also provides a methodological improvement
for analyzing voting behavior. Hence, the thesis provides a theoretical, an empirical
as well as a methodological contribution to the existing literature. However, the
focus is on the empirical analysis of voting behavior and government performance,
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which is only possible with theoretical and methodological extensions.
The thesis proceeds as follows. In the first part, the theoretical and methodolog-
ical background of understanding voting behavior and government performance is
given. In chapter two following the introduction, the literature on voting behavior is
reviewed. Special emphasis is put on voting behavior and government performance
in developing countries. Further, possible explanations for market imperfections in
developing countries are described in more detail. The general theory of voting be-
havior, starting with the Columbia School, the Michigan School and the rational
theory of voting is described in chapter three. Additionally, we introduce the exten-
sion of the well known Baron, Grossman and Helpman model (BGH), by Bardhan
and Mookherjee. It establishes the basis for our own extension and generalization
of the BGH model. However, before we introduce our extended model, the method-
ology of measuring and analyzing voting behavior is explained in chapter four. We
introduce two econometric tools to estimate probabilistic voter models, the multi-
nomial logit model and the latent class model. Chapter three ends with a short
description of the concept of local Nash equilibria by Schofield (2007). Finally part
one closes with the theory of our extended BGH model and the derivation of govern-
ment performance indices, measuring government accountability and capture. The
second part is the central part of the thesis, it applies the theoretical concepts em-
pirically. Chapter six introduces the three case study countries, Ghana, Senegal and
Uganda. The measurement of voting behavior and it’s implications on government
performance are described for each country in chapter seven to nine. The empirical
part ends with a comparative perspective on the three case studies. Finally the last
chapter concludes and summarizes the content of the theoretical as well as of the
empirical part of this thesis.
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Part I
Theory

Chapter 2
Voting Behavior and Government Performance: A
Literature Overview
A review of the burgeoning literature on participatory policy processes reveals that
scholars typically focus on the involvement of stakeholder organizations and interest
groups as a prerequisite of efficient development policies and particularly ignore the
role of voters and elections (World Bank, 2011). This situation is at odds with
political theory, which interprets electoral competition as a fundamental democratic
mechanism for guaranteeing that governmental policies reflect society’s interests.
A theoretical justification for neglecting electoral competition and the role of the
voter can be found in Becker’s seminal contribution to political economy theory,
which focuses on interest group competition based on the assumption that voters’
electoral choices are completely controlled by interest groups e.g., via campaign
spending (Becker, 1983). Another micro-political foundation for the neglect of voters
can be derived from socio-structural theories of voting, i.e., following the theory of
Lazarsfeld et al. (1968) or Lipset and Rokkan (1967), voters’ electoral choices are
completely determined by their social classes; hence, electoral competition does not
imply any incentives for elected politicians to perform well and serve the needs and
desires of their electorate. For example, following a socio-structural theory of voting,
most scholars of African politics agree that ethnic voting dominates vote choice in
multi ethnic and nascent African democracies (Horowitz, 1985; Bratton et al., 2011;
Hoffman and Long, 2013). This kind of voting pattern reduces the incentives of
the current government and of the opposition parties to select party platforms that
reflect society’s interests, because policy positions are not consulted for vote choice.
There exists a broad range of literature concerning voting behavior on the one
hand and government performance on the other hand. Prominent examples for the
former are Campbell et al. (1960) and Lazarsfeld et al. (1968). Important contribu-
tions to the literature of government performance are among others from (Bailey,
1999) and (Stevens, 2005). However, in this thesis we will focus on the work com-
bining both strands of literature. Interesting work addressing the impact of voter
behavior on governmental performance was just recently published in political econ-
omy theory (e.g., Keefer and Khemani (2005) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002)).
According to this theory, electoral competition is often restricted in reality, leading
to biased policy outcomes. In general, policy biases result from two major mech-
anisms: government capture and a lack of government accountability. The latter
mechanism corresponds to a lack of sufficient electoral incentives for elected politi-
cians to implement policies that benefit their constituencies; instead, politicians
serve their self-interests. The former mechanism corresponds to the bias of electoral
competition in favor of special interests. Especially Keefer and Khemani disagree
with Becker and argue that the power of special interests and lobbying does not
sufficiently serve as an explanation of biased policy outcomes (Keefer and Khemani,
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2004). Taking the example of India, Keefer and Khemani demonstrate that although
the majority of the population is poor, the provision of public goods is skewed to-
wards special interests of the rich instead of improving the living standards of the
poor. Neither does missing participation in elections provide a solution to the puzzle
of biased policy outcomes, as poor people in India tend to participate in elections
even more than the middle class or the rich. The voter and hence the demand side
of public policies does not seem to be the critical point, rather the suppliers of poli-
cies, political parties and individual candidates have to be blamed. In their paper,
"Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives
for Providing Public Services", Keefer and Khemani (2005) get to the bottom of this
issue and give an overview of the interaction between provision of public goods and
political incentives. Usually politicians should be responsible for their people and
use public policies to reduce poverty and increase welfare. Instead, it has been
observed that especially in low income countries public policies and social service
provision to the poor are insufficient and especially the income gap between rich
and poor people is further increasing. When we assume that politicians are aware
of their political action, it cannot be a knowledge problem that developing countries
are facing. It rather seems to be an incentive problem that makes politicians act
contradictory to society’s interests. Generally one can distinguish between broad
public goods that benefit many voters and targetable goods that serve only a chosen
subset of voters (Persson et al., 2003). Due to imperfections in political markets
politicians prefer to provide targetable goods like private transfers to few people
rather than providing public services that reduce poverty in a more general way
(broad goods). This behavior results out of a reason: Politicians are rent seeking
and their main goal is to maximize their utility by being reelected. Especially in de-
veloping countries reelection does not always come along with high quality policies,
it is therefore irrational for politicians and parties to provide broad public services
(e.g. education and welfare benefits). Electoral competition can be won a lot easier
by promising narrow targetable goods such as infrastructure, agricultural subsidies
or governmental jobs. However, this does not serve as a mechanism for guaranteeing
that governmental policies reflect society’s interests any more. Keefer and Khemani
(2005) focus on the voter’s role to explain the dilemma of missing incentives and
especially the redistribution gap from the wealthy to the poor that is increasing
in developing countries. They mainly make out three aspects that support market
imperfections in developing democracies: a) asymmetric information of voters, b)
social polarization and c) missing accountability of political actors.
Information asymmetries The basic theory regarding distorted electoral compe-
tition through imperfectly and asymmetrically informed voters goes back to Baron
(1994) and Grossman (1994). Baron (1994) makes a distinction between informed
and uninformed voters. Informed voters vote policy oriented, whereas uninformed
voters heavily rely on party loyalties and ideologies. Their vote choice is influenced
by campaign expenditures unrelated to political platforms and political decision
making. The uninformed voters in Baron’s model basically correspond to the inter-
pretation of elections by Becker, where vote choice is solely determined by interest
groups via campaign spending. Especially in developing countries people are only
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coarsely informed about policies. This is among others due to illiteracy, limited
mobility and restricted media access. Without information people are not able to
assess politicians adequately on their political performance but rather use proxies
to do so. These proxies are mainly easy observable policies or already existing party
loyalties. Khemani (2004) describes that policy actions that are easy observable
increase the closer a country moves to elections. The influence of party loyalties
is further described in Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002), they assume that a higher
level of voter loyalty increases government capture by interest groups and reduces
electoral competition. Reduced electoral competition in turn leads to lower political
accountability. As a consequence Mani and Mukand (2002) show that politicians
maximizing their political support have strong incentives to focus on targeted and
visible policies at the cost of broad social services. Basically, this follows because of
three reasons. First, only few voters have enough specific and substantial informa-
tion to evaluate whether policies have contributed to better quality services or not.
Second, measurable benefits may not emerge until several years after a policy has
been implemented, which increases voters difficulties to reward (or punish) politi-
cians within a particular policy cycle. Third, providing service jobs or building roads
and buildings can easily be targeted to the own constituencies and hence is even for
low-informed voters highly visible. Gazdar (2000); World Bank (1998, 2001), as well
as Keefer (2002b) provide empirical evidence for this phenomena.
One strand of evidence on the importance of information for voter behavior and
induced governmental performance comes from the literature on electoral cycles in
fiscal and monetary policies. Cross-country analyses indicates that electoral cycles
in monetary and fiscal policies are significantly larger in developing countries (Block,
2002; Schuknecht, 2000; Shi and Svensson, 2000). Shi and Svensson (2000) establish
a direct link between electoral budget cycles and limited information available to
voters, where the later is measured via access to free media. Analogously, Besley
and Burgess (2003) show that state governments in India respond to declines in
food production and crop flood damage through higher public food distribution
and calamity relief spending where newspaper circulation is greater. Thus, external
interventions such as information campaigns by civic society organizations may be
useful in promoting the diffusion of information needed for political accountability,
particularly in poorer countries. Overall, although there is theory and some empirical
evidence for the importance of information for voter behavior and induced political
incentives of elected politicians to perform on a high level, it is still fair to conclude
that a comprehensive micro-political foundation has not yet been provided.
Social Polarization Social polarization exists in a country, where the society is
divided, because people strongly identify with different groups, like religious, ethnic
or linguistic groups etc. Especially ethnicity is believed to be a driving force in
elections in African countries (Berman et al., eds, 2004; Horowitz, 1991; Olorunsola,
1972). If people are strongly divided in ethnic groups and tend to vote on this basis,
elections do not represent political opinions any more but rather a census of ethnic-
ities (Ferree, 2006; Horowitz, 1985; Lever, 1979; McLaughlin, 2008). The less voters
care about policies, the less issue orientated and accountable a politician needs to be
to the overall society. Easterly and Levine (1997) discovered a negative correlation
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between ethnic diversity and the quantity and quality of provision of public goods.
This is confirmed by studies in Kenya that show that high ethnic diversity leads to
lower spending in primary school funding and school facilities (Miguel, 2001). The
recent study by Eifert et al. (2010) again confirmed the importance of ethnicity dur-
ing elections. They demonstrated that ethnicity becomes more salient the closer an
upcoming election moves. Just like information asymmetries social polarization also
leads to a situation in which politicians are missing electoral incentives to implement
policies that benefit the country as a whole. Instead, they focus on maximizing their
own personal interests as well as on the interests of their clientèle. This explains
why in many developing countries, where the population is heterogeneous and di-
vided into many different groups, suboptimal policies persist and politicians, who
implement these policies are being reelected.
Missing Accountability1 A third imperfection of political markets corresponds to
politician’s inability to make credible promises in elections. Persson and Tabellini
(2000) demonstrate that when pre-election premises are not credible, elections be-
come less effective instruments for holding politicians accountable. Keefer (2002a)
shows that in countries where political parties are weak or not established, politi-
cians tend to make credible promises only to voters with whom they have built a
personal reputation. Such ties emerge most clearly as the patron-client relationship
that a large body of literature identifies with policies in developing countries. The
more politicians serve their clients, the less money is available for public goods. An-
other problem of young and unstable democracies is the fact that parties have to
prove themselves within very short time horizons. People did not have the chance to
build up party identities yet and it is quite possible that they will change their vote
choice from one election to the next. Those short time horizons force the incumbent
parties to act in the short-run rather than in the medium or long-run. Short-run
policies are often less efficient and effective than longer planned policies. Paired
with weakly established political party systems short time horizons impede credible
political commitments from elected politicians. Empirical evidence for clientelistic
policies is provided for example by Glewwe and Jacoby (1994); Sanmartin (2001) as
well as Glaeser and Shleifer (2002). Further, because of the uncertainty inherent in
young democracies, politicians will first serve their own purpose and exploit office
to generate high rents for themselves. This behavior is attended by high levels of
corruption and public investment spending. Both are evidently higher in younger
than in older democracies (Keefer, 2002a). Finally the history of democratization
and multi party elections is rather short in many developing countries, hence, politi-
cal parties are not yet institutionalized. While party identity is an important voting
motive in industrialized countries, in those young democracies people rather identify
with certain personalities than with a political party. Hence, political parties are not
credible on their own, but are dependent on a charismatic leader who is personally
credible. Examples of strong leaders can be found frequently in Sub-Saharan Africa,
i.e. Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe or Teodoro Obiang
1Missing accountability in terms of Keefer and Khemani (2004) corresponds rather to missing
credibility of the politicians, than to a lack of incentives, as we defined missing accountability.
Hence, we will further speak of missing credibility in the context of Keefer and Khemani (2004).
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Nguema in Equatorial Guinea.
Summarized there are mainly three concerns that affect accountability. First,
clientelism, second short time horizons and third institutionalized parties. Each of
them can influence political credibility in one or the other direction. Clientelistic
governments only act accountable to their clients, which further increases the bias
towards special interests and does not provide any incentives to implement broad
public policies. Short time horizons lead to policies that are immediately observable
and to politicians that exploit the state for their own well being. Neither of those
increases government accountability and overall credibility. Finally institutionalized
parties have built up a reputation towards their voters, which makes them more
accountable and reduces the level of corruption and public investment spending.
Though in developing countries, many parties are not institutionalized yet and are
hence missing accountability.
Again, to our knowledge there hardly exist empirical studies applying econometric
estimations of probabilistic voter models based on individual election survey data to
estimate the relative importance of information asymmetries, social polarization and
lack of credible commitments as determinants of distorted political incentives derived
from electoral competition. Therefore, we consider it as an important contribution to
literature to provide first a descriptive overview but also an econometric estimation
of probabilistic voter models including explicitly voters motivation for non policy
oriented voting, e.g. valence or personal voting, induced by asymmetric information,
social polarization or lack of credible commitments.
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Chapter 3
Theory of Voting Behavior
The act of voting is a central element of decision making in modern democracies. It
gives each citizen who is eligible to vote the opportunity to co-decide political de-
cisions. For researchers, it is not first and foremost the actual result of the election
that is interesting to study, but how the result was achieved and why it resulted
the way it did. There exist three main approaches to analyze voting behavior, (1)
the socio-structural theory of voting, also known as the Columbia school (Lazars-
feld et al., 1968; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), (2) the Michigan School, which favors
a socio-psychological view (Campbell et al., 1960) and (3) the theory of rational
voting (Downs, 1957). The Michigan school gained fame for their path breaking
study The American Voter, where the role of political socialization is especially
emphasized. Further, Campbell et al. (1960) differentiate between long-term and
short-term forces. Party identification is the most important long-term factor, while
policy issues and characteristics of the candidate are classified as short-term forces.
The main work of the Columbia school is the 1944 published book The Peoples
Choice (Lazarsfeld et al., 1968). It analyses the US presidential elections in 1940
with a panel survey of 600 individuals from Erie County in Ohio. Lazersfeld and
his colleagues especially emphasize that vote choice is mainly determined by social
structures like social class, ethnicity or religion. Finally, the theory of rational vot-
ing assumes that voters gain utility from the policies that are implemented when
a candidate is elected. Naturally they will vote for the candidate whose policies
provide the highest expected utility for themselves. Further, political parties seek to
choose the policy position that maximizes their expected vote share. Hence, voters
as well as political parties act rational when they vote or choose their policy posi-
tions. Therefore, Anthony Downs was among the first to combine voting behavior
and government behavior.
However, when considering that about 50-90% of the population take part in
elections, the marginal effect of an additional vote on the election outcome is rather
small. This is because the probability P 1 that one’s vote is actually decisive is only
marginal. Even if the cost of voting is also small, taking part in elections is not
rational as long as voter turnout is high. The utility gained from voting is measured
as the utility difference between the policies of the candidates, B, multiplied with
P . Hence, the cost of voting C has to be smaller than the product of P and B to
make the act of voting a rational choice. The phenomena that most people do vote,
although their behavior seems irrational is known as the paradox of voting. Mueller
(1989) phrases it nicely, "Several people have noted that the probability of being
run over by a car going to or returning from the polls is similar to the probability
of casting the decisive vote". Trying to explain the paradox, some scholars found
ways to transfer the obviously irrational behavior into rational behavior. Riker and
Ordeshook (1968) introduced the term D, which acts as an utility component that
1Please find a table with all symbols and definitions in the appendix
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voters gain from the pure act of voting. Taking part in elections is seen as civic duty
that comes along with a well functioning democracy. Hence, citizens participate in
elections, when:
R = PB − C +D (3.1)
where, D is the utility gained from the act of voting itself (civic duty). Another
explanation is of game theoretic nature. The utility gained from voting heavily
depends on whether all other people vote or not. When everybody thinks that their
vote does not count and abstain from the election, P increases and equals one if no
one else votes. The lack of information on how many people actually participate
in the election, can lead to a situation where the act of voting becomes rational if
the expected benefit B is large enough. Further, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) show
that it is a rational choice to vote, if voters apply a minimax-regret strategy and the
utility difference B is at least double the cost of voting.
When voters decide to participate in elections and voting behavior is modeled as
a rational choice, the literature differentiates two kinds of models, a deterministic
voter model and a probabilistic voter model. In the deterministic voter model with
two political parties, the probability that voter j votes for party A equals simply:
PAj (A,B) =1 when U
A
j > U
B
j
PAj (A,B) =0.5 when U
A
j = U
B
j
PAj (A,B) =0 when U
A
j < U
B
j
(3.2)
The utility voter j associates with party k in this case party A or party B is depicted
by UAj and UBj respectively. Though the empirical application of the deterministic
voter model is problematic, as not all aspects of the utility function are observable.
Further, candidates are not aware of the exact preferences of all voters and cannot
definitely predict their vote choice. But also voters are not perfectly informed about
political parties and their policy positions. Hence, vote choice is aﬄicted with uncer-
tainty, the application of a probabilistic model is more suitable than the application
of a deterministic model. In a probabilistic model, whether voter j votes for party
A results in the following function:
PAj (A,B) = Prob(U
A
j ≥ UBj ) with Ukj = V kj + kj (3.3)
V kj denotes the deterministic part that is already known from equation 3.2 and kj
is the probabilistic component of the utility function. The deterministic part of
the utility function V kj can be further split up into three sub components, which
originate partly from the Columbia as well as from the Michigan school.
Vjk = V
P
jk + V
R
jk + V
NP
jk , (3.4)
where P stands for policy oriented voting, R for retrospective voting and NP for
non policy oriented voting.
Policy oriented voting goes back to the theory of Hotelling (1929), who analyzed
spatial competition in a duopoly. Further, he already observed similarities of his
model with the political market and electoral competition. Downs (1957) finally
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picked up the idea of Hotelling, "Our main thesis is that parties in democratic
politics are analogous to entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking economy. So as, to attain
their private ends, they formulate whatever policies they believe will gain the most
votes, just as entrepreneurs produce whatever products they believe will gain the
most profits for the same reason. In order to examine the implications of this thesis,
we have assumed that citizens behave rationally in politics." (Downs, 1957, pp.295-
296). He assumed that political parties choose their policy position on an ideological
left-right scale, that ranges between 0 and 100. Voters’ preferences are single peaked
and distributed on the same scale. The utility of each voter is formulated as a loss
function. The further a candidate’s policy position is from the voter’s ideal position
the less utility he gains from voting for that particular candidate. In a two party
competition the equilibrium results at the median position, where the vote share
of both parties is maximized. Though the general validation of the theory of the
median voter is very limited. When more than two candidates participate in elections
or the policy space is multidimensional instead of one dimensional, the equilibrium
does not exist. Davis et al. (1970) extended the model of Downs, for multiple policy
dimensions as they assumed that the political issues influencing electoral competition
cannot be combined in one ideological dimension. Hence, a voter will choose the
political party whose policy positions on all issue dimensions d will minimize the
sum of the policy distances.
While policy oriented voting requires detailed information on candidate’s policy
positions, retrospective voting is less demanding concerning voters’ political knowl-
edge. Retrospective voting refers to the act of voting that is based on observed
performance indicators, e.g. unemployment rates and GDP growth rates. Even
if individual voters are uninformed or disinterested in politics the electorate as a
whole is able to hold government accountable (Page and Shapiro, 1992), because
retrospective voting provides incentives to politicians as they can either by sanc-
tioned for their poor performance or selected, when they performed very well (Katz
and Katz, 2009; Kramer, 1971; Fiorina, 1981; Gomez and Wilson, 2001, 2003). In
general one can distinguish two kinds of retrospective voting, the first one is called
the sociotropic hypothesis (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981), which assumes that
voters consider the well being of the economy as a whole, when they decide who to
vote for. Pocketbook voting on the other hand, describes voters who associate their
own well-being and personal living conditions with government performance and
base their vote choice on these personal indicators (Campbell et al., 1960; Kramer,
1971, 1983). It is important to mention that both theories assume that it is not
the absolute well being that influences vote choice, but the perceived change of well
being compared to the past election period. Especially most recent events are taken
into account, while efforts from former periods are rediscounted (Kramer, 1971; Fair,
1978) and become less important over the years. The issue of timing is one reason,
why retrospective voting does not always provide the right incentives to politicians
and candidates. It results in increased spending during the year of elections and
reduced spending in all other years. Cole (2009) provides evidence that in election
years more agricultural credits are provided and in another paper, Cole et al. (2012)
show that also the spendings on relief in response of natural disasters are increased
when elections are close. However, an adequate level of disaster preparedness is much
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more efficient than relief spending, after the catastrophe happened. Nevertheless in
comparison to relief spending, spending on disaster preparedness is not rewarded
by voters. At this point it is obvious that voters offer wrong incentives to their
politicians, as they rather spend money on disaster relief than on the much more
efficient disaster preparedness. It follows that politicians actually gain votes if they
act decently during natural disasters, although they did not contribute sufficiently
to disaster preparedness beforehand (Healy and Malhotra, 2013). In this case wrong
incentives arise from focusing on short term policies as well as from biased policy
beliefs of the voters.
Finally, next to retrospective voting and policy oriented voting there also exists
non policy voting. In comparison to the former two, non policy oriented voting is not
related to actual political behavior and policy platforms. Especially voters with low
levels of political awareness and low education levels, fall back on non policy factors
when they make their vote choice (Abrajano, 2005). Typical non policy factors are
for example personal characteristics of the candidate, ethnicity and charisma. The
crucial point about non policy factors is that they are exogenously given in the sense
that they are permanent attributes of the candidate or the political party. Sometimes
they are referred to as an extension of valence-issues (Peress, 2010), which are defined
as "those that merely involve the linking of the parties with some condition that
is positively or negatively valued by the electorate", by Stokes (1963). However,
the distinction between policy and non policy voting factors is not always discrete
(de Mesquita, 2000), as non policy factors might also influence the perception of
policy factors. Charisma, for example, can help political candidates to promote their
policy positions. The drawback of non policy voting compared to retrospective and
policy issue voting is that it does not enhance government accountability. Political
candidates have no incentives to provide broad public goods for the society as a whole
if their election probability depends mainly on non policy voting that is beyond any
policy issues.
While Anthony Downs was the first one to actually combine voting behavior
and government behavior theoretically, others extended his work and developed it
further. David Baron was one of the first to distinguish informed and uninformed
voters when modeling voting behavior. In his paper, he assumes that informed voters
vote because of policy positions while uninformed voters are swayed by non policy
factors (Baron, 1994). Two years later Grossman and Helpman (1996) continued
modeling voting behavior, their main aim was to include interest groups in the
process and explain why the political process does not serve the interests of the
median voter. At this point, we will introduce the model of Bardhan and Mookherjee
(2000), which is an extension of the models of Baron, Grossman and Helpman.
Bardhan and Mookherjee put special emphasis on the concept of capture and voting
weights, which are core pieces of the theoretical chapter as well as of the application
chapter of this book.
In their model2, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) classify each voter j in one of
three classes c(j), poor (p), middle income (m) and rich (r). Further, there are n
2This part is based on the detailed description of the extended Baron, Grossman and Helpman
model by Bardhan and Mookherjee in their working paper Relative Capture of Local and Central
Governments (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002).
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districts, in each district i live βip poor people, βim people with middle income and
βir rich people3. Some of the voters in each class are interested in policies, while
others are not. The interested voters are aware of the political process, know the
political parties and their policy platforms. When they decide about their vote
choice, they heavily rely on the parties’ policy positions. Uninformed voters on the
other hand are not interested in politics, when they vote, they decide because of
non policy reasons that are not related to policy issues. Bardhan and Mookherjee,
just like Baron and Grossman and Helpman assume that those uninformed voters
are swayed by campaign expenditures when making their vote choice. Whether
someone is interested in politics or not is closely related to socioeconomic status and
education level, hence the share of informed voters α is highest in the rich class and
lowest in the poor class (αp ≤ αm ≤ αr).
During elections, voters can choose between two parties k, say party A and party
B, who provide policies piA and piB respectively. Informed voters j gain utility from
the policy choice of each party, but also from a non policy based weighting factor a
that measures the voter’s preference for party A over party B.
Uc(j)(pi) + ajI(A) (3.5)
Party preference aj can be split up in a nationwide preference a and an individual-
specific preference j. For simplicity, Bardhan and Mookherjee assume that the
voter-specific preferences j are distributed uniformly, which leads to linearity be-
tween vote shares and policy-based utility differences. Typical reasons for one party
being preferred over another are incumbent advantages, personal characteristics or
exogenous shocks (e.g. natural disasters, economic or financial crisis). Baron showed
theoretically that the incumbency advantage, which results from existing power in
the legislature and name recognition, leads to policy positions that are closer to the
median. Though in the theoretical model party preferences are not further specified.
Taking party preferences and policy positions into account an informed voter j in
class c will vote for party A if Uc(piA) − Uc(piB) + a + j ≥ 0. From this and the
linearity between vote shares and policy-based utility differences, it follows that the
total share of informed voters voting for party A equals
1
2
+ f [a+WI(pi
A)−WI(piB)], (3.6)
with WI(pik) = βrαrUr(pik) + βmαmUm(pik) + βpαpUp(pik).
While informed voters consider policy positions, uninformed voters are convinced
by campaign expenditures, C, and vote for the party that spends relatively more
money on election campaigning, e.g. election posters, election advertisements or
door to door visits. Hence, the uninformed voter will vote for party A if h[CA −
CB] + a + j ≥ 0 and the share of uninformed voters voting for party A will be
1
2
+ f [a+h(CA−CB)]. The marginal effectiveness of campaign spending is denoted
by h and is assumed to be strictly greater than zero. Depending on the kind of
election campaigning, election expenditures are more or less productive in generating
3In the following we will drop the district index i, as we will extend and apply the model only for
the case of presidential elections, which take place in only one country wide district.
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votes, which is expressed by h. Finally summing up the vote share of informed and
uninformed voters results in
SA =
1
2
+ f [a+WI(pi
A)−WI(piB) + h{1− βrαr − βmαm − βpαp}{CA − CB}
=
1
2
+ f [a+ V (piA, CA)− V (piB, CB)]
(3.7)
with V (piA, CA) ≡ WI(pik)+χCk, which denotes the net effectiveness of the electoral
strategy of party k. The marginal effectiveness h of campaign spending is included
in χ = h{1 − βrαr − βmαm − βpαp}, which additionally depends on the fraction of
uninformed voters. The electoral strategies of the two parties are represented by the
vector (pik, Ck), when they are given, the probability that party A wins the election
equals:
GA(V (piA, CA)− V (piB, CB)) ≡ Prob[a+ V (piA, CA)− V (piB, CB) ≥ 0]. (3.8)
GA is the distribution function of the party preference a, it is strictly increasing with
V (piA, CA)− V (piB, CB).
Political parties are assumed to be office seekers that act purely opportunistic in
elections. Their aim is to win the election, by choosing the electoral strategy (pik, Ck)
that maximizes their expected vote share. The objective function is represented by
the weighted sum of informed voter’s welfare and uninformed voter’s welfare, which
results from campaign spending.
WI(pi
k) + χCk (3.9)
In a case where no interest groups are actively lobbying for political support, the
election outcome is solely determined by informed voters. Each party chooses the
policy platform that maximizesWI , following Downs (1957) that means that all par-
ties will converge at the median position. Baron calls this the centripetal incentives,
which are dominant when the share of informed voters is high. The opposite effects
are called centrifugal incentives, they are triggered by interest groups and campaign
contributions. It follows that when all parties take the median policy position the
outcome of the election only depends on the exogenous party preferences a+ i.
Bardhan and Mookherjee assume that there exists only one organized interest
group and all interest group members are from the rich class. But not all of them
actually contribute financially to the common interest, only a share l of the rich
citizens contributes, while the rest of them (1 − l) free-rides. Depending on the
organizational structure and the possibilities to exclude non-paying members from
the gains achieved by the interest group, the share l varies and allows more or less
free-riding. In the model of Baron, the number of interest groups is not further spec-
ified. However, he differentiates between the kind of policies that are implemented,
while particularistic policies can be denied to an interest group that does not con-
tribute to the candidate, collective policies are provided to everybody independent
of whether they contribute to the party or not. He concludes, when the benefits
from a policy are free to everybody, no interest group will contribute to the political
parties. Thus, when only collective policies matter, campaign spending is zero and
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both candidates will locate at the median position to please the informed voters.
Grossman and Helpman model two cases, one with only a single lobby and another
with several interest groups lobbying for political support. While in the first case
the more popular party will receive greater campaign contributions from the lobby,
in the second case, the equilibrium policy positions are not uniquely determined.
Further, depending on the beliefs of the different lobby groups, any party can win
the elections. Grossman and Helpman call this behavior a self-fulfilling prophesies
that is due to coordination failure among lobbies.
The equilibrium in the extended Baron-Grossman-Helpman (BGH) model of Bard-
han and Mookherjee, is achieved in a two-stage, non cooperative, political game. At
the first stage the lobby decides about it’s campaign contributions, based on the par-
ties’ policy platforms. The second stage involves the political parties, which select
their policy positions to maximize their vote share. Accepting campaign contribu-
tions from interest groups, forces the political parties to move away from the median
position towards the more extreme policy positions favored by that particular inter-
est group. Hence, the party will only accept campaign contributions if the gained
votes by uninformed voters exceed the lost votes of informed voters. When pi∗ is the
median position, interest groups would have to contribute at least C˜k(pik) to make
the party indifferent between the two options.
WI(pi
k) + χC˜k = WI(pi
∗) (3.10)
Equation 3.10 illustrates the participation constraint, rearranging the formula results
in the minimum contribution of the interest group that will be sufficient for party k
to accept the offer.
C˜k(pik) =
1
2
[WI(pi
∗)−WI(pik)] (3.11)
In the following Bardhan and Mookherjee consider two cases, one where the partic-
ipation constraint binds for both parties and another case where the participation
constraint only binds for the less favored party. In the first case, the actual proba-
bility that party A or party B wins the election does not change when pik or Ck are
modified, only the policy positions of each party may vary because of the influence
of lobby groups. The probabilities do not change, because if moving away from the
median position results in a loss of informed voters, it will be compensated by the
gain of uninformed voters, convinced by campaign spending. The probability that
party A or party B will win the election is always Gk(0), because of the binding
participation constraints. When interest groups pay exactly C˜k(pik) to get policy pik
from party k, this policy choice maximizes the term G¯kUr(pik) − 1lβr C˜k(pik), which
corresponds to the utility gained by a rich citizen minus the share of campaign con-
tributions he actually pays himself. Hence, in equilibrium the following function is
maximized,
lχβrG¯
kUr(pi
k)+WI(pi
k) ≡ βpαpUp(pik)+βmαmUm(pik)+βr{αr+lχG¯}Ur(pik). (3.12)
The objective function corresponds to a linear quasi-utilitarian welfare function,
with the share of informed voters representing the welfare weights. In the first
proposition of their paper Bardhan and Mookherjee show that if the participation
21
Chapter 3 Theory of Voting Behavior
constraint only holds strictly for one party, the first order condition is:
Ur(pi
A(pA))− Ur(piB(1− pA)) ≥ 1
χlβrg(GA
−1(pA))
. (3.13)
Equation 3.13 holds with equality when pA < 1. pA denotes the win probability
and g is the density of GA. From proposition one it follows that when one party is
favored over the other, their policy platforms will diverge. This happens irrespective
of whether only one participation constraint binds or both of them bind. Interest
groups rather pay campaign contribution to the party that has better chances to
form the government, because only the governmental party can actually implement
policies. Hence, the preferred party will select policies that are further away from the
median, but closer to the special interests of the lobby groups. The more pronounced
the voters’ preferences are for one of the two parties, the more the parties’ policy
positions will diverge from each other. The divergence will be even stronger, when
the participation constraint only binds for one party. For the less preferred party the
participation constraint will always bind, as it does not make any sense to spend more
money than just necessary on a political party that is likely to loose the upcoming
election. For the preferred party additional campaign contributions enhance the
chance of winning the election, which makes it reasonable to exceed the participation
constraint. Grossman and Helpman show explicitly that the lobby will increase
it’s campaign contributions to the preferred party, as long as the marginal utility
of campaign contributions is greater than the marginal cost of them4. Campaign
contributions that exceed the participation constraint will pull policy positions even
further away from the median and increase divergence.
In comparison to Baron and Grossman and Helpman, Bardhan and Mookherjee
explicitly describe the weight of the different classes and introduce the term capture.
Capture is defined as policies that are biased towards special interests. If we recall
Equation 3.12, the weights of the group specific utilities are given by the population
share of the respective group, by the fraction of informed voters and by lobbying
activity. However, the political process does not necessarily have to suffer from
capture. First consider the case where all voters are informed: αc = 1, for all
c. The welfare weights will be reduced to the population shares, βp, βm, βr, which
corresponds with equal weights for every individual, quasi one man one vote. With
only informed voters group weights only depend on demographic characteristics.
Accordingly in developing countries where the share of poor people is high, the total
weight of poor citizens would be greater than the weight of mid income and rich
citizens. The fact that this is not the case is well known, especially in developing
countries the political process is biased towards the interests of the urban and rich
part of the population (Lipton, 1977; Sahn and Stifel, 2003; Avery and Peﬄey, 2005).
The reason therefore lies in the different share of informed voters among poor people
and rich people. From this it follows that literacy, poverty and inequality increase
the level of capture in a country. Additionally lobbying increases the weight of
the rich people, which further contributes to the already existing bias. Capture is
also influenced by party loyalties, as one-sided party preferences lead to enhanced
4The marginal cost of an additional campaign contribution is one.
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lobbying efforts for that particular party. Uncertainty in the outcome of elections
on the other hand can also decrease the level of capture, as lobby groups cannot be
sure about a parties electoral success. The critical point about capture and disparate
voting weights is that those citizens with the higher voting weight are dominant in
the political process, which leads to future policies that further privilege this elite.
Hence, inequality will persist or even increase in the long run, when an elite exists
and captures the common people.
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4.1 Estimation of Probabilistic Voter Models
Probabilistic voter models are estimated with so called Discrete Choice models.
Discrete Choice models1 are applicable for all kind of research questions that involve
a choice between alternatives e.g. consumers choosing their favorite yogurt brand
in the supermarket, commuters choosing their way of transport and also voters
choosing their preferred political party. All these choice situations have in common
that the number of possible choices is finite, they are countable. There are two
more requirements for a discrete choice model, the alternatives have to be mutually
exclusive and the choice set has to be exhaustive. The latter means that all possible
alternatives are included in the choice set, whereas the former demands that only
a single alternative is selectable from each choice set. The example of vote choice
easily satisfies all three obligations, there is only a finite number of parties that run
for office, during election day all parties that are legally eligible for election will be
presented on the ballot paper and each voter is only allowed to choose one party.
Hence, discrete choice models are exceptionally suitable to model voting behavior.
To derive the discrete choice model, usually a random utility approach (RUM)
is utilized. A decision maker j is choosing an alternative k among K alternatives.
Choosing an alternative creates utility Ujk, k = 1, ..., K for him. The decision maker,
in our case the voter, acts rational and chooses the alternative that provides the
highest utility for him, that is he chooses alternative k over l if and only if Ujk >
Ujl ∀ k 6= l. Unfortunately the researcher is not aware of the decision maker’s utility,
he can observe the choice situation and may know some attributes of the alternatives
and characteristics of the decision maker himself, but the true utility remains hidden
for him. Though he can consider the representative utility which is given by the
function Vjk = V (xjk, sj) ∀ k, where xjk are the attributes of the alternatives and
sj the characteristics of the decision maker. Of course the representative utility
function is not able to describe the true utility, hence Vjk 6= Ujk. The true utility
can be split in two parts, the representative utility and an error term nj that contains
everything that is not known by the researcher a priori, Ujk = Vjk + jk. As jk is
unknown by the researcher, it is treated as random and has a joint density, f(j).
Depending on the specification of the density function several discrete choice models
can be distinguished. An independently, identically extreme value distribution (iid)
for instance results in a logit model and a multivariate normal distribution in a
1The explanation of discrete choice models mainly goes back to Train (2009)
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probit model. In general the probability that an alternative is chosen is given by:
Pjk = Prob(Ujk > Ujl ∀ k 6= l)
= Prob(Vjk + jk > Vjl + jl ∀ k 6= l)
= Prob(jl − jk < Vjk − Vjl ∀ k 6= l).
(4.1)
With the density f(j) at hand, the cumulative probability can be written as
Pjk =
∫

I(jl − jk < Vjk − Vjl ∀ k 6= l)f(j)dj. (4.2)
I(·) is an indicator function, which equals 1 if the expression in parentheses is true
and 0 otherwise.
After Luce (1959) derived the logit formula, it became one of the most widely
applied discrete choice models in research. And also for the estimation of voting
behavior in part two of this book we apply a logit model. The major advantage of
the logit model compared to other discrete choice models is that the formula for the
choice probability takes a closed form. As already explained earlier, the decision
maker generates utility from choosing an alternative, this utility can be split in a
part which is known to the researcher Vjk and a random part which is unknown, jk.
When we assume that the unknown error term is independently, identically extreme
value distributed (iid), the logit model is obtained. The density of jk is
f(jk) = e
−jke−e
−jk (4.3)
Independently distributed error terms denote that jk is not related to jl. The logit
probability can be derived as (McFadden, 1974)
Pjk =
eVjk∑
l e
Vjl
. (4.4)
The relation between representative utility and probability is sigmoid (see Figure
4.1). The shape of the curve indicates that changes in probability are low when the
representative utility is either very low or very high compared to all other alterna-
tives. Changes in representative utility have the greatest effect on probability, when
the probability of being chosen is 50%. The specific shape of the probability curve
has important implications on policy makers (Train, 2009) and also on political par-
ties choosing their election campaigning strategy. We will further emphasize this
point in chapter 5.
Generally there exist different logit models depending on the kind of variables and
parameters that are included. Usually a multinomial logit model only consists of
individual specific variables whereas a conditional logit model includes only alterna-
tive specific variables. To describe the different kinds of variables it is necessary to
further specify the structure of the data used in the analysis. The dataset will be
transformed into the long format, which is displayed schematically in Table 4.1.
The data is formatted in the long format, where each observations represented
by one row. In the case of Table 4.1 an observation is displayed by a voter/party
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Figure 4.1: Graph of logit curve
Source: own illustration based on Train (2009)
Table 4.1: Data format for the logit model
Case Id Choice Party Age Gender Issue 1 Issue 2 Party ID
1 1 0 P1 23 male 9 16 0
2 1 1 P2 23 male 4 4 1
3 1 0 P3 23 male 16 9 0
4 2 1 P1 46 male 0 9 0
5 2 0 P2 46 male 16 9 0
6 2 0 P3 46 male 16 16 0
7 3 1 P1 30 female 9 16 0
8 3 0 P2 30 female 9 4 1
9 3 0 P3 30 female 4 0 0
10 4 0 P1 81 male 4 4 0
11 4 0 P2 81 male 16 4 0
12 4 1 P3 81 male 9 16 1
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Source: own illustration based on Thurner (1998)
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combination, the variable Id indicates the identification number of the voter, while
Party indicates the three political parties that are eligible for election. Depending
on the number of alternatives (political parties), each voter faces K choice situa-
tions and hence represents K observations. The dependent variable is Choice which
equals one if the particular party is chosen and zero otherwise. To see the difference
between alternative specific variables and individual specific variables, take a look
at the variables Issue 1 and Agein Table 4.1, while the latter is different for every
voter/party combination, the former is a characteristic of the voter and independent
of the alternatives. Typical alternative specific variables are issue distances and
party identification, among the individual specific variables are usually age, gender
and ethnicity.
In the literature a mixture of multinomial logit and conditional logit model is
often referred to as a mixed logit model, which may cause confusion as logit models
with random parameters are also specified with the same term. Following Croissant
(2012) we will call either model a multinomial logit model independent of the kind
of variables included. A simple form of the model that will be estimated later on,
will look like this:
Pjk =
eVjk∑
l e
Vjl
, with Vjk = αk + βxjk + δkrj, (4.5)
where xjk is a vector of alternative specific variables, β the generic coefficient and
αk an alternative specific constant, additionally there is the individual specific vari-
able rj with it’s alternative specific coefficients δk. Alternative specific coefficients
are always estimated with one of them set to zero, as the model cannot be identi-
fied otherwise. The remaining coefficients are interpreted relative to the alternative,
whose coefficient was normalized. Generic coefficients are constant across all alter-
natives.
As the probability Pjk is distributed logistically the coefficients cannot be inter-
preted straightforward like in a linear regression analysis. Though the algebraic sign
gives the direction of the effect, the absolute level is not interpretable. That is why
marginal effects and elasticities are important for further interpretation. Depending
on whether the variable is binary or continuous, marginal effects measure either a
discrete change or an instantaneous rate of change. Further, marginal effects can be
calculated at the means of all other variables held constant or at the actual value of
all other variables. The former is known as the marginal effect at the mean and latter
as average marginal effects. Average marginal effects have the advantage that they
better represent the data at hand and provide an individual specific effect. Further,
especially when binary or categoric variables are part of the estimation mean values
can be misleading, i.e. when considering gender, place of living or ethnicity. That
is why we will use the average marginal effects in the empirical application of this
paper. For continuous variables, the extent to which the probability of choosing a
certain alternative will decrease or increase when one of the independent variables
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is increased by one unit results in:
∂Pjk
∂xjk
=
∂Vjk
∂xjk
Pjk(1− Pjk) (4.6)
∂Pjk
∂xjl
= −∂Vjl
∂xjl
PjkPjl (4.7)
for alternative specific variables xjk or xjl and
∂Pjk
∂sj
= Pjk
(
∂Vjk
∂sj
−
∑
l
Pjl
∂Vjl
∂sj
)
(4.8)
for individual specific variables sj. The marginal effect for categorical variables is
calculated simply as:
MEsj = Pjk(sj = 1)− Pjk(sj = 0) (4.9)
Some researchers prefer elasticities to marginal effects because they are normalized
to a one percentage change of the independent variable. The elasticity of Pjk with
respect to xjk, the cross-elasticity and the elasticity with respect to a individual
specific variable are:
Ekxjk =
∂Pjk
∂xjk
xjk
Pjk
= −∂Vjk
∂xjk
xjk(1− Pjk) (4.10)
Ekxjl =
∂Pjk
∂xjl
xjl
Pjk
= −∂Vjl
∂xjl
xjlPjl (4.11)
Eksj =
∂Pjk
∂sj
sj
Pjk
= sj
(
∂Vjk
∂sj
−
∑
l
Pjl
∂Vjk
∂sj
)
(4.12)
4.2 Analyzing Heterogeneity in Voting Behavior
Heterogeneity is a necessary condition for the existence of capture. As we are ana-
lyzing the implications of voting behavior on government performance and especially
on government accountability and capture, we were looking for an approach that is
able to include heterogeneity. The multinomial logit model described in the previous
chapter assumes that all individuals act homogeneous, hence it is not the optimal
tool for our purpose. However, there exists an extension to the multinomial logit
model, the latent class model. The idea of a latent class model is that there ex-
ist different groups of individuals within a population, who share similar personal
characteristics. These groups or classes are homogeneous within themselves but het-
erogeneous compared to other classes. Latent class models are also known as mixed
logit models with discrete mixing distribution (Train, 2008), which is a more obvious
term as the latent class model is a special case of the mixed logit model, precisely
that case where the mixing distribution is not continuous but discrete.
Mixed logit models are an extension of the simple logit model to overcome its
limitations. These limitations are (1) random taste variation, (2) proportional sub-
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stitution patterns and (3) correlations over time. As long as tastes vary systemati-
cally logit models can deal with them what they cannot deal with is random taste
variations meaning variations that do not result from observed variables. But Train
(2009) also emphasizes that the logit model still gives a pretty good approximation
of average tastes even when they are random, which is because of the relative ro-
bustness of the logit formula to misspecification. The issue of substitution patterns
(2) goes back to the IIA assumption of the logit model, the IIA assumes that the
ratio of the logit probabilities of two alternatives is independent of any other alter-
native. That this is not always the case is obvious in the prominent red-bus-blue-bus
problem (the interested reader should consider for example Ben-Akiva and Lerman,
1985). The third issue is about panel data, logit models are able to analyze these
data as long as unobserved factors are not correlated over time. Overcoming these
limitations can also be seen as a strength of the logit model since the model has to
be very well defined and include all the relevant explanatory variables. Still, there
might be some unobserved variables or choice patterns that the researcher does not
know of, which will challenge the ability of the logit model to generate valid results.
That is why extensions of the logit models were developed one of them being the
mixed logit model.
The mixed logit model assumes that parameters are not the same for each indi-
vidual, but follow a certain mixing distribution. The probabilities can be expressed
in the following form
Pjk =
∫
Ljk(β)f(β)dβ (4.13)
Ljk(β) is the standard logit probability with parameters β
Ljk(β) =
eVjk(β)∑L
l=1 e
Vjl(β)
. (4.14)
In this case f(β) is the density function and mixing distribution. When the mixing
distribution f(β) = 1 and the parameters are fixed, the mixed logit model becomes
the simple logit model. Another possibility is provided when the mixing distribution
is discrete, which means that there is a finite set of values the parameters can take.
The model is then called latent class model and takes the following form:
Pjk =
C∑
c=1
pic
(
eVjk∑
l Vjl
)
(4.15)
pic is the share of the population which belongs to class c and has parameters βc.
Depending on the model which is estimated, it is possible to define a vector of de-
mographics zj that determines class membership. The vector of demographics will
be called covariates further on. Next to the covariates there are two more kinds
of variables, attributes and predictors. The latter have been introduced as individ-
ual specific variables in the former section already and the former are the already
known alternative specific variables (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005). Nowadays la-
tent class models are often solved using an EM algorithm (Pacifico, 2012), which
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will be explained in further detail in the following paragraph.
EM-Algorithm This part heavily relies on the work of Pacifico (2012), who is the
author of the program lclogit which estimates latent class models in Stata. When
the EM-Algorithm was developed it was first designed for the imputation of missing
data (Dempster et al., 1977). In latent class models the class shares are taken
as missing values and estimated with the EM-Algorithm. EM stands for two steps,
expectation and maximization. First the expectation of the missing data distribution
is estimated, afterwards the missing-data log likelihood is maximized.
This is the log-likelihood function that has to be maximized:
LL =
J∑
j=1
ln
C∑
c=1
pic
K∏
k=1
(
eUcjk∑L
l=1 e
Ucjl
)djk
(4.16)
djk is a dummy variable which equals one, if the alternative is chosen and zero
otherwise. The same log likelihood can also be written in a different way, which can
then be maximized by repeatedly updating the following recursion:
ηt+1 = argmaxη
∑
j
∑
c
Cj
(
ηt
)
lnpic
∏
k
(
eUcjk∑L
l=1 e
Ucjl
)djk
(4.17)
ηt+1 = argmaxη
∑
j
∑
c
Cj
(
ηt
)
ln(Lj | classj = c) (4.18)
η contains all the parameters that need to be estimated, including the choice and
class probabilities, Lj is the likelihood function for the missing data and Cj(ηt) is the
probability that household j belongs to class c, which is conditional on the density
of the data and the previous value of the parameters. Using Bayes’ theorem Cj(ηt)
can be computed easily.
Cj(η
t) =
Lj | classj = c∑C
c=1 Lj | classj = c
(4.19)
Then the likelihood function can be rewritten as
ln(Lj | classj = c) = lnpic + ln
∏
k
(
eUcjk∑L
l=1 e
Ucjl
)djk
(4.20)
and maximized using the following steps.
1. Calculate (Lj | classj = c) for each class2
2. Using the results from (1) calculate the conditional class membership proba-
bility Cj(ηt)
2use random starting values for the first iteration. These starting values have to be different for
each class
31
Chapter 4 Methodology
3. Next estimate a conditional logit model which is weighted by the individual-
specific class membership probabilities
βt+1c = argmaxβ
∑
j
∑
c
Cj
(
ηt
)
ln
∏
k
(
eUcjk∑L
l=1 e
Ucjl
)djk
(4.21)
4. Following (3) the second part of equation 4.21 is maximized to get the updated
vector of class shares
pit+1 = argmaxpi
J∑
j=1
C∑
c=1
Cj(η
t)lnpic (4.22)
• Depending on the specified model, the class shares may depend on some
demographics zj, which influence the class shares the following way.
αt+1 = argmaxα
J∑
j=1
C∑
c=1
Cj(η
t)ln
e(αczt∑
c e
(αczj)
, αC = 0 (4.23)
• Afterwards the class shares pic for each class can be updated
pit+1c =
e(αˆ
t+1
c zj∑
c e
αˆt+1c zj
(4.24)
• Taking βt+1c and pit+1c the updated conditional probabilities of class mem-
bership can be calculated for every individual.
• In the case of no dependencies between demographics and the class shares,
the class shares can be simply calculated as
pit+1c =
∑
j Cj(η
t+1)∑
j
∑
cCj(η
t+1)
, c = 1, ..., C (4.25)
5. With the updated conditional probabilities of class membership the recursion
can start again from point 3 until convergence.
Goodness of Fit To evaluate the goodness of fit of the model and also to decide
about the number of classes, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) are used. Further, there also exists the Akaike
Information Criterion 3 (AIC3) and the Consistent Akaike Information Criterion
(CAIC). The information criteria are based on the Log-Likelihood and the degrees
of freedom. The lower the value of the information criteria, the better is the model
fit. In the empirical application we will follow the suggestion of Andrews and Currim
(2003) and Dias (2004) that when determining the number of latent classes, AIC3 is a
better criterion than BIC and AIC (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005). The Information
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criteria are defined as3:
BIClogL = −2logL+ (logJ)npar, (4.26)
AIClogL = −2logL+ 2npar, (4.27)
AIC3logL = −2logL+ 3npar, (4.28)
CAIClogL = −2logL+ [(logJ + 1])npar, (4.29)
Furthermore, we will consider the classification error, that determines whether the
model is able to correctly predict the latent classes. The estimated proportion of
classification error is defined as:
ClassificationError =
∑J
j=1
[
1−maxPˆ (c|zj, yj)
]
J
(4.30)
Pˆ (c|zj, yj) is the posterior class membership probability, given the choice variable
yj and the covariates zj. Next to the classification error we will also consider the
prediction error when evaluating the outcome of the latent class estimation. The
prediction error indicates whether the model is able to predict the original choice
pattern. It is calculated as the share of wrong predictions of the total number of
observations.
PredictionError = 1−
∑
iErrori
N
(4.31)
Errori equals one if the choice is predicted correctly and zero if the prediction is
wrong. Finally when estimating latent class models, it is not obvious that the model
converges. Especially when the number of estimated classes is high, the problem of
local maxima often occurs (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005). Hence, another impor-
tant indicator about the quality of the model is whether the model converges and
finds a global maxima.
4.3 Equilibrium Conditions in Probabilistic Voter Models
The literature on voting behavior has always put special emphasis on identifying
policy positions that result in an equilibrium, where no party has an incentive to
move away from. Political equilibria are crucial, because if no equilibrium exists,
theoretically established implications on government performance are not possible.
One of the best known equilibria in public choice theory is the median voter model,
which concludes that political parties converge to the electoral center (median po-
sition) when they are maximizing their vote share (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957;
Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). As long as there exist only two political parties, a one-
dimensional policy space and deterministic vote choices the median position equals a
pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PNE), which always represents a global optima. How-
ever, when there is more than just one policy dimension usually a two party PNE
does not exist (McKelvey, 1976). Enelow and Hinich (1984) introduced next to the
3npar = number of estimated parameters
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deterministic utility component a stochastic utility component which enables the
existence of a PNE. When the stochastic utility component is sufficiently large and
a quadratic utility function is assumed, the political parties converge at the mean
voter position. A PNE with diverging policy positions results, when the stochastic
part of the utility function is sufficiently small compared to the deterministic utility
component (Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Merrill III and Grofman, 1999). The result
was further generalized by Enelow and Hinich (1989) to apply it for the multi party
case as well. The restricting assumption of their model is the concavity of the vote
share function. When a uniform distribution of the stochastic term is assumed, con-
cavity is always given. Baron (1994); Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Bardhan
and Mookherjee (2000) also utilize a uniformly distributed error terms in their mod-
els of voting behavior. With this assumption, they are perfectly able to model voting
behavior theoretically, identify equilibrium conditions and derive indicators of gov-
ernment performance. Though the assumption of uniformly distributed error terms
is only theoretically valuable, as it does not describe real world behavior. That is
why nowadays studies on voting behavior mainly estimate probabilistic voter models
using a logit model, whose error terms are Type I extreme value distributed instead
of uniform. The probability share functions of extreme value distributed error terms
are usually not globally concave, hence instead of PNEs only Local pure-strategy
Nash equilibria (LNE) can be found (Schofield, 2007). LNEs in comparison to PNEs
are only local optima. The difference between a local and a global optima is pre-
sented highly simplified in Figure 4.2. Schofield (2007) analyzed the case of extreme
value distributed error terms and defined the following equilibrium concepts.
(i) A strategy vector z∗ = (z∗1 , ..., z∗j−1, z∗j , z∗j+1, ..., z∗p) ∈ Xp is a local strict Nash
equilibrium (LSNE) for the profile function V : Xp → <p iff, for each agent
j ∈ P , there exists a neighborhood Xj of z∗j in X such that
Vj(z
∗
1 , ..., z
∗
j−1, z
∗
j , z
∗
j+1, ..., z
∗
p) > Vj(z
∗
1 , ..., zj, ..., z
∗
p) for all zj ∈ Xj − z∗j
(ii) A strategy vector z∗ = (z∗1 , ..., z∗j−1, z∗j , z∗j+1, ..., z∗p) is a local weak Nash equi-
librium (LNE) if, for each agent j, there exists a neighborhood Xj of z∗j in X
such that
Vj(z
∗
1 , ..., z
∗
j−1, z
∗
j , z
∗
j+1, ..., z
∗
p) ≥ Vj(z∗1 , ..., zj, ..., z∗p) for all zj ∈ Xj
(iii) and (iv) A strategy vector z∗ = (z∗1 , ..., z∗j−1, z∗j , z∗j+1, ..., z∗p) is a strict, respec-
tively, weak pure, strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE, respectively, PNE) if Xj
can be replaced by X in (i), (ii), respectively.
(v) The strategy z∗j is termed a local strict best response, a local weak best
response, a global strict best response, or a global weak best response to
z∗−j = (z
∗
1 , ..., z
∗
j−1, z
∗
j+1, ..., z
∗
p), respectively, depending on which of the con-
ditions (i)-(iv), hold for z∗j .
In his paper Schofield (2007) further inserts the valence term and shows that under
certain conditions the joint electoral mean of the stochastic vote model with valence
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Figure 4.2: Global and local maxima
Source: own illustration
is a LNE. Valence is similar to the term of non policy voting used in this book, it is
independent of policy issues and parties’ positions, but rather measures the general
approval with the president. In electoral competition high valence parties tend to
position themselves in the center of the policy space, while low valence parties move
away from the mean position. Schofield (2007) states the necessary conditions for
the existence of a LSNE/LNE at the joint origin z∗0 = (0, ..., 0). The first order
condition is that dVj/dzj = 0 and the second order condition demands that the
Hessians ( d2Vj/dz2j ) are negative definite at the joint origin. Please note that the
first order as well as the second order condition are only necessary and not sufficient
conditions for the LNE.
However, Schofield (2007) applies a very simplified utility function in his paper,
u∗ij(xi, zj) = λj − β ‖ xi − zj ‖2, where vote choice solely depends on valence and
policy voting. Further, valence is displayed only by the alternative specific constant
λj and neither party identity nor retrospective voting is included in the model. To
have a more realistic model of party competition, Kurella and Pappi (2014) tie
party positions to a meaningful ideological component and Erikson and Romero
(1990); Adams (2001); Adams et al. (2005) include party identification in the utility
function of the voter. In the paper of Henning et al. (forthcoming) the utility
function additionally includes policy issues, party identification and retrospective
voting, besides the model also accounts for heterogeneity of the voter, which has
not been considered by other authors yet. Further, in comparison to Schofield, our
goal is not to verify that a certain policy position (electoral mean) corresponds to a
LNE, but we presume that the empirical policy positions are in fact LNEs. There are
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different techniques to do so, one would be to utilize a Bayesian estimation subject
to the constraint that the policy platforms correspond to a LNE. Another more
simple approach, is to determine some of the parameters residually. In the empirical
part of this book, the residual parameters are interest group preferences and the
intrinsic preferences of the candidate. Consequently empirical party positions will
always represent a local Nash equilibrium.
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Chapter 5
Theory and Derivation of Government
Performance Indices
In the previous chapters we explained the role of the voter and elections in policy
processes as well as the the theoretical model of voting behavior by Baron-Grossman-
Helpman. Further, the idea of probabilistic voting models and methods for statisti-
cal applications were introduced. In this chapter of the book we will contribute to
the literature by closing existing research gaps, i.e. combining the theoretical work
on voter behavior and government performance with the existing empirical work
on voter behavior. In particular, we apply an extended Baron-Grossman-Helpman
model (BGH) as a theoretical framework to derive theoretically founded indices that
measure government accountability and capture. The latter corresponds to the bias
of electoral competition in favor of special interests and the former describes the lack
of sufficient electoral incentives for elected politicians to implement policies that ben-
efit their constituencies, but rather serve their self interest. Therefore, the original
BGH-model is combined with empirical voter studies, via applying the more general
Local Nash equilibrium (LNE) concept to the electoral equilibrium as suggested by
Schofield (2007). Please note that in comparison to Schofield we do not take the
electoral mean and verify that it is a LNE, but estimate the probabilistic voter model
subject to the constraint that the empirical policy positions correspond to a LNE.
Based on our theoretical framework, we are able to derive indices that characterize
voting behavior, which is measured as the relative importance of different policy and
non policy voting motives. The theoretical framework was developed by Henning et
al. (forthcoming), who measured voting behavior and government performance for
the case of Malawi. In the following we will first introduce the model outline, before
we derive the indices1.
5.1 Modeling Voting Behavior
5.1.1 The Voters
Following the literature on the theory of voting also described in the former sections
of this book, we assume that people vote for different parties based on the utility a
voter ascribes to them. Let j ∈ NV denote the index of an individual voter, NV
denote the set of voters and n is the total number of voters. Further, let NP denote
the set of political parties that run for election, where k ∈ NP denotes the index of
an individual party and K is the total number of parties. Then each voter can be
described by a vector Uj = (Ujk, .., UjK), where it holds:
Ujk = Vjk + jk (5.1)
1The chapter can be found in a very similar version in Henning et al. (forthcoming).
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Here, Vjk denotes the observable utility that voter j associates with party k, and the
term jk presents the stochastic error. Following the literature, we assume that each
jk is drawn from the same probability distribution. The cumulative distribution of
the errors is denoted as Ψ. Because of the stochastic assumption, voter behavior is
modeled by a probability vector, where the probability that a voter j votes for party
k is:
Pjk = Pr[Vjk ≥ Vjl, for all l 6= k] = F jk (Uj) (5.2)
The expected vote share of a party k results as:
Sk =
1
n
∑
j
Pjk (5.3)
Pr[] stands for the probability operator associated with Ψ; this probability is a
function of the vector of observable utilities that voters associate with the different
parties. The specific function F depends on the assumed distribution Ψ. In this
regard, different distributions are assumed in the literature, implying different voter
models. For example, many theoretical studies assume a uniform distribution in a
two-party set-up, as these assumptions facilitate formal analyses (for example, see
Grossman and Helpman (1996), Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) or Persson and
Tabellini (2000)). However, the work horse model that is applied in empirical voter
studies corresponds to the logit model, assuming an extreme value distribution for
Ψ. In particular, assuming that each jk is iid extreme value-distributed allows the
derivation of an analytical form for F jk (Uj) (McFadden, 1974):
Pvk = F
j
k (Uj) =
eV jk∑
l∈NP e
V jl
(5.4)
Following the voter theory, the utility that a voter v associates with a party k
incorporates different components (i.e., a policy (V P ), a retrospective (V R), and a
non policy (V NP ) component):
Vjk = βjV
P
jk + δjV
R
jk + αjV
NP
jk , (5.5)
where β, δ and α are the relative weights of the different utility components. In
a perfect political world where all voters are well informed about policies, electoral
competition would be based on the policy platforms, say γA and γB, suggested by
candidates A and B. Hence, in a perfect world, vote choice is only based on the
policy oriented component V Pjk(γk). The motive of policy oriented voting goes back
to the classic voting theory created by Davis et al. (1970) and Enelow and Hinich
(1984). The spatial voting model formulates voter’s utility as a loss function of
the weighted distance between a voter’s own ideal point xdj on a specific policy
dimension d and the position taken by a party, γdk.
V Pjk =
∑
d
βd(γdk − xdj)2 (5.6)
38
5.1 Modeling Voting Behavior
However, because in the real world, the transformation of policies into welfare is
rather complex, the calculation of expected utility is also rather complex from the
viewpoint of individual voters. In addition not all voters are aware of policies and
especially in developing countries the share of uninformed voters is high. Hence,
voters apply simple heuristics to estimate their expected utility. Basically, voters
apply different types of policy and non policy indicators to estimate the future utility
they expect assuming a candidate is elected. Non policy oriented indicators corre-
spond to the concept of valence (Schofield, 2007), which holds that based on specific
characteristics zG of the incumbent, such as appearance, charisma, occupation and
ethnicity, voters perceive a specific competence or popularity of candidates and par-
ties. Moreover, following Grossman and Helpman (1996), we also assume that voters
are at least partially swayed by the relative campaign spending of different parties.
This effect may reflect the influence of election advertisements or other efforts made
to mobilize support (e.g., election rallies, door-to-door visits by campaign workers,
etc.):
V NPjk (z, c) =
∑
l
αjklz1 +
∑
l
αLjklCl, (5.7)
where Cl denotes the campaign spending of party l and c is the vector of campaign
spending of all parties. Parties collect campaign funds from different sources. Ac-
cording to Magee et al. (1989) or Grossman and Helpman (1996), organized interest
groups have strong incentives to provide campaign contributions to political parties.
However, Magee et al. (1989) assume that campaign spending by interest groups is
mainly governed by electoral motives, while Grossman and Helpman highlight the
influence motive of interest groups (i.e., interest groups provide resources to parties
expecting that in exchange, parties will adapt their platforms to the ideal points of
the interest groups). The efficiency of campaign spending and lobbying respectively
is denoted by αLjkl, the indices show that the utility gained from voting for party k
does not only depend on the campaign contributions received by party k, but also
on campaign spending of all other parties. The same applies for the influence of
personal characteristics zk on voters’ utility, which is denoted by αjkl. In addition
to campaign spending by special interest groups, especially in developing countries
international donor organizations also provide financial resources to politicians (e.g.,
via development aid). Development aid is often granted conditional on the imple-
mentation of specific policies (Dollar and Easterly, 1999). Moreover, financial aid
gives national politicians some leeway to generate benefits for their electorate. Thus,
from the viewpoint of national politicians, development aid is similar to campaign
spending. Therefore, we formally include development aid in c, although we are
aware that campaign spending by national interest groups and development aid are
fundamentally different in many other respects.
A third set of indicators corresponds to the concept of retrospective voting (Fio-
rina, 1981; Katz and Katz, 2009) which implies that voters use observable welfare
indicators Zrj , such as income growth or other measures of well-being realized in
the incumbent’s last election period, to update their evaluation of the incumbent’s
competence and popularity. From the viewpoint of the incumbent party, the welfare
indicator is determined by implemented policies, Zrj = zjr(γ). Hence, the retro-
spective component of voters’ perceived utility is also a function of governmental
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policy, V Rjk(zjr(γG)), where γG indicates the governmental policy. Assuming a linear
approximation for V R implies:
V Rjk(Z
r
j (γG)) = δjkrZ
r
j (γG) (5.8)
Please note that following the empirical voting literature, we assume that perceived
economic performance has an impact not only on voters’ evaluations of governmental
parties but also on their evaluation of all other non-governmental parties.
5.1.2 Parties and the Government
Political parties choose their policy platform, γk to maximize their vote share, Sk and
consequently their representation in the legislature. Further, they are aware of the
fact that their chosen policy platforms will affect their popularity among voters in
different ways. First, voters evaluate party platforms based on their policy oriented
utility component. They compare party positions on different policy dimensions to
their own ideal points; the closer a party’s platform to a voter’s ideal point, the more
utility is provided. Second, parties choose their platforms while considering orga-
nized interest groups, which vary their campaign contributions to a party according
to the position a party takes. The parties know that any contributions they collect
from interest groups can be used to finance campaign activities, which in turn sway
voters in their electoral choice. Following Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Bard-
han and Mookherjee (2006), we assume that in political equilibrium, interest groups
donate locally truthful campaign contribution schedules to parties. Hence, the total
contributions collected by a party k correspond to a weighted sum of interest group
welfare:
Ck =
∑
i
%ikWi(γk) (5.9)
where Wi(γk) denotes the average per capita welfare of an individual member of
interest group i and %ik denotes the weight of interest group i to party k. Please note
that the sum of the interest group weights is generally lower than 1 (see Grossman
and Helpman, 1996)2. Moreover, we formally treat international donor organizations
as interest groups (i.e., the amount of financial aid provided by these organizations
corresponds to their intrinsic policy preferences, Wi(γ), with i=donor).
After rearrangement the share equation results in:
Sk =
1
n
∑
j
Pjk =
1
n
∑
j
F jk (γk) (5.10)
Finally, in previous models it was assumed that parties are purely office seeking,
in our model, we understand politicians not as pure office-seeking agents who only
2Please note that compared to Grossman and Helpman 1996, our set-up is more general (i.e., we
allow for more than two parties and allow the assumption of a non-uniform distribution for Ψ).
Therefore, the equilibrium results of Grossman and Helpman (GH) do not directly apply to our
more general set-up. However, at this stage, we do not prove that the essential results of GH
also hold for our more general set-up but instead assume this point exogenously. We leave a
rigorous proof of this assumption for future work.
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maximize their political support Sk, but also as parties with intrinsic policy prefer-
ences. Let uk(γk) denote the intrinsic policy preferences of party k. Then the total
utility of a party results as:
Uk = Sk(γk) + ϑkuk(γk). (5.11)
ϑk is a party-specific weight that reflects the relative importance of rents received
from political office versus the intrinsic utility derived from a policy. Accordingly,
the policy platform chosen by a governmental party k=G to maximize it’s total
utility derived from political support and it’s intrinsic political utility results from
the following first-order condition:
∂UG
∂γG
=
∂SG
∂γG
+
∂uG
∂γG
=
∑
j∈NV
∑
k
∂F jG
∂Vjk
βj ∂V Pjk
∂γG
+ δj
∂V Rjk
∂γG
+ αjα
L
jGk
∑
J
%ki
∂Wi
∂γG
+ ϑk ∂uG
∂γG
= 0
(5.12)
Rearrangement implies:
∂UG
∂γG
= βG
∂V PG
∂γG
+ δG
∂ZRG
∂γG
+ αG
∂WG
∂γG
+ ϑG
∂uG
∂γG
= 0 (5.13)
where it holds:
βG =
∑
j∈NV
F jGGβj; (5.14)
δG =
∑
j∈NV
δG
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k
F jGkδjkr
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ; (5.15)
αG =
∑
i
%iG
∑
j∈NV
αj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k
F jGkα
L
jGk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (5.16)
∂V PVG
∂γG
=
∑
j
F jGGβj
βG
∂V PVjG
∂γG
; (5.17)
∂ZRG
∂γG
=
∑
j
δj
∑
k F
j
Gkδjkr
δG
∂Zrj
∂γG
; (5.18)
∂WG
∂γG
=
∑
i
%iG∑
h %hG
∂Wi
∂γG
(5.19)
F jGk =
∂F jG
∂Vjk
(5.20)
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It follows from Equation 5.13 that the optimal policy platform chosen by a gov-
ernmental party G, given the platforms of all other parties, satisfies the necessary
condition for maximizing a weighted sum of the average welfare of voters, the aggre-
gated welfare of all interest group members and the intrinsic policy preferences of a
party. The corresponding welfare weights are given by βG, δG, αG and ϑG. While
in the model of Bardhan and Mookherjee the additive welfare function is globally
maximized, for the time being we are only able to locally approximate the maximum
of the welfare function. Nevertheless we can derive government performance indices
and verify empirically how they are linked to voting behavior.
5.2 Government Performance Indices
5.2.1 Government Accountability
As described in the introduction, according to the relevant literature (e.g. Keefer and
Khemani, 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002), less electoral competition implies
incentives for the government to implement policies that do not correspond to the
needs and desires of the majority of society, hence government performance is c.p.
lower. Given our derivations above, the more c.p. voters rely on non policy indi-
cators when evaluating parties, the less a political support-maximizing government
considers voter’s preferred policy position when it formulates governmental policies.
Formally, the larger the α-parameter in relation to the β- and δ-parameters, the more
voters base their vote choice on non policy factors; thus, more electoral competition
implies that the government orients its policy towards organized interest groups and
ignores voters. Accordingly, we define an index of governmental accountability (GA)
vis-a-vis the voter as the following relation:
GA1 =
(βG + δG)
αG + βG + δG
(5.21)
While GA1 measures the relative accountability of the government vis-à-vis the voter,
(1−GA1) measures relative accountability towards organized interest groups. In a
scenario with only informed voters, who base their vote solely on policy platforms
the index equals 1, indicating 100% government accountability. In reality, not all
voters are informed about policies, that is why the index will be below 1. Though a
low value for GA1 does not necessarily imply that the government is not accountable
to society. A high α-value only implies that the electoral outcome is significantly
driven by campaign spending. However, as long as campaign funds are generated
primarily by national interest groups, whose members represent the general interests
of society, elected politicians have strong incentives to represent organized interest
groups as well as the average voter. Only if campaign spending is derived primarily
from special interest organizations (e.g., farmers organizations, oil lobby or even
international donors) a high α-value implies low government accountability. This
effect occurs because those interest groups do not represent all members of society,
but only a small fraction of it. In many cases, donor organizations for example act
in the interest of a specific society, but from a country’s perspective, donor-driven
policies are at best derived from imposed welfare functions.
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Next to voters and interest groups, government is also acting accountable towards
itself. As demonstrated by Equation 5.13, the larger ϑG is in relation to the sum
of (αG + βG + δG), the larger is c.p. the incentive of the government to pursue its
self-interest. Hence, we derive GA2 as a second index of government accountability:
GA21 =
ϑG
αG + βG + δG
(5.22)
Because information on ϑ is limited and often not available for the researcher, we
developed an alternative way to calculate GA2.
GA22 =
ϑG
αG+βG+δG
ϑG
αˆG+βˆG+δˆG
(5.23)
While the numerator is identical with GA21 , in the denominator αˆG, βˆG and δˆG were
calculated under the assumption that all voters are informed and do not engage
in non policy voting. The ratio corresponds to the percentage of accountability
that is achieved in the actual situation in comparison to the optimal accountability
that would be achieved if all voters based their vote choice on policy indicators and
observed economic performance only. An index greater than 1 implies that intrinsic
policy preferences are less pronounced in the situation without any non policy voting.
A third intuitively conceivable measure of government accountability corresponds
to the possibility of the government to diverge from it’s current policy position. The
index can be calculated separately for all policy dimensions, d, and is defined as:
GAd3 =
xd2 − xd1
xmaxd − xmind
s.t. S(x1) ≥ 0.5 and S(x2) ≥ 0.5
(5.24)
While x1 represents the point farthest to the left side of the scale which still gains the
majority of votes, x2 represents the same on the right side. Further, (xmaxd − xmind )
is the range of the corresponding policy dimension. GA3 indicates the leeway of
the government to select a policy that pursues its own interests and the interests
of lobby groups against society’s will without loosing the election. Thus, the larger
GA3, the lower is c.p. government accountability. The index ranges from zero, which
indicates that every movement away from the current position will result in electoral
turnover, to one, which means that the governmental party can change its policy
position arbitrarily without any consequences for the election outcome.
5.2.2 Government Capture
The government chooses it’s optimal policy platform by maximizing a weighted
welfare function. Hence, the individual weights of each voter can be locally ap-
proximated ((βG + δG)), just like the weights of organized interest groups (αG) and
intrinsic policy preferences (ϑG). We define wv as the relative weight of an individual
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voter determining governmental policy results.
wv =
F jGGβj + δj
∑
k F
j
Gkδjkr
(βG + δG)
(5.25)
In the two party case wj can be rearranged to PjG(1−PjG). From this it follows that
the weight is maximized, when electoral competition is very close and all individuals
are indifferent between the two parties. As explained in detail below the relative
political weight of individual voters depends on the relative importance of policy and
non policy voting motives. Please note that a perfect democratic vote corresponds to
an equal relative weight for all voters (i.e., the weight of each voter equals 1
n
if n is the
total number of voters). If voters differ in the relative importance of voting motives,
they also have different voting weights; in particular, the relative importance of the
valence component in comparison to the policy oriented and retrospective voting
component determines the relative weights of voters.
Further, we can also derive the relative political weight of social groups. We define
social groups as partitions of the total society (e.g., rich versus poor or rural versus
urban voters), where T denotes the index of a social group. Thus, it holds:
wT =
∑
j∈T
wj (5.26)
Based on the political weights of social groups, we define governmental capture as
the average weight of a member of a social group T compared to the average political
weight of a member of another social group T’:
GC =
wT
wT ′
nT ′
nT
(5.27)
When GC > 1, the average weight of group T is greater than that of group T ′, which
indicates that group T captures group T ′. When GC < 1, it is just the other way
around and when GC = 1, both groups have the same average weight and no cap-
ture persists. The relative weight of an individual voter and hence of a social group
is determined by relative voting behavior, i.e., the relative importance of non policy
voting motives versus policy voting motives. Further, government capture results
from the lobbying activities of vested interest groups and is particularly pronounced
when not all members of society are equally organized into interest groups (Gross-
man and Helpman, 1994) or when the relative political weight of different interest
groups deviates from the corresponding population shares of the society members
organized in these interest groups (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). However, please
note that given our general theoretical framework, it follows that biased electoral
competition might compensate for biased incentives of politicians induced by asym-
metric lobbying activities and vice-versa. Imagine, for example a country with the
majority of people working in the agricultural sector, who are demanding agricul-
tural subsidies. The government of this country does not act accountable towards
the voter, but only towards interest groups. However, the most influential interest
group is the National Farmers Union, which also favors agricultural subsidies and
is lobbying for it’s members’ interests. After all, the government will implement
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agricultural subsidies because it is captured by the National Farmers Union and the
result will represent the interests of the majority of society, although government
accountability towards the voter is low. Thus, at least theoretically, although both
channels of interest mediation, election and lobbying, are biased still an unbiased
policy outcome might result. To analyze whether biased policy positions exist and
whether they result from missing accountability or capture, we calculate the policy
positions γ∗dG that corresponds to the optimal government policy position, if the
weights of interest groups and intrinsic policy preferences are zero (GA1=1).
γ∗dG =
n∑
j
wjxdj (5.28)
The government party G takes position γ∗dG on issue d, if they only act accountable
towards the voter. However, the position might still be biased by unequal voting
weights and capture. The optimal, unbiased government policy position, γ∗∗dG, results
as the simple mean of the voters’ policy positions, assuming that weights are equal
for every voter ( 1
n
).
γ∗∗dG =
1
n
n∑
j
xdj (5.29)
Comparing the empirical policy position γdG with the optimal policy position γ∗∗dG
gives information whether the policy positions are biased or not.
To measure the relative importance of different voting motives, we proceed as fol-
lows. First, for voting motives based on indicator variables controlled by parties (i.e.,
policy oriented voting based on party platforms and retrospective voting based on
observed economic development that is indirectly controlled by governmental party
choices), we use relative marginal effects of the different indicator variables. In par-
ticular, we define the marginal effect of an indicator variable κ on the governmental
party, as follows:
MEGκ =
∂SG
∂κ
(5.30)
Then we can define the following directional utility differentials:
MEP =
∑
κ∈P
|MEGκ| (5.31)
MER =
∑
κ∈R
|MEGκ| (5.32)
MENP =
∑
κ∈NP
|MEGκ| (5.33)
When we calculate the marginal effect of non policy voting we only consider those
variables that are manipulable by campaign expenditures. Although especially per-
sonal characteristics of the candidate and hence also the characteristics of the voter
are part of non policy voting they are not considered at this point. These charac-
teristics are not changeable by the policy maker within a short time horizon, which
is why they have no implication on the partial derivative of the vote share function.
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Finally, to assess the relative importance of different voting motives empirically, we
relate calculated relative marginal effects (RI) to the sum of all marginal effects:
RINP =
|MENP |
|MENP |+ |MEP |+ |MER| (5.34)
RIP =
|MEP |
|MENP |+ |MEP |+ |MER| (5.35)
RIR =
|MER|
|MENP |+ |MEP |+ |MER| (5.36)
Naturally the sum of all relative marginal effects adds up to one. When comparing
non policy and policy voting, the RI for retrospective voting can be added to the RI
of policy voting, as they both directly depend on policy positions and can be seen
as the counterpart of non policy voting.
Summarizing the above, we estimate a probabilistic voter model and describe
voting behavior as the relative importance of policy, non policy and retrospective
voting. Further, we measure government performance with the government account-
ability indices, GA1, GA2 and GA3, and individual specific and group specific voter
weights, wj. As the government performance indicators are derived theoretically
from the maximization of the incumbent’s support function, they are independent
of actual voting behavior. However, we assume that voting behavior and government
performance are linked. In particular we hypothesize that government accountabil-
ity is lower in countries where people vote mostly non policy oriented. Furthermore,
we expect to find a relationship between heterogeneity/capture and biased policy
outcomes. Of course the relationship can be verified theoretically from the Nash
Equilibrium, but because of the extreme value distributed error terms and the gen-
eral case of multiparty elections the procedure becomes very complicated. That is
why, for the time being we will choose a more modest approach and analyze the
relationship empirically. The theoretical verification is left for future research.
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Empirical Application

Chapter 6
Introduction of Case Study Countries
There exists a large body of empirical voter studies that analyze the behavior of
African voters (For example, see the literature overview of Hoffman and Long (2013),
Ferree and Horowitz (2010) or Bratton et al. (2011)). However, these empirical voter
studies mainly focus on the relative importance of different non policy factors, e.g.
ethnicity and regional origin, when determining African vote choice and do not relate
different voting motives with induced government performance (Ferree and Horowitz,
2010; Bratton et al., 2011; Hoffman and Long, 2013). At the methodological level,
the majority of the empirical African voter studies apply socio-structural theories
(e.g., the theory of Lazarsfeld et al. (1968) or Lipset and Rokkan (1967)) or social
psychological theories of voter behavior (Campbell et al., 1960). Hoffman and Long
(2013) published one of the few studies of voter behavior in Africa to mention the
importance of policy issues and the spatial theory of voting (Downs (1957) as well as
Enelow and Hinich (1984)). However, although these authors mention the relevance
of policy distances as variables of party choices, they fail to include these factors in
their empirical application (see Hoffman and Long, 2013). The neglect of policy-
oriented voting in African election studies is inapprehensible since spatial theory
of voting (Enelow and Hinich, 1984) has become the workhorse model of election
studies in industrialized countries (Adams et al., 2005).
Moreover, the few existing African voter studies that explicitly consider different
voter motives (e.g., economic versus ethnic voting or approval voting) only provide a
test of statistical significance without providing a measure of the relative importance
of different voting motives. One notable exception is the study by Bratton et al.
(2011), who computed the marginal effects of different indicators of ethnic and eco-
nomic voting. In particular, Bratton et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence from a
cross-country panel analysis that includes 16 African countries. In addition to eth-
nic identification, he also includes voters’ perception of the economic development
achieved under the current government as a particularly important determinant of
voters’ electoral choices.
In this context, the present application contributes to the literature by closing
existing research gaps. We measure voting behavior as the relative importance of
different voting motives: policy voting, non policy voting and retrospective voting.
By applying the theory introduced in the first part of this book, we explicitly consider
these voting motives and further analyze their impact on government performance.
To analyze voting behavior econometrically we estimate a multinomial logit model
as well as a latent class model, which is a comparatively new approach in political
voter studies. In this context it had only been applied a few times before, e.g.
by Hoffman and Long (2013), who analyzed voting behavior in Ghana applying a
latent class model. The latent class model explicitly includes heterogeneity of voters
in the analysis, which is necessary when measuring capture. Additionally we do not
only analyze a single country, but apply our theory empirically to three countries
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in Sub-Saharan Africa, namely Ghana, Senegal and Uganda. This enables us to
compare the results of the three countries and draw further conclusions on general
applicability of our approach. In the following we will briefly introduce the countries
of choice, Ghana, Senegal and Uganda.
The three case study countries are all located in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ghana and
Senegal are both situated in West Africa at the Atlantic coast, while Uganda is a
landlocked country in East Africa. Further, they differ in many other characteristics,
especially in their degree of democracy and economic development. While Senegal
witnessed its first real multiparty presidential elections in 1978, in Ghana they took
place almost 15 years later in 1992 and Ugandans only vote in multiparty presiden-
tial elections since 2005. In Senegal and Ghana several peaceful turnover of power
took place until now, while in Uganda Yowery Museveni has been in power without
interruption since 1986. The history of multiparty elections and turnovers is also
reflected in the Polity IV democracy index and Freedom House index (Marshall et
al., 2012; Freedom House, 2014). Polity IV measures the level of democracy, the
Polity Score ranges from -10 to +10. Countries with a score between -10 and -6
are classified as autocracies, when the score is between -5 and 5 they are considered
to be anocracies and finally democracies have a score between 6 and 10. Freedom
House on the other hand measures the freedom in the world, taking the mean of a
Civil Liberties and a Political Rights index to calculate the so-called Freedom Rat-
ing, which ranges from 1 (best) to 7 (worst). In Figure 6.1 the indices are depicted
for the period of 2005-2012 for all three case study countries. Ghana is the most
stable among them, has the highest democracy index and is considered to be the
most free country. Senegal is also classified as a democracy, but it’s score declined
from 8 to 7 in 2007 because President Wade further consolidated his power, which
finally led to an electoral boycott of the 2007 legislative elections by the opposition
parties. Freedom House considers Senegal a free country, the political rights rating
improved from 3 to 2 in 2013, after the successful turnover of power in 2012. Last
is Uganda, which has a Polity IV Score of one and is hence classified as anocracy.
Also the Freedom House rating is far behind the ratings of Ghana and Senegal, with
a score of 4.5 Uganda is only considered as a partly free country. Next to the polit-
ical differences also the economic status of the three countries diverges, Ghana and
Senegal are both lower middle income countries, while Uganda is still a low income
country. Though Uganda’s economy is growing with a GDP growth rate of 4.6%,
which is above the average growth rate of Sub-Saharan Africa (3.5%) and also above
the growth rate of Senegal (3.7%). Additionally Uganda’s growth rate is expected
to increase further and even overtake Ghana in the upcoming five years. Currently
Ghana’s economy is growing by a rate of 7.9%, but the expected growth rates for
the following years are decreasing. Hence, we expect Uganda to further improve it’s
income status in the near future.
To analyze voting behavior empirically, micro data is necessary that measures so-
ciodemographic variables, retrospective evaluation of government performance and
policy positions. Hence, we conducted our own voter survey in Ghana and Uganda,
whereas in Senegal we used Afrobarometer data, but were able to add several ques-
tions to the existing questionnaire. In all three countries the agricultural sector is
still very important for the local economy, in Ghana and Uganda the agriculture
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Figure 6.1: Freedom House and Polity IV indices
Source: Marshall et al. (2012); Freedom House (2014)
share of GDP is 21.5% and 23.1% respectively. In the case of Senegal it is only
14.9%, but still 77.5% of the people are employed in the agricultural sector. In
Uganda even 82% of the labor force work in agriculture and in Ghana 56%. Be-
cause of the importance of agriculture, we explicitly asked for policy positions on
agricultural policy issues in the voter survey. We assume that these are the relevant
issues in the elections for the voter as well as for the political parties. The biggest
advantage of our own surveys in Ghana and Uganda is that we did not only ask
for the voter’s own policy position, but also for his evaluation of the party’s policy
positions. Hence, we were able to calculate the perceived policy distance between
political parties and voters. In Senegal on the contrary, we only have the position
of the voter and had to calculate the policy position as the mean policy position of
those voters that voted for that particular party. Both approaches are applied in the
literature on voting behavior, though the first one includes more information and
is hence better suitable. An advantage of the Afrobarometer survey is it’s sample
size, 1200 people were interviewed in Senegal. In our own surveys we interviewed
601 individuals in Ghana and 624 in Uganda. After data cleaning and deletion of
missing values, we ended up with a sample size of 325 in Uganda, 333 in Ghana and
667 in Senegal. Summarizing the last two paragraph, we are applying our theoretical
analysis to three Sub-Saharan African countries that still rely very much on agri-
cultural policies. Ghana is the most developed country with more than 20 years of
experience with multi party elections and a comparatively well functioning economy;
Senegal has the longest history of multi party elections, but is lacking behind Ghana
in economic and democratic development; Finally, Uganda is still in the process of
becoming a democracy, has not witnessed an electoral turnover yet and only voted
in two multiparty presidential elections since 2005. Also economically Uganda is not
as developed as Ghana and Senegal, but is expected to increase economic growth
significantly in the following years and catch up with other countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
From the theoretical derivations in the former part, we expect that non policy
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voting reduces government accountability. Further, we hypothesized that hetero-
geneity in voting behavior leads to capture and biased policy positions. In the
following chapters we will estimate a probabilistic voter model for Ghana, Senegal
and Uganda, to analyze voting behavior and it’s implications on government per-
formance empirically. Each chapter will contain an introduction to the the country,
a short historical summary and a literature overview on voting behavior. After-
wards the data will be explained, before the actual voter model is estimated. We
put special emphasis on the issue of heterogeneity, which will be treated in a sepa-
rate section. Finally, we will combine voting behavior and government performance,
with our theoretically derived government performance indices. After each chapter
a summary is given. The second part of this book closes with a conclusion that
compares the results from the three empirical case studies.
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Ghana
Ghana is a country in Western Africa, bordering the Gulf of Guinea, located between
Cote d’Ivoire and Togo. It is divided into ten administrative regions (Western,
Central, Greater Accra, Volta, Eastern, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Nothern, Upper
East and Upper West) (see Figure 7.1). The population size of Ghana is 25.76
million, which is among the ten biggest states of Sub-Saharan Africa. The country
is home to many different ethnic groups, the dominant group is the Akan tribe with
a population share of 47.5%, 16.6% belong to the Mole-Dagbon tribe, 13.9% to the
Ewe tribe, 7.4% to the Ga-Dangme tribe and 5.7% to the Gurma tribe.
The country is considered to be one of the more stable nations in West Africa
and was categorized as a lower middle income country by the The World Bank
(2013) with a GNI per capita of $1550 in 2012. The economy mainly relies on cocoa,
gold and lately oil. Although agriculture is just providing 21.5% towards the GDP,
more than half of the workforce is employed in the agricultural sector (56%). The
oil production in Ghana just started in 2010 and led to a rapid GDP growth by
14.4% in 2011, the score dropped again to 7.9% in 2012, but still Ghana is currently
experiencing one of the highest growth rates in Sub-Saharan Africa (3.5% in 2012).
The Freedom House Index (Freedom House, 2014) considers Ghana to be a free
country, with a political rights rating of one and a civil rights rating of two. It
is further considered to be a democracy with a Polity IV score of eight in 2012
(Marshall et al., 2012).
7.1 From Independence to Democracy
Ghana was a British colony until 1957, when it became the first African country
that gained independence from the European colonization. In these years Kwame
Nkrumah ruled the country with his Convention People’s Party (CPP) first as prime
minister (1954-1960) and later as president when Ghana’s first republic was declared
in 1960 (1960-1966). Within only eight years Nkrumah led Ghana from being a
promising, ambitious country to a state were people were deeply unsatisfied with
the government and especially with their president. While Nkrumah visited Hanoi
in 1966, the army exploited his absence and forcefully took over power. After this
first military coup in Ghana a history of instability and changes of government began
(Osei-Kwame and Taylor, 1984). In 1966 the new regime stayed in office for three
years, until in 1969 elections took place and Dr. Kofi Busia was elected as president
of the second Ghanaian Republic. However, the economic situation did not improve
during Busias government. On the contrary, ethnic conflicts as well as regionalism
increased and corruption was once more on the rise. After a dramatic devaluation
of the Ghanaian Cedi, a second military coup took place in 1972 and terminated the
second republic of Ghana. After the coup a military government ruled until 1979,
when once more elections were scheduled. Against expectations shortly before the
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Figure 7.1: Administrative Regions in Ghana
Source: Map No. 4186 Rev. 3, February 2005, UNITED NATIONS
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election, Jerry Rawlings and a few other young officers forcefully took over power.
They claimed to free Ghana from their corrupt political and economical elite. De-
spite the repeated military coup the election took place in December 1979 and the
army moved back to the barracks. The new president Hilla Limann and his Peoples
National Party won the election with 62 percent of the vote, this marked the be-
ginning of the third Republic of Ghana. Limann’s way of government was close to
Nkrumas traditional way of governing. However, in two years of government he did
not succeed in fighting corruption nor the emerging shadow economy. Hence, in 1981
it was again Jerry Rawlings who took over power. This time he banned all political
parties and overthrew the constitution. He led the country in a socialistic way and
successfully fought corruption. But still economic success did not materialize and
Ghana suffered tough times in the mid to late eighties. Only in the beginning of
the nineties the tide turned. Inflation decreased and especially the situation of the
rural population finally improved. In the meantime the third wave of democratiza-
tion arrived in Sub-Saharan Africa. During this time many countries changed their
political system towards multi-party democracies (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997;
Lindberg, 2006). One of them was Ghana, where the first real multi-party election
took place in 1992, when incumbent Jerry Rawlings and the National Democratic
Party (NDC) were contested by the National Patriotic Party (NPP) with it’s candi-
date Albert Adu Boahen. Rawlings won the election and led Ghana into the Fourth
Republic.
7.2 Literature Overview
In Ghana until now six presidential and parliamentary elections under the demo-
cratic multi-party regime took place, whereof all apart from the first one were consid-
ered fair and free by international observers (Freedom House, 2011). There were two
peaceful transfers of power, 2000 when the NPP won the presidential election with
their candidate John Kufuor and 2008, when John Atta-Mills gained back power for
the NDC. Hence, Ghana passed Huntington’s Two Turnover Test and moved from
an emergent democracy to a stable democracy (Huntington, 1991). There exists a
broad range of literature on voting behavior during the past six elections, authors
mainly focused on regional and ethical voting patterns especially in 1992, 1996 and
2000. Though, beginning with the new century they changed path towards a more
policy oriented examination of voting behavior. The literature suggests that Ghana’s
democracy has matured over the past two decades. While the first election was nei-
ther fair nor free and later elections were mainly determined by ethical and regional
factors, the most recent elections were characterized by voters, who considered policy
factors, party attributes and past political performance of the incumbent.
The first multiparty election in 1992 was determined by a rural/urban split of the
population. Whereas rural regions supported the incumbent candidate Rawlings,
the urban constituencies favored the opposition parties. In his paper, Bawumia
(1998) drew a link between the distributional impacts of the Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) and the voting patterns of rural/urban voters. Especially rural areas
were benefiting from the SAP policies implemented by Rawlings and they rewarded
him with their votes at the ballot box. Although a rural/urban distribution of
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the election result is clearly observable and seems to confirm non policy voting,
the pattern also points in the direction of rational voting behavior. Voters are
rewarding the policies benefiting themselves (rural voters) and punishing those ones
that discriminate them (urban voters). Following the theory described in the former
section these people would base their vote mainly on policy issues, in this specific
case agricultural and SAP policy issues. For the election in 1996 a similar pattern
of voting behavior was observed, only voter segments changed from the rural/urban
divide to a more regional segmentation, mainly those people living in the center and
those living in the periphery. Again the central regions, which are basically urban
supported the NPP and the periphery which contains the Volta Region in the east,
the Western and Brong-Ahafo Regions in the west, and the Upper East and Upper
West regions in the north voted for the NDC (Nugent, 1999; Jeffries, 1998). These
rural/urban but also center/periphery divide is found in the literature throughout
all elections in Ghana. On the one hand there is the typical NPP voter, who lives
in the urban areas and cities, is well educated and belongs to the Asante tribe and
on the other hand is the NDC voter, who lives in rural regions, tends to be poor,
is less educated and identifies with the Ewe tribe (Whitfield, 2009; Lindberg, 2012).
After the first two election defeats the NPP realized it’s disadvantages in the rural
areas and increased campaign efforts especially in those regions for the 2000 election
(Lindberg, 2005). The change of strategy was successful and proved to be one of
the main reasons for the NPP victory in 2000. Lindberg (2005) addresses another
topic in his paper, he quantifies the amount of swing voters in Ghana. In his sample
he identifies only 18 percent swing voters compared to 82 percent core voters. The
reasons that lie behind being a swing voter are not yet discovered, no significant
differences in socioeconomic characteristics like age, education, gender etc. could be
found between core and swing voters in the studies so far.
The election result in 2004 was once more very close and in favor of the NPP.
Which suggests an incumbent advantage. The NDC used this advantage in the
elections 1992 and 1996, but still they lost their incumbency in 2000. From now
on the NPP had the advantage on their side and used it successfully in the fol-
lowing election in 2004 (Kelly, 2005). But once again the head start did not last
for long, the election in 2008 brought back power to the NDC, the result was as
close as it has never been before with the NDC winning in the run-off by less than
one-half of a percentage point. Ghana earned a lot of praise for their fifth election
which took place in a very professional manner. But although Ghana is growing
in it’s democracy still ethnicity and regional identification are playing an impor-
tant role during elections, especially the Ashanti (NPP) and Volta (NDC) region
strongly support their traditional candidates (Jockers et al., 2009). Hoffman and
Long (2013) conducted an exit poll on Election Day 2008, they questioned 4022
voters in 227 parliamentary constituencies. Their research focused mainly on an-
swering some of the questions that were swirling around in literature for the past
years using econometric evidence. In their paper they investigate the role of ethnic-
ity, other voter characteristics like education, income etc., party identification and
retrospective evaluations on voting behavior. Their results show that the well known
core voters that were described earlier do exist, but the ability of only this factor to
explain election results is poor. Candidates performance and the general economic
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conditions do also shape vote choice and most importantly party identification. The
finding that party identification is responsible for vote choice is not surprising, as
it is part of the definition of core voters (Lindberg, 2005). In general Hoffman and
Long (2013) describe Ghanaians as voters who actually consider policy platforms
and political performance rather than use simple ethnic bloc voting. Unfortunately
they do not measure policy issues explicitly which leaves a gap in the literature on
voting behavior in Ghana.
The most current election in 2012 were overshadowed by the death of President
John Atta-Mills in July 2012. Following the constitution the vice president John
Dramani Mahama became the interims president for the time until the upcom-
ing election in December 2012 (Pryce and Oidtmann, 2014). He was also chosen
to represent the NDC as their presidential candidate. The NPP nominated Nana
Akufo-Addo as their candidate. Although a total of 16 political parties were reg-
istered for the election, only the NDC and NPP had a serious chance to gain the
majority of votes. All other parties won only very limited votes and struggled with
a result of five percent. Finally, the result of the 2012 election was not as close as
expected and as the previous election in 2008. Mahama gained 50.7% in the first
round and hence rendered a second round unnecessary. His opponent Akufo-Addo
was defeated, he only won 47.7% of the vote.
Taking the very close electoral outcomes of the recent elections in Ghana into
account, the role every single voter plays for the outcome of the election result is
enormous. Consequently electoral competition should serve as a fundamental demo-
cratic mechanism and guarantee that governmental policies reflect society’s interests.
Whether this is the case in Ghana has not been analyzed in the literature so far.
Which is why we will estimate a probabilistic voter model and analyze voting be-
havior in Ghana empirically with data gathered just before the 2012 presidential
election. In comparison to previous studies, we measure voting behavior holistically,
by including policy oriented voting, non policy oriented voting and retrospective
voting. Further, the impact of voting behavior on government performance espe-
cially on government accountability and capture is analyzed, which will give valuable
information on the state of democracy in Ghana.
7.3 Data Description
Data on voting behavior is still scarce especially in developing countries and although
Afrobarometer provides an excellent set of data, some questions necessary for the
analysis of elections and its implications on government performance are missing
(Lindberg, 2012). For example, voter’s as well as party’s positions on policy issues
are rarely available. Additionally the timing of most surveys is not planned according
to upcoming elections, which is crucial for voter surveys. Because of this drawbacks
we conducted our own voter survey in Ghana during September 2012. With regard
to the presidential election that took place in Ghana at the 7th of December, we
assumed most Ghanaians have made up their mind about the upcoming election,
providing reliable data on the actual voting decision. Further, all political parties
have identified their issues for the upcoming election and chosen their candidates
respectively. The fieldwork, which we conducted when election campaigning was in
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full progress, confirmed our assumptions.
7.3.1 Sampling Procedure
The voter survey in Ghana was drawn on a national probability sample. The sam-
ple design provides a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age. This
objective was achieved by strictly applying random selection methods at every stage
of sampling and by applying sampling with probability proportionate to popula-
tion size. The sample design is a clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability
sample. At a first stage the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) were randomly se-
lected, further the sample was stratified by agri ecological zones, residential locality
(urban/rural) and sub-national area (North/South). PSUs are the smallest, well-
defined geographic units for which reliable population data is available. In Ghana,
this is the census Enumeration Areas (EAs). In a next step the EAs were identified
on maps and a list of all households was prepared. In total 20 EAs were randomly
selected from over 4500 EAs in Ghana based on the 2000 population census. In
each EA 30 households were again randomly selected for interviews. To ensure that
women were not under represented, there is a gender stratum of an equal number
of men and women in the overall sample. To accomplish this stratum, the gender of
the respondent was alternated after each interview.
The interviews were conducted face-to-face in the respective first language of the
interviewee. All interviewers were intensively prepared and trained before the actual
survey, to guarantee a smooth interview procedure.
7.3.2 Questionnaire and Variables
The sample contains 601 individuals from twenty different districts across Ghana.
The questionnaire includes questions on socioeconomic characteristics, voting be-
havior, policy positions and network characteristics. It is very similar to the Afro-
barometer surveys in many ways but also includes additional questions and abandons
some of the questions that are not necessary for analyzing voting behavior (e.g. is-
sues regarding taxation or gender). Especially missing questions asking for policy
positions have strongly restricted the applicability of probabilistic voter models in
former surveys. Thus in this survey policy positions were explicitly asked. The seven
different policy issues, include general economic/social issues but also issues focusing
particularly on agricultural policies (taxation or support of agricultural sector).
For further analysis some observations were deleted from the sample. This was
especially due to missing values concerning the vote choice question, but also missing
values concerning voters’ own policy position. After data cleaning 333 complete
observations remained for the analysis of voting behavior. In the following part
variables used in the analysis are introduced and explained in more detail. For
comprehensibility the variables are split up into dependent and independent variables
and into their category of voting: policy, retrospective and non policy.
Dependent Variable A probabilistic voter model is estimating vote choice. De-
pending on the kind of data available actual or intended vote choice is used as the
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dependent variable. Just like in the Afrobarometer survey, in our questionnaire
respondents were asked:
B2. If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would
you vote for?
additionally we asked respondents about their general intention to vote in the next
election:
B5. Do you already know whether you will vote in the elections in December?
92% responded yes, I will definitely take part in the election, 3% said they will not
vote, 4% did not know yet and only four people did not reply. Our results overesti-
mate the actual turnout of the presidential election (official turnout was 79.43%) by
12%. The result is a well known problem in voter studies, as turnout is often over
reported in voter surveys. People misreport whether they vote or not, because they
are aware of the fact that the act of voting is socially desirable. The phenomenon is
known as the social desirability response bias (Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010). Still,
we expected that the vote choice question gives a good approximation of the actual
vote choice, as the timing of the survey is close to the next presidential election
(Bratton et al., 2012). In total 394 (66%) respondents answered the question cor-
rectly and named a valid political party, while 207 did not reply accordingly. Table
7.1 shows the results of the survey (n=394) as well as the official election results of
the presidential elections in 2008 and 2012 (Nonvoters were not considered). The
Table 7.1: Presidential election results from Ghana
NDC NPP CPP PPP PNC other
Presidential election 2008 47.76 49.32 1.34 - 0.87 0.70
Presidential election 2012 50.70 47.74 0.18 0.59 0.22 0.57
Own survey 2012 48.73 45.69 0.76 1.78 0.25 2.79
Source: African Elections Database (2014a), own survey
survey results are quite close to the actual election results, which confirms the re-
liability of the data. Furthermore, the numbers show that election campaigning is
rather a two-party then a multi-party contest. NDC and NPP are the only political
parties that are able to decide the electoral competition in favor of themselves. For
further analysis the remaining small parties (CPP, PPP, PNC and other parties)
were dropped, hence Ghana will be treated as a two party case.
Independent Variables
Policy Voting Voting decisions are affected by policy issues. In political theory it
is assumed that on the one hand political parties take different positions on policy
issues, depending on their kind of electoral strategy. On the other hand citizens
also vary in their positions on different policy issues. E.g. a farmer might be
more interested in agricultural policies and take a protective position on this issue,
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while someone working in the non-agricultural, industrial sector will rather demand
taxation of the agricultural sector. The agricultural sector is very important in
Ghana and provides work for more than 50% of the population, hence we expect that
especially agricultural issues have to be considered when analyzing voting behavior.
In the questionnaire respondents were confronted with seven different policy issues,
for each issue they were requested to place themselves and the four main parties
(NDC, NPP, PNC and CPP)1 on a five point scale. Each issue was presented with
two endpoint statements (The exact phrasing of the questions can be found in the
questionnaire printed in the Annex of this book).
• 1-Agree with liberal policies, 5-Disagree with liberal policies (liberal)
• 1-Tax revenues should be used to provide public goods, 5-Tax revenues should
be used to improve economic growth (economic)
• 1-Economic growth shall be achieved through the agricultural sector, 5-Economic
growth shall be achieved through the industrial (non-agricultural) sector (agrvsind)
• 1-Economic growth through technological progress, 5-Economic growth through
better market access (tpvsma)
• 1-Promotion of cash crops, 5-Promotion of food crops (cashvsfoodcrops)
• 1-Agricultural sector should be taxed, 5-Agricultural sector should be sup-
ported (taxvsprotect)
• 1-Governmental decision making process without the population, 5-Governmental
decision making process including the population (weakvsstrongstate)
While the first two statements measure general policy issues, the latter are specific
for the study of agricultural policy positions in developing countries. In Figure 7.2
the distribution of voters’ policy positions is plotted for rural and urban residents.
Ghanaians have a very strong aversion against liberal policies (liberal), which were
described as legalizing abortion, homosexual marriage etc. Almost ninety percent
strongly disagree with these liberal policies and only 5.1% are neutral or agree with
liberal policies. The result is almost identical for rural and for urban regions. For
the second issue, economic, the general opinion is not as clear. While 61% of the
rural population favor the provision of public goods, only 57% of the urban popu-
lation think the same. Twenty two percent of them would rather use tax money to
improve economic growth and economic development compared to 14% of the rural
population. The majority of Ghanaians (58%) wants to achieve economic growth
via the agricultural sector. The rural population is mainly dependent on agriculture
and hence advances the view to support the agricultural sector stronger than the
urban population (agrvsind). One third of the urban people does not favor one
alternative over the other, they choose to position themselves in between both state-
ments. This kind of behavior is not specific for the issue agrvsind, but also occurs
for the issues economic, tpvsma and cashvsfoodcrops. It seems that urban
people do not have a strong opinion concerning the agricultural issues. Agricultural
growth should be achieved mainly through technological progress, 63% (46%) of the
1For later analysis only responses for the NDC and NPP were taken into account as the election
campaign is almost solely a duel between the two.
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rural (urban) people agree with this statement. Only 17% (23%) want to achieve
growth through market access. The question whether economic growth should be
achieved through the promotion of cash crops or food crops shows a clear separation
between rural and urban respondents. In the rural areas, people are dependent on
the production of food crops for their own consumption. Hence, they rather claim
that the promotion of food crops (45%) is supported, while only one third of the
urban people think so. In urban areas people mainly buy their food on local mar-
kets and do not grow it themselves, that is why for them the promotion of the more
profitable cash crops is rather desirable. The issue of taxation or protection of the
agricultural sector is again very clear (taxvsprotect). 85% want the agricultural
sector to be supported. For this issue the difference between rural and urban areas
is not as pronounced, though more people from the urban areas would like to tax
the agricultural sector. The last policy issue is especially important for developing
countries that moved from an autocratic government to a democratic government
(weakvsstrongstate). In Ghana the population is demanding democracy and
involvement of the citizens. 71% agree or strongly agree with the statement that it
is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that
means it makes decisions more slowly. Interestingly the usually better informed and
better educated urban people have on average a slightly more autocratic opinion on
this issue than the rural population.
Besides their own policy positions, respondents were also asked to evaluate the
policy positions of the main political parties. In the case of Ghana we assume that
the true party position corresponds to the mean of the perceived party positions of
all voters. But as people are not fully rational they make mistakes when estimating
policy positions, with the survey data we are able to calculate the cognition error for
each voter. Figure 7.3 shows the positions of NDC and NPP as well as the distribu-
tion of the voters perceived positions of both parties. Figure 7.3 also shows that the
policy positions of NDC and NPP are very similar on all seven policy issues. The
NDC is a little bit closer to the rural interests, as they are positioned further towards
the support of the agricultural sector, want the sector to be supported instead of
taxed and also favor the promotion of food crops. But as already mentioned before,
the differences are only marginal and do not allow to draw any further conclusions
on differences in policy programs between the NDC and NPP. Both parties strongly
disagree with liberal policies. Their position on the issue economic is not as clear,
tax money shall be spend almost equally for public goods and economic growth.
Further, on the issues cash crops vs. food crops, technological progress vs. market
access and agricultural vs. industrial sector, both parties also take a position in
between the endpoint statements. The support of the agricultural sector is equally
important for both parties, they take an identical position of 4.3. Finally, NDC as
well as NPP demand a rather weak state apparatus with lots of involvement of the
population in the political process and government accountability towards society.
In industrialized countries political parties take positions to distinguish themselves
from other political parties, in Germany for example the CDU is always classified on
the right side of the SPD (Shikano and Pappi, 2004). The same is true for Repub-
licans and Democrats in the US. However, in developing countries and especially in
young democracies most political parties do not differ very much from each other in
61
Chapter 7 Ghana
1 3 4 5
agree with Liberal policies vs. disagree with liberal policies
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
public goods vs. economic growth
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
agricultural sector vs. industrial sector
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
technological progress vs. market access
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
cash crops vs. food crops
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
taxation vs. protection
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
weak vs. strong state
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
agree with Liberal policies vs. disagree with liberal policies
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
public goods vs. economic growth
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
agricultural sector vs. industrial sector
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
technological progress vs. market access
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
cash crops vs. food crops
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
taxation vs. protection
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
weak vs. strong state
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Rural Urban
Figure 7.2: Voter positions in Ghana
Source: own data
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their policy positions or party manifestos (Ottaway, 1999; van de Walle, 2003; Erd-
mann, 2004). Taking the results from Figure 7.3 we can confirm this assumption. For
further analysis, policy distances were calculated from voters’ policy positions and
their perceived party positions. To additionally emphasize greater policy distances
and get rid of the algebraic sign, the squared distance is used for the estimation of
the probabilistic voter model.
Retrospective voting In the survey questions considering sociotropic voting as
well as pocketbook voting were asked. Further, time was added as an additional
dimension - past, present and future. In total there are six questions in the survey
dealing with the issue of the economic situation of the country and one’s own personal
living conditions. Expecting the variables to be correlated, we conducted a factor
analysis to reduce the number of variables in the model2. Interestingly the factors
did not merge on sociotropic or pocketbook voting but on the time dimension. End-
ing up with three factors: retro-future, retro-present, retro-past. Both
variables concerning the present situation give a rather negative impression, almost
60% of the Ghanaians consider the current economic/living conditions as very bad
or fairly bad. When evaluating the situation compared to twelve month ago, 40%
say that the situation has not changed, but 30% think that the situation has im-
proved. The assessment of their own living conditions is slightly more positive than
that of the country’s economic conditions. Finally, the evaluation of the future is
very positive, almost 90% expect that the situation will be better or much better in
twelve month time. Although we have to point out that the question for future gov-
ernmental performance and personal well being included a large amount of missing
values. While more than 90% answered the questions considering past and present
conditions, only 68% had an opinion concerning the future economic condition of the
country and 73% concerning their own living conditions in twelve month time. The
finding suggests that for many Ghanaians the near future (the next twelve month)
is associated with a relative high degree of uncertainty.
Non policy voting To account for non policy voting a whole set of sociodemo-
graphic variables as well as some variables that measure approval with the president
were included. Whether someone approves or disapproves with the president’s per-
formance depends on many different factors. Following the theory described in
chapter 5 we assume that approval with the president is mainly a valence issue,
strongly manipulable by election campaigning. To measure approval with the pres-
ident we factor analyzed seventeen questions asking how well or badly the current
government is handling the following matters? (e.g. managing the economy, creat-
ing jobs or empowering women). The result is again a three factor solution featuring
perf-economy, perf-social, perf-infrastructure. Most variables are bal-
anced out with negative and positive evaluations. Matters that are perceived to be
handled rather bad by the government are: keeping prices down, narrowing the gap
between the rich and the poor and fighting corruption in government. Issues that are
2The models were also estimated with all variables included, which did not change the results
significantly.
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handled pretty well are: reducing crime, improving basic health services, addressing
educational needs, providing water and sanitation services, resolving violent conflicts
between communities, combating HIV/AIDS and empowering women.
Further, sociodemographic variables were included in the model. The main regions
(volta, central, ashanti, nothern) and ethnicities (akan, ga, ewe, mole)
are coded as dummy variables, as well as gender, rural and farming. Further-
more, information on household expenditures, age and education are also part
of the model framework. To measure peoples’ awareness of politics, they were also
asked: To what extent would you say you are interested in politics (polint). Some
descriptive statistics can be found in Table 7.2. In the sample 52% of the respon-
dents belong to the Akan tribe, which is about 4% more then their population share
in the last national census (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). The other tribes
are represented according to their population share, though the Ga-Dangme and
Gruma are slightly underrepresented, while the Guan and Grusi are slightly over-
represented. The gender stratification in the sampling strategy led to a balanced
proportion of men and women. The rural population is heavily underrepresented
with only 26%, in the last census 48% of the population were considered to live in
rural areas. The mean household expenditures in Ghana are 300 Ghana Cedi (GHS)
per month, which equals about $1023. However, household expenditures range from
0GHS to 4500GHS, which reflects the unequal income distribution in the country.
The income Gini coefficient of Ghana is 42.8 and the richest 10% of the population
have 14.1 times as much income as the poorest 10%. For comparison the Gini coef-
ficient of Germany is 28.3 and the richest 10% have only 6.9 times as much income
as the poorest 10%. Another method to measure income is the Lived Poverty Index
(LPI) that calculates the mean of the following questions: Over the past year, how
often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without -enough food to eat?;
- enough clean water for home use?; - medicines or medical treatment?; - enough
fuel to cook for food?; - a cash income?. Possible answers were, never – just once
or twice – several times – many times – always (Mattes, 2008). It follows that the
poverty level is low, when the index is close to zero and high, when it is close to
four. For our sample the LPI equals 0.66. The score is close to the LPI score for
the Afrobarometer data (0.61), which classifies Ghana as the country with the third
lowest LPI. The mean age of the sample is 38 years, the youngest participant is 18
years old and the oldest 82 years. In the sample 22% have never been to school, most
of them are older than 30 years. The majority of the younger generation visited at
least primary school, but many of them also went to secondary school. Only 3% of
the sample enjoyed tertiary education. The general interest in politics also differs
very much from person to person, 26% are not at all interested in politics, 22% are
not very interested, 27% are somewhat interested and 25% are very interested.
7.4 Estimation of Voting Behavior
The literature on African politics has mainly postulated that Africans tend to vote
non policy oriented and clientelistic instead of rational and policy oriented (Horowitz,
31GHS = $0.34
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Table 7.2: Description of survey data
N mean sd CI-left CI-right min max
Retrospective Variables
Ghana (present)1 333 2.429 0.073 2.287 2.572 1 5
Personal (present) 333 2.563 0.074 2.417 2.709 1 5
Ghana (past) 333 3.049 0.054 2.942 3.155 1 5
Personal (past) 333 3.179 0.052 3.077 3.282 1 5
Ghana (future) 333 3.900 0.042 3.818 3.981 1 5
Personal (future) 333 4.015 0.041 3.936 4.095 1 5
Government Performance
perf-economy 333 -0.050 0.947 -0.152 0.052 -2.418 2.376
perf-social 333 -0.020 0.895 -0.116 0.076 -2.430 2.110
perf-infra 333 0.031 0.803 -0.055 0.117 -2.173 2.249
Sociodemographic Characteristics
rural2 333 0.261 0.440 0.214 0.309 0 1
gender3 333 0.495 0.501 0.442 0.549 0 1
age 333 38.249 15.270 36.609 39.889 18 82
education4 333 2.790 1.396 2.640 2.940 1 7
farmer5 333 0.474 0.500 0.421 0.528 0 1
expenditures6 333 300.066 412.775 255.732 344.400 0 4500
polint7 332 2.518 1.136 2.396 2.640 1 4
Regions
western 333 0.099 0.299 0.067 0.131 0 1
central 333 0.081 0.273 0.052 0.110 0 1
greater accra 333 0.078 0.269 0.049 0.107 0 1
volta 333 0.105 0.307 0.072 0.138 0 1
eastern 333 0.150 0.358 0.112 0.189 0 1
ashanti 333 0.165 0.372 0.125 0.205 0 1
brong ahafo 333 0.105 0.307 0.072 0.138 0 1
nothern 333 0.120 0.326 0.085 0.155 0 1
upper east 333 0.057 0.232 0.032 0.082 0 1
upper west 333 0.039 0.194 0.018 0.060 0 1
Tribes
akan 333 0.520 0.500 0.466 0.573 0 1
ga/dangme 333 0.030 0.171 0.012 0.048 0 1
ewe 333 0.138 0.346 0.101 0.175 0 1
guan 333 0.051 0.220 0.027 0.075 0 1
gruma 333 0.027 0.162 0.010 0.044 0 1
mole dagbon 333 0.156 0.364 0.117 0.195 0 1
grusi 333 0.054 0.226 0.030 0.078 0 1
mande 333 0.012 0.109 0.000 0.024 0 1
other 333 0.012 0.109 0.000 0.024 0 1
1 1=very bad, 5=very good; 2 1=rural, 0=urban; 3 1=women, 0=men; 4 1=no schooling,
7=tertialry education; 5 1=farmer, 0=no farmer; 6 in GHS; 7 1=not at all interested,
4=very interested
Source: own data
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Table 7.3: Voting motives in Ghana
very very
unimportant unimportant important important
character 1.83 4.66 25.12 64.89
outer appearance 20.80 32.11 24.79 19.30
ethnic origin 30.12 44.43 13.48 9.65
regional origin 29.28 44.09 14.64 9.32
political knowledge 3.33 6.32 34.28 51.25
party affiliation 10.82 19.13 32.95 33.94
past political performance 1.66 4.83 31.45 58.07
election campaign 14.98 18.47 29.78 33.11
Source: own data
1985; Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008; Bratton et al., 2011; Eifert et al., 2010; Hoffman
and Long, 2013). To get a first impression how voters make their voting decision
in Ghana, Table 7.3 shows what Ghanaians replied when they were asked directly
about their voting motives.
C17. When you consider voting for a certain candidate, which of the following
things are important for your choice?
From their responses it seems that only one out of ten Ghanaians thinks that ethnic
or regional origin is very important for their vote choice, on the other hand almost
60% find that past political performance is very important. The most important
determinant in electoral competition in Ghana however seems to be the character
of the candidate, more then 90% think that the candidates’ character is important
or very important for their vote choice. Unfortunately character is a concept that
involves many latent variables and is therefore hard to interpret. Someone may
appeal to have a good character, because he rules the country when the economy is
booming (retrospective), because he is postulating policy positions that are close to
ones own (issue voting) or because he is charismatic and belongs to a well known
family (non policy voting). This way of getting behind the question why voters vote
for a certain party gives a first direction, but does not create any deeper knowledge.
The first description of voting behavior in Table 7.3 leads to the hypothesis that in
Ghana retrospective voting is the most important voting motive, closely followed by
policy voting and non policy voting. In a next step we estimate a probabilistic voter
model with our own survey data to examine to which extend the hypothesis is true
and which other factors influence African voting behavior.
7.4.1 Multinomial Logit Model
With the data described in the former section we estimated different specifications
of a multinomial logit model (ML). The ML was chosen because alternative specific
as well as individual specific variables are important to explain voting behavior and
hence have to be included in the model specification. From model one to model
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five explanatory variables were added stepwise to improve model fit. All model
specifications take the NDC as reference party which means that the individual
specific variables have to be interpreted in comparison to the incumbent party NDC.
Model one is a purely policy oriented model, it contains all policy distances and
an alternative specific constant. The constant absorbs all information that is not
explicitly included in the model. From model one to model five the constant is
gradually split up into retrospective voting motives, performance indicators, ethnic
and regional dummies and sociodemographic characteristics. Table 7.4 shows the
estimation results. The goodness of fit significantly increases from model one to
model five. McFadden’s R2 is 0.24 in the first model and increases to 0.67 in the fifth
model. The first model shows the importance of policy oriented voting, five of seven
policy issues are significant and all of them show the theoretically expected negative
sign indicating that greater distances between a voter and a political party reduce
the probability to vote for the parties’ candidate. Retrospective voting increases
the explanatory power of the model further, apart from the factor future both other
factors are negative and significant. This was expected as the probability to vote
for the opposition party usually decreases when a voter’s evaluation of the economic
situation of the country and of his own personal situation is positive. Analogously,
we expected the performance indicators, which were added in model specification
three, to have negative coefficients. The three additional variables further increase
the R2 by twenty percentage points and therefore have major impact on voting
behavior in Ghana. Models four and five basically include variables that account
for sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents. In Ghana only the two
big ethnic groups Akan and Ewe have significant influence on voting behavior and
also regional voting is only significant in one region, the Central region. From the
other sociodemographic variables solely education influences voting behavior, while
interest in politics, residential locality, age, farming background and expenditures
are not significant. From the literature introduced in the former section we were
expecting to find significant influence of residential locality on vote choice, which
is not the case. Hence, it seems that rural and urban voting patterns were not as
important for the last presidential election as they were in the foregoing elections.
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Finally, Model 6 in the last column is a reduced model specification that is con-
sidered to be the optimal model. It was derived by stepwise omitting independent
variables and testing via likelihood ratio test whether the removal of the variables
actually deteriorated the model fit. The model presented here proved to be the best
one considering this test. Model 6, is a mixture of the previous models with all
variables being significant and a McFadden’s R2 of 0.66. Interestingly the coefficient
for retro-present changed it’s algebraic sign from negative to positive, which is
in contrary to the theory of retrospective voting. A positive evaluation of the cur-
rent political situation has positive influence on the opposition party and not on the
incumbent. This can be a sign that the opposition is a powerful player in the current
government and voters reward them for their political actions. The evaluation of
government performance has negative coefficients, just as expected beforehand. Bet-
ter performance increases the probability to vote for the governmental party. The
hypothesis that the Asante (akan) mainly support the NPP while the ewe support
the NDC is also confirmed. From the regional dummies only central is left in the
optimal model, the coefficient is negative and hence in favor of the NDC. The result
is surprising as the NDC is usually close to the rural population and the Central
Region is rather considered to be urban, traditionally a stronghold for the NPP.
education has positive impact on voting for the NPP, which goes in line with the
assumption that the traditional NPP voter lives in urban areas, has a better income
and a higher education level.
Because the probabilistic voter model is a logistic regression model the coeffi-
cients cannot be interpreted as straightforward as in a linear regression analysis.
Furthermore, the direction of the effect is meaningful, but for broader interpretation
marginal effects or elasticities have to be consulted. Considering policy voting, the
marginal effects of each issue are very small. On average, when the NDC changes its
position on the policy issue cashvsfoodcrops by one unit, it results in an proba-
bility change of 0.3%. The marginal effect can be positive or negative depending on
the policy position of the individual, hence we also calculated the absolute marginal
effect for each policy issue. In the case of cashvsfoodcrops the absolute effect
equals 5.5%. The effect of changing the policy position on the issue taxvsprotect
has an even lower and negative effect on the probability to vote for the NDC (-0.2%).
The absolute change in probability is 3%. The biggest influence and hence potential
stems from the issue weakvsstrongstate, changing the position on this issue
yields an average probability change of 0.3% and an absolute probability change of
9%. Figure 7.4 shows the effects of changing policy positions for both parties for
the issue of weakvsstrongstate graphically. The bar charts in the background
display the distribution of the voters’ policy positions on this issue. It is striking out
that there is hardly any difference between the two political parties. Actually the
NPP is the dominant party for most of the scenarios, the NDC only gets more votes
then its political opponent when taking a position close to four (weak government).
The maximum of the curve is situated at 3.78 with a probability to vote for the
incumbent of 50.17%. The status quo position of the NDC, 3.85, is already very
close to the optimal position. Although the marginal effects of the policy issues are
small, policy voting is important in Ghana. When considering Figure 7.4 it becomes
obvious that moving away from their current position will lead to a reduction of vote
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Figure 7.4: Changing policy positions: weakvsstrongstate
Source: own data
share for both political parties. Hence, they stick to their almost identical policy
positions to maximize their vote share. The finding goes in line with the rational
theory of voting in a two party case, where both political parties locate at the median
position.
Non policy voting is cognitive less challenging for the electorate and offers a wider
range for political parties to differ from each other, hence it is expected that marginal
effects are more pronounced for retrospective voting and performance voting. In-
deed, retrospective voting, has a negative effect of four percentage points on the
election probability of the NDC for npp-retro-present, while the effect of npp-
retro-past is positive (7%). When considering performance voting, especially
improving npp-perf-economy gains additional votes (12%), but also npp-perf-
social and npp-perf-infra yield eight and seven percentage points respectively.
The marginal effect of education is -2%, increasing the education level would re-
duce the chances of the NDC and improve the chances of the opposition party, NPP.
Greater marginal effects are visible for the dummy variables of region and ethnicity.
When all voters belong to the Akan tribe, the NPP gains 30% and would doubtlessly
win the election. The opposite effect holds true if the whole country would belong
to the Ewe tribe, then the NDC gains 26%. In contrast to ethnicity the effect of
living in the Central region is only small. The NDC gains additional 13 percentage
points. Although the effects of region and ethnicity are significantly bigger than the
effects of retrospective voting and policy oriented voting, there is little scope for the
political parties to benefit from them, as both region and ethnicity cannot simply be
changed through political action. These characteristics are a matter of a country’s
census and therefore constant in the medium to long run. Quite the contrary to the
perception of government performance, which is considered to be very influenceable
by election campaigning and interest group spending. Hence, trying to influence the
perception of government performance (positively for the incumbent party and neg-
atively for the opposition party) is the most efficient instrument to gain additional
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Figure 7.5: RI of non policy, policy and retrospective voting
Source: own data
votes. However, it is also the most expensive and favors the incumbent.
For further interpretation of the importance of the different voting motives, we
do not only compare the marginal effects but rather concentrate on the relative
importance of each of the voting motives RINP , RIR and RIP . When calculating
the RIs, valence voting only contains the performance factors and not the individual
characteristics, because they are not adjustable by actions of the governmental party.
The relative importance is biggest for non policy voting with an average of 60%
followed by policy voting with 32% and last is retrospective voting with only 8%.
Figure 7.5 shows the distribution of the RI indicators as a density plot.
7.4.2 Heterogeneity
In the ML model non policy voting was identified to be the driving force in elections
in Ghana. But the relative importance of policy voting as well as non policy vot-
ing ranges widely, while retrospective voting is mainly distributed around 10% with
little variance. Although the mean RI for policy voting is 32%, there are also some
individuals who have a relative importance of 69% and hence lower RI’s for non pol-
icy and retrospective voting. The same is true for non policy voting, the maximum
RI is 88% and the minimum RI is 27%. Voting motives are not equally important
for every voter, they differ from person to person. For further insight into the het-
erogeneity of voting behavior, Figure 7.6 shows the distribution for policy and non
policy voting voting depending on whether someone lives in a rural or urban area.
From the literature overview in section 7.2 we are already aware of the importance
of the place of residence on voting behavior. In general people from rural areas have
a lower education level and less access to information, that is why we hypothesize
that these citizens will especially rely on non policy voting instead of policy voting
to determine their vote choice. The opposite is expected from the urban population,
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Figure 7.6: RI of non policy and policy voting in rural and urban areas
Source: own data
who would vote more policy oriented and less non policy oriented. In comparison to
the different electoral outcomes in rural and urban areas, the differences in voting
behavior are small and actually the other way around than expected. Rural voters
vote slightly more policy oriented, while urban voters focus more on non policy vot-
ing. In Figure 7.6 it was attempted to explain the differences in voting behavior by
splitting the sample in rural and urban voters. Although small differences between
rural and urban voters are visible they cannot sufficiently explain the heterogeneity
in voting behavior found in Figure 7.5. In the past years econometric methods were
further developed and some of the new approaches also found their way into political
studies analyzing voting behavior. One of them is the latent class approach, which
we will apply to further explain the heterogeneity that was already discovered in the
ML model.
In the former section we found out that voting behavior is heterogeneous in Ghana.
Depending on the personal characteristics of a voter, his voting behavior and also his
vote choice varies. The estimated latent class model consists of two sub models, the
choice model that determines which alternative is chosen and the class model that
estimates class membership. In the class membership model the personal character-
istics are explicitly included as covariates. In the case of Ghana the choice model
was held constant with only the variables on issue voting, retrospective voting and
performance voting included. For the class model different model specifications were
tested. All models were estimated with one, two, three and four classes respectively.
Independent of the model specification the three and four class models did not con-
verge and hence cannot be considered any further4. Table 7.5 shows the overview
statistics of each estimation. Model 1 does not include any covariates that further
4Because of the occurrence of local maxima, often latent class models do not converge, especially
when the number of estimated classes is high (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005).
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Table 7.5: Comparison of different LC model specifications
LL BIC AIC AIC3 CAIC Npar df Class.Err. Pred.Err. Conv.
MCL Model
1-Class -79.16 233.83 184.33 197.33 246.83 13 320 0.00 0.10 yes
Model 1: no covariates
1-Class -116.67 285.61 251.34 260.34 294.61 9 324 0.00 0.18 yes
2-Class -97.94 306.24 233.88 252.88 325.24 19 314 0.35 0.02 yes
3-Class -86.81 342.07 231.63 260.63 371.07 29 304 0.53 0.01 no
4-Class -85.14 396.79 248.27 287.27 435.79 39 294 0.57 0.00 no
Model 2: Akan, Ewe, Central, Education
1-Class -116.67 285.61 251.34 260.34 294.61 9 324 0.00 0.18 yes
2-Class -67.93 269.44 181.86 204.86 292.44 23 310 0.06 0.06 yes
3-Class -47.62 310.14 169.24 206.24 347.14 37 296 0.15 0.02 no
4-Class -44.26 384.73 190.51 241.51 435.73 51 282 0.24 0.00 no
Model 3: Akan, Central, Education
1-Class -116.67 285.61 251.34 260.34 294.61 9 324 0.00 0.18 yes
2-Class -68.11 264.01 180.23 202.23 286.01 22 311 0.06 0.05 yes
3-Class -52.02 307.32 174.03 209.03 342.32 35 298 0.16 0.03 no
4-Class -45.91 370.61 187.82 235.82 418.61 48 285 0.29 0.00 no
Model 4: Akan, Central, Education, Expenditures
1-Class -116.67 285.61 251.34 260.34 294.61 9 324 0.00 0.18 yes
2-Class -64.97 263.53 175.95 198.95 286.53 23 310 0.03 0.08 yes
3-Class -46.33 307.56 166.66 203.66 344.56 37 296 0.14 0.02 no
4-Class -39.55 375.31 181.09 232.09 426.31 51 282 0.25 0.01 no
Source: own estimation
determine class membership, hence the class assignment is only due to the data
structure in the choice model. While models without covariates provide very good
prediction abilities, the classification of the different classes is not their key strength,
which is confirmed by the large classification error. Model number two includes all
the individual specific variables that were also included in the ML model as covari-
ates. As the variable Ewe is not significant in Model 2, it was left out in Model 3 to
further improve model fit. Both model specifications show very similar classification
and prediction errors. In the last model, Model 4, the variable household expen-
ditures was included as an additional covariate. Although household expenditures
were not significant in the ML model, they have an impact on class membership
and further improve model fit. When deciding about the optimal number of latent
classes, we follow Andrews and Currim (2003) and Dias (2004) who "suggest that
the AIC3 is a better criterion than BIC and AIC in determining the number of latent
classes in choice models", Vermunt and Magidson (2005). Hence, for all four models
the two class solution proves to be the best one. In model specifications two to four
the BIC criterion reaches the same decision. The normal AIC criterion prefers the
three class solution, which is not feasible as it does not converge.
The coefficients of the different model specifications are actually very similar to
each other, in model two and three the model for choices as well as the model for
classes almost coincide. Model 4 appears very different on first sight, but actually
is also very close to the other two models when one switches Class 1 and Class
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Table 7.6: Latent class estimation results
Model for Choices
Class 1 z-value p-value Class 2 z-value p-value Wald(=) p-value
Attributes
Constants -2.693 -3.213 0.002 1.867 3.398 0.001 20.256 0.000
cashvsfoodcrops -0.566 -1.902 0.058 -0.430 -2.163 0.031 0.145 0.700
taxvsprotect -0.786 -2.419 0.016 -0.132 -1.027 0.306 3.504 0.061
weakvsstrongstate -2.321 -2.032 0.043 -0.466 -2.416 0.016 2.619 0.110
Predictors
retro-present 1.955 2.343 0.020 -0.218 -0.564 0.573 5.541 0.019
retro-past -2.019 -2.897 0.004 -0.767 -1.846 0.066 2.343 0.130
perf-economy -2.992 -2.758 0.006 -2.432 -3.748 0.000 0.198 0.660
perf-social -3.104 -2.991 0.003 -0.514 -1.170 0.243 5.158 0.023
perf-infra -1.955 -2.810 0.005 -0.269 -0.438 0.662 3.341 0.068
Model for Classes
Class 1 z-value Class 2 z-value p-value
Class Membership 0.50 0.50
Covariates
intercept 0.000 -5.762 -2.318 0.021
education 0.000 1.097 1.760 0.079
central 0.000 -3.153 -1.847 0.066
akan 0.000 5.825 2.822 0.005
ewe 0.000 -0.740 -0.472 0.637
Source: own estimation
2. Model 1 is different from the others, which can be traced back to the missing
covariates and hence missing depth of data.
In the following we will concentrate on the interpretation of model two because
it is best comparable with the ML model from the former section, as it includes
the same variables. The model output can be found in Table 7.6, the output of
the other model specifications is available from the author on request. The high
and negative intercept in the class model reflects a bias towards being in Class 1.
Education on the other hand positively influences membership in Class 2. The same
is true for those individuals belonging to the Akan tribe. The coefficient for the
Ewe tribe is not significant, but has a negative sign and is thus driving individuals
towards Class 1. Being from the Central region is another characteristic that is
more pronounced in Class 1 than in Class 2. In Table 7.7 all voter characteristics
are displayed for both classes5, a t-test indicates whether the differences between
the two classes are significant or not. Although not all characteristics are included
as covariates, still most of them differ significantly between the two classes. Of all
the sociodemographic characteristics only Gender, Age and Political interest show
no significant differences. Class 1 can be considered as the rural class, with more
people living in rural areas, more people being employed in the farming sector and a
lower education level. Also household expenditures are lower compared to Class 2.
5Someone was considered to belong to a class, when the class membership is greater then 0.5.
Another possibility is to multiply class membership probability with the variable value. The
second method was calculated as well, but the results did not change
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Table 7.7: Descriptive statistics by latent classes
Class 1 Class 2 p-value
Sociodemographic characteristics
rural 0.476 0.053 0.000
egnder 0.494 0.497 0.954
age 37.872 38.615 0.658
education 2.134 3.426 0.000
farmer 0.616 0.337 0.000
expenditures 227.268 370.710 0.001
polint 2.433 2.598 0.186
Regions
western 0.037 0.160 0.000
central 0.055 0.107 0.084
greater accra 0.085 0.071 0.627
volta 0.201 0.012 0.000
eastern 0.006 0.290 0.000
ashanti 0.061 0.266 0.000
brong ahafo 0.122 0.089 0.326
nothern 0.238 0.006 0.000
upper east 0.116 0.000 0.000
upper west 0.079 0.000 0.000
Tribes
akan 0.061 0.964 0.000
ga/dangme 0.055 0.006 0.010
ewe 0.256 0.024 0.000
guan 0.104 0.000 0.000
gruma 0.049 0.006 0.017
mole dagbon 0.317 0.000 0.000
grusi 0.110 0.000 0.000
mande 0.024 0.000 0.045
Source: own data
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Source: own data
Taking a look at the regional differences shows that Class 1 is dominated by people
from the north and east of Ghana (Volta, Northern, Upper East and Upper West),
while Class 2 is mainly represented in the south, west and in the center of Ghana
(Western, Central, Eastern and Ashanti).
Before interpreting the choice model, we take a look at the distribution of the
dependent variable between the classes. The differences are very distinct. On the
one hand, Class 1 clearly supports the NDC with 82% (NDC=18%) and on the other
hand, Class 2 supports the NPP with 80% (NDC=20%). This party identification is
also visible in the estimated constant in the latent class model. While the alternative
specific constant is strongly negative and significant for Class 1, which indicates an
affinity towards the NDC. It is the other way around for Class 2, the constant is
positively significant. The sign of the policy issue coefficients is negative regardless
of which class is considered, but the level of the coefficients is smaller for every issue
in Class 2 compared to Class 1. This is a first indicator for a lower importance
of policy oriented voting in Class 2. The predictor variables are also consistently
lower for Class 2. Further, they are all significant in Class 1, while in Class 2 only
retro_past and perf_economy influence the model significantly. The only
positive predictor in Class 1 is the coefficient retro_present. By implication
the calculation of marginal effects is only possible for the variables included in the
choice model and not for those included in the class model. Interestingly the effects
of the latent class model are almost identical to the effects from the ML model6.
The maximum variation from the marginal effect of the ML model is 3% for the
policy issue weakvsstrongstate.
The relative importance of the voting motives is plotted class specific in Figure
6This is also true when the other model specifications of the latent class are considered, the only
exception is Model 1, where no covariates were included.
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7.7. The difference in policy and valence voting are quite small between Class 1 and
Class 2, but the difference in retrospective voting is considerably larger. The mean
RI of Class 1 for retrospective voting is only 8% and for Class 2, 14%. Besides it is
also visible that Class 1 votes less policy oriented than Class 2, which is not obvious
from the model output. The coefficients of Class 1 are actually bigger than those
of Class 2, but relative to the total sum of the marginal effects, policy voting is less
important in Class 1 than in Class 2. Analogously the relative effect of non policy
voting is also smaller in Class 2. Hence, we can conclude that the differences in
voting behavior are more evident in the results of the latent class analysis compared
to the results of the ML analysis.
7.5 Voting Behavior and Government Performance
In the previous sections two distinct groups of voters were identified. On the one
hand there is Class 1, which consists of the rural people with lower education levels
and lower income. They strongly support the incumbent party, the NDC. Class 2
on the other hand, is an urban class, with better education and higher household
income, they vote for the NPP with almost 80%. While both classes differ in their
personal characteristics and their vote choice, the modality of how they choose their
favorite party and their voting behavior respectively do not differ very much from
each other. In this section we further investigate government performance in Ghana,
whether the government acts accountable towards the voter and if the political
process is biased towards special interests, which is formally known as capture. As
we could not identify any groups that actually differ in their voting behavior, we
assume that capture is not very pronounced in Ghana. At least not between rural
and urban areas.
7.5.1 Government Accountability
Governments act accountable when their implemented policies correspond to the
needs and desires of voters as a whole and not to lobbying activities or intrinsic
policy preferences of politicians. Based on the ML model as well as the different
latent class models, accountability indices were calculated for the case of Ghana
(see Table 7.8). Depending on the model on which basis the index was calculated,
GA1 varies between 0.42 for the ML model and 0.54 for model one of the latent class
analyses. While the latent class models two to four are very similar to the ML index,
model one is significantly different. Just like in the description of voting behavior,
the absence of personal characteristics in the model reduces its abilities to express
the heterogeneity that is included in the sample. Hence, we will exclude the results
of model one during further explanations. A government accountability index of
GA1=0.42-0.45 indicates that elections and hence voters account for 42-45% of the
total weight that voters and interest groups have collectively in the political process.
The results imply that voting plays a crucial role in the political process in Ghana,
but it is not the dominant player. Interest groups and lobbying have a weight of
55-58% and hold the majority of power. Though, the index is very close to 50%,
which indicates almost equal power of voters and interest groups respectively.
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Table 7.8: Government accountability indices (ML and LC Analysis)
ML Latent Class Model
M6 M1 M2 M3 M4
GA1 0.421 0.542 0.450 0.449 0.434
GA2 0.601 0.456 0.563 0.559 0.690
cashvsfoodcrops 0.138 0.101 0.164 0.163 0.164
GA3 taxvsprotect 0.153 0.069 0.114 0.111 0.120
weakvsstrongstate 0.113 0.084 0.115 0.115 0.125
Source: own calculations
The second index, GA2, is corresponding to the degree of intrinsic policy pref-
erences ϑ of the governmental party. Unfortunately no data is available on these
intrinsic policy preferences, however, we can estimate the extent to which the relative
weight of intrinsic policy preferences would decrease if we assume that voters do not
engage in non policy voting. To this end, we recalculate the parameters αG, βG and
δG, assuming non policy factors are zero for all voters and divide the sum of these
recalculated parameters by the sum of the originally estimated parameters. This
ratio corresponds to the percentage of intrinsic policy preferences that are achieved
in the current situation compared to the percentage of intrinsic policy preferences
that are achieved if all voters based their vote choice solely on policy indicators
and observed economic performance. The variation of the second indicator GA2 is
considerably larger between the different model specifications than for GA1. GA2
varies between 0.56 for model two and 0.69 for model four. The results indicate
that based on actual voting behavior the relative political weight of intrinsic policy
preferences of the government is 0.44-0.31 times lower then in a hypothetical case
when only policy and retrospective voting exist. From the theoretical framework in
chapter 5 we already know that government accountability is high, when people vote
mainly policy oriented and retrospective, hence intrinsic policy preferences must be
low. GA2 being below one is a sign of very low intrinsic policy preferences in the real
world scenario for Ghana. Although the actual degree of intrinsic policy preferences
can only be measured with appropriate data, which is not available so far.
The third and last indicator measuring government accountability, calculates how
much the incumbent party can change it’s own policy position, to please their intrin-
sic preferences or the preferences of lobbying groups, without loosing the election.
The basis for the calculations is the policy scale from one to five considering the
different policy issues. Without loosing the majority of the votes the NDC can move
it’s policy position within a range of 14-16% on the issue cashvsfoodcrops, 11-
15% on the issue taxvsprotect and 11-12% on the issue weakvsstrongstate.
All three issues do not allow big shifts of the policy positions for the governmental
party. The NDC has to stick to it’s current policy positions, as otherwise they will
loose the majority in the next election (see also Figure 7.4). The result indicates
high government accountability towards the voter, as the political party can only
move it’s policy position to a minor degree to please either their own intrinsic policy
preferences or the policy preferences of interest groups.
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Figure 7.8: Lorenz curve (left: ML - M6, right: LC - M2)
Source: own data
7.5.2 Government Capture
Although a government acts accountable, electoral competition can still be biased in
favor of special interests. To measure the discrimination of certain voters or groups
of voters, we defined the individual voter weight, wi, as well as the index GCT,T ′
that measures government capture. In the special case of a two party democracy,
following equation 5.25 the individual weight corresponds exactly to Pij(1 − Pij)
for the ML model. In a perfect democracy, the general rule: one man one vote
should apply. Translated into our theory of voting, in an optimal unbiased scenario
everybody has equal weights corresponding to his or her population share. In the
sample (n=333) the unbiased individual weight equals 1
333
. However, this case does
not exist in a real world scenario and also in Ghana voting weights are biased.
In Figure 7.8 the Lorenz curve is depicted for the voter weights calculated from
the ML model results and from the latent class results. The corresponding Gini
coefficient7 is 0.61 for the former and 0.74 for the latter. The unequal distribution of
weights is more pronounced in the Latent Class model, where 20% of the population
own 80% of the weight, while the results from the ML model conclude that 40%
own approximately 60% of the total weight. However, both results confirm major
inequalities and an enormous bias between individual voters.
After exploring the bias in voter weights, the next step is to identify whether
the weights are randomly distributed among the population or if some groups have
significantly higher weights than others. From the literature on developing countries
we expect a heavy bias towards the well educated8, rich9 and urban population
7The Gini-coefficient measures the relative share of the area between the Lorenz curve and the
angle bisecting plane and the total area under the angle bisecting plane. The latter corresponds
to a perfect equal distribution. Accordingly a Gini-coefficient of one indicates a maximally
unequal distribution, while a Gini coefficient of zero indicates a perfect equal distribution.
8Someone was considered to be better educated, when he finished at least primary school.
9Someone was considered rich or poor by using the variable household expenditures, when someone
spends on average more then 300 Cedi a month they were considered to be rich. The index was
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Figure 7.9: Capture in Ghana
Source: own data
(Lipton, 1977; Sahn and Stifel, 2003; Avery and Peﬄey, 2005). The results however
point in the opposite direction. Taking a look at Figure 7.9 reveals that especially
those groups that were expected to be captured are actually the ones capturing their
counterparts. This means the poor people capture the rich, the rural capture the
urban, women capture men and well educated capture the less educated. The results
are robust independent of whether the ML or the latent class model estimation
is taken for the calculation. For regional and ethnic groups capture indices were
calculated for the typical voter groups of the NDC and NPP. Usually the NDC is
supported by the Ewe and the Volta region, while the NPP has it’s strongholds in the
Ashanti/Central region and among the Akan tribe. In contrary to the results above,
the measurement of capture between regional and ethnic groups shows significant
differences for ML and LC model. The ML model concludes that the Central and
Ashanti region are heavily capturing the Volta region and the Akan tribe is capturing
the Ewe tribe. The Latent class analysis qualitatively agrees but the effects are much
smaller, especially the capture index between Akan and Ewe is almost zero. Finally
the two classes, determined in the latent class analysis, are also contrasted with each
other, the result is very clear, Class 1 has a significantly larger average weight and
is hence capturing Class 2. The result was to be expected, as Class 1 is the rural
class and we have noted before that the rural and poor part of the population are
capturing the rich and urban people.
The results have to be looked at separate from each other, first there is capture
among different socioeconomic groups and second there is capture between regional
or ethnic groups. The results for the former are clear, the theoretically weaker
also calculated taking the LPI (Mattes, 2008) for measuring wealth, the results are comparable
to the ones presented here.
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groups like the poor, rural and female population are not captured, but actually
have a greater average weight. The result is robust and independent of whether a
ML or latent class analysis is applied. Further, for the latter case, the results differ
significantly in their magnitude, but still point in the same direction. As the concept
of capture assumes that voting behavior and personal weights differ between people,
heterogeneity is a necessary condition. Hence, the latent class analysis is considered
superior to the ML analysis and we belief that the degree of capture between Akan
and Ewe and Central/Ashanti and Volta is rather small. Further, it became apparent
that the NDC exerts it’s incumbent advantage towards the NPP, as NDC supporters
capture NPP voters.
The distribution of power differs heavily across groups, hence the parties policy
positions should usually be biased towards those groups that have higher average
weights. The issue taxation vs. protection of the agricultural sector is an important
political issue in Ghana. Both parties actually take an identical position of 4.20.
Incumbent and opposition are equally interested in protecting the agricultural sector.
The position of the rural population is to protect the agricultural sector even further
(4.59), while the urban population demands slightly less protection (4.23). That
means that although the rural population has a higher average voter weight, the
NDC is closer to the urban than to the rural position. It further implies that the
incumbent party could actually increase their vote share by moving further towards
protecting the agricultural sector. This raises two question, first why does the NDC
position itself closer to the urban than to the rural policy position and second, why do
they not move closer to both voter groups if they could thereby gain additional votes.
The answer can be found in the definition of the support function of the incumbent
party, which includes voters, interest groups and intrinsic policy preferences. When
the policy position does not agree with the voters policy position, it must either
please special interests by lobbying groups or serve the parties own intrinsic policy
preferences. Recalling the accountability index GA1, interest groups and voters both
have about 50% of the total weight within the political process, hence the probability
is high that the movement towards the taxation of the agricultural sector and away
from the voter is due to pressure from organized interest groups. We can further
calculate the empirically optimal policy position of the government party that follows
from the support function, by taking the weighted mean of all voters policy positions
(see equation 5.28). The result is 4.30 with the ML voter weights and 4.38 for the
LC voter weights. If the government would only be accountable towards the voter,
they would take exactly that policy position, which is in fact closer to the rural
policy position than to the urban policy position. In a situation without capture,
where everybody has the same political weight, the optimal position equals 4.32
(see equation 5.29). The difference between the one man one vote position and
the weighted policy position is small, which indicates that the bias induced through
different voter weights does not influence actual policy positions significantly and
that the fact that the NDC does not take this position is due to lobbying and intrinsic
policy preferences instead.
Finally we are linking government performance and voting behavior. In Figure
7.10 personal voter weights are plotted on the y-axis and the utility share of non
policy voting on the x-axis. Non policy voting is measured as personal characteris-
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Figure 7.10: Relationship between voter weights and voting behavior (left: ML - M6,
right: LC - M2)
Source: own data
tics multiplied with the corresponding alternative specific coefficient and the three
variables measuring government performance also multiplied with their alternative
specific coefficient10. The locally-weighted polynomial regression shows the relation-
ship between voter weights and non policy voting. It resembles a reverted U-shape,
with its maximum around zero for the ML model as well as for the latent class
analysis. Though the scale of the y-axes as well as of x-axes is wider in the latent
class case. For both models it applies that the greater the absolute value of non
policy voting, the smaller is the voter weight respectively. The result approves with
the theory that non policy voting actually leads to lower voting weights and hence
also to lower accountability. The points at the edge of the plot are those voters that
strongly identify with the NDC because of non policy factors, hence they don’t need
to be convinced with actual policy decisions or economic well being. Governmental
accountability towards those voters is generally low and they will be captured by
other voters with greater personal weights. Still, voters with low weights can enjoy
political privileges, though they are often of clientelistic nature and hence do not
promote general government accountability.
7.6 Summary
Ghana is a stable democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a history of multiparty
elections since 1992. During the past twenty years several turnovers took place,
currently the NDC is in power and the NPP is the most important party in the
opposition. In the literature Ghana is often described as a country, where especially
ethnicity and region drive election results. With our analysis we cannot confirm
these results. Although we also identified non policy voting to be the most impor-
10The latent class analysis does not include any personal characteristics in the choice model, hence
non policy voting only consists of the alternative specific constant.
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tant voting motive, with a relative importance of 60%, we further found out that
policy voting accounts for 32% and retrospective voting for another 8%. Hence,
policy voting is important in Ghana and significantly determines policy outcomes.
Especially agricultural policy issues are of special interest. We also showed that
voting behavior is not homogeneous among voters, but differs from person to per-
son. And not only voting behavior differs, also the personal weights we calculated
for every voter are distributed extremely unequal. The Gini coefficient of the dis-
tribution of the voter weights is between 0.62 and 0.75, which suggests dramatic
disparity. Though, while you would expect that the elite of the country, the urban
and rich people are holding the lion’s share of the weight in the political process.
We found out that those groups which are usually considered to be disadvantaged in
the political process actually have higher average personal weights in Ghana. The
result is that rural people are capturing urban people, poor capture rich and uned-
ucated people capture educated people. Furthermore, the result is robust, also if we
estimate a latent class model instead of a multinomial logit model. With the latent
class model we identified two distinct classes, for the rural, poor and uneducated
people the probability to be in Class 1 is much higher than the probability to be in
class two. While the opposite is true for the urban, rich and educated part of the
population. Hence, Class 1 possesses higher average voting weights and is capturing
Class 2.
When weights are unequally distributed in the political process it normally also
leads to biased policy positions. In the case of Ghana the NDC should take policy
positions that are close to the rural, poor population, as they hold higher average
weights than their urban counterparts. Empirically we do not find this bias, the NDC
does not take the position of the rural population, they actually position themselves
closer to the position of the urban people. A diverging position from the empirical
position is either due to pressure of interest groups or intrinsic policy preferences.
From the accountability indicators GA1 and GA2 we know that voters and interest
groups have about the same power in the political process, further intrinsic policy
preferences do not seem to be very pronounced in Ghana. Additionally GA3 showed
that the leeway the NDC has to move its policy positions is quite small, which
further argues for accountability towards the voter. Hence, we conclude that the
fact that the policy position of the NDC is closer to the urban than to the rural
population, is due to interest groups. These groups demand policy positions that
are closer to the urban interests, but the possibilities of the government to please
their demands are restricted by government accountability towards the voter (GA3).
Hence, although voting weights are distributed unequally in Ghana, the political
process is not heavily biased. The government is accountable towards the voter and
elections provide an effective mechanism to promote democracy.
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Senegal
Senegal is the westernmost country on the African continent. The Atlantic Ocean
marks the western border, to the north you find Mauritania, to the east is Mali, and
Guinea and Guinea-Bissau are located in the south of the country. Furthermore,
within Senegal lies the small country of Gambia (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).
Senegal is divided into 14 administrative regions, which can be seen in Figure 8.1.
The largest city and also the country’s capital is Dakar, which is located on the
Cap-Vert peninsula at the westernmost tip of the country. 13.6 million people live
in Senegal, it is hence the least populated country compared to Ghana and Uganda.
Just like in many other countries in Africa, in Senegal live many different ethnic
groups, most of them speaking their own tribal language. The biggest ethnic group
are the Wolof with 43%. While French is the official language in Senegal, Wolof
is the language that is mainly spoken among the people, especially in Dakar. The
Pular are the second largest group with 23.8% followed by the Serer with 14.7%.
The remaining ethnic groups are smaller, with population shares of less than 5%.
The GNI per capita (Atlas method) was $1030 in 2012, just like Ghana, Senegal
is considered a lower middle income country (The World Bank, 2013). The economy
strongly relies on agriculture, 14.9% of the GDP are due to the primary sector and
77.5% of the labor force are occupied in the sector. The dominant agricultural
products are peanuts, millet, corn and rice. Other industries are phosphate mining
and fertilizer construction. Additionally due to its location, another important sector
is commercial fishing. The GDP growth rate was 3.7% in 2012 and is close to the
average GDP growth rate in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although GDP growth is expected
to increase in the future in Senegal, it will not be sufficient to reach the same growth
rates as Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.
Senegal is among the oldest democracies in Africa (Olympio, 2012) and also often
classified as one of the showpieces of African democracies (Galvan, 2001). Marshall
et al. (2012) agrees and classifies Senegal on the Polity IV scale as a democracy with
a polity score of 7. Additionally Senegal is considered to be a free country with a
political rights and civil rights rating of 2. The civil rights ranking just improved
from 3 to 2 since the last survey in 2013 (Freedom House, 2014), which is mainly
due to the peaceful change of government in 2012.
8.1 From Independence to Democracy
Senegal gained independence from France in 1960. First in collaboration with Mali
under the name of the Mali Federation. But the union did not hold for long, a few
month later the two countries split up again and became two independent states.
After independence in 1960, Léopold Senghor became the first president of Senegal.
With the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS) a Socialist party, he ruled the country
for 20 years. From 1966-1976 Senegal was basically a one-party state until finally
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Figure 8.1: Administrative Regions in Senegal
Source: Map No. 4174 Rev. 3, January 2005, UNITED NATIONS
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in 1976 Senghor allowed opposition parties to participate in the political process.
However, political parties could not be found at will, but had to fit in Senghor’s
predetermined ideological range. The former one party system was transformed to a
three party system, with one party representing liberal and democratic tendencies,
another party representing the socialist and democratic ideology and a third one fol-
lowing the Marxist-Leninist ideology (Busky, 2002). The ruling UPS was renamed
to simply Socialist Party (PS), which consequently represented the socialist choice.
The liberal, right-of-center alternative was the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS)
and the radical left was represented by the African Independence Party (PAI) (Gal-
van, 2001). In the first multiparty presidential elections in 1978, the PDS with their
ambitious leader and presidential candidate Abdoulaye Wade were the only serious
opponent of the PS. While the PDS gained 17.5% of the votes, Senghor got 82.5%
and stayed in power for two more years, until he retired voluntarily in 1980 (Galvan,
2001). His successor Abdou Diouf took over his position, Diouf had been prime min-
ister since 1970 and was a well known politician. Diouf decided the following three
elections in 1983, 1988 and 1993 in favor of himself and the PS. Eventually in 2000
after 40 years of PS government, Abdoulaye Wade put an end to the regime. He and
the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) decided the election in favor of themselves.
The peaceful transition of power was a big step towards democratization for Sene-
gal, although throughout his function as president Abdoulaye Wade employed some
rather undemocratic strategies to stay in power (Kelly, 2012). His undemocratic
strategies culminated in the presidential elections in 2012, when Wade announced
that he would run for a third term as president, although he had promised differently
in 2007 and had to change the countries constitution for his purpose. In the consti-
tution of 2001 it was written that the president is limited to rule for a maximum of
two terms, Wade succeeded by arguing that his first term did not count as it had
been during the previous constitution (Adebayo, 2012). The President’s behavior
led to many protests, violence and riots in the pre-election phase in 2012. Finally
it was agreed by the Constitutional Court of Senegal that Wade was legitimized to
run for a third term. The opposition candidate Macky Sall from the Alliance for the
Republic (APR) was his main challenger, he gained 26.58% in the first round in 2012
compared to 34.8% for the incumbent. In the second round the opposition united
and aligned with Sall which led to an overwhelming victory with 65.8% of the votes.
Abdoulaye Wade and his party were defeated after 12 years in office. However, Wade
and his fellow party members accepted the defeat straight away and were one of the
first to congratulate Macky Sall on his victory (Kelly, 2012). After the troublesome
pre-election phase the outgoing of the election and the peaceful handover of power
was a surprise to many national and international observers. It raised hopes that
Senegal is further moving towards a well functioning democracy.
8.2 Literature Overview
Senegal is a prime example for studying voting behavior. Since 1978 seven multiparty
elections took place that were considered more or less free and fair (Vengroff and
Magala, 2001; Resnick, 2013; Galvan, 2007). Without military interference three
peaceful turnover of power occurred, while the first turnover did not put a new
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political party in power but just a new president (1980 when Diouf took over from
Senghor), in 2000 and 2012 the governmental party changed as well. With Abdoulaye
Wade accepting his defeat in 2012, Senegal also achieved democratic consolidation
following the definition of Huntington (1991), who emphasizes that, "at least two
turnovers whereby the opposition party that ousts an incumbent also accepts defeat
in a subsequent election", have to take place (Resnick, 2013).
Poteete (2013) and many other scholars of African politics confirm that the link
between elections and policy is not very distinct in Africa. The same applies for
Senegal in particular, where political parties generally have ideologically meaningful
names but hardly provide any ideology or policy platforms that differ from each
other (van de Walle, 2003; Koter, 2013). Compared to other African countries like
Ghana or Malawi where ethnicity and regionalism plays a dominant role for vote
choice (Ferree and Horowitz, 2010; Bratton et al., 2012; Lindberg, 2012), in Senegal
ethnic and regional identity is less related to voting behavior (Osei, 2012). Of course
some regional patterns exist, e.g. Sall’s strongholds are Fatick and Matam, and
Wade gained strong support from his home department Kebemer and the Mouride
capital of Touba (Resnick, 2013). But they do not significantly influence voting
behavior. Instead, in Senegal, especially in the early times of democracy Islam and
the Sufi Muslim brotherhoods played an important role for voting behavior. The
religious leaders, the marabouts, would issue a ndïgel a recommendation to vote
for a certain candidate, which was widely accepted and followed by their talibes1.
The PS was always very close to the religious leaders and kept on good terms with
Touba, the holy city of Mouridism. These relations partly explain the PS dominance
which lasted for almost 40 years. In 2000 the brotherhood decided to not further
support Diouf and they did not issue a ndïgel to vote for him. The later president
Abdoulaye Wade was also aware of the power of the brotherhoods and established
excellent relations with them (Osei, 2012). He tried hard to get further support from
religious and traditional leaders for the 2012 elections, mainly by distributing gifts
like money, vehicles and diplomatic passports (Koter, 2013). However, this attempt
of clientelism was not successful, as especially the most important religious figures
decided not to interfere in the political battlefield anymore.
Although ethnicity, regionalism and religion are less important in Senegal com-
pared to other African countries, the rural/urban divide has been very pronounced
at elections. While rural regions support the incumbent, the opposition mainly gains
their votes from the urban areas and cities. Koter (2013) analyzed the relationship
between incumbency advantage and place of residence and could show that urban-
ization and incumbent score were negatively correlated for all elections in Senegal
so far. Like many other African countries Senegal is dominated by rural areas, 60%
of the voters live in rural regions and accordingly have a crucial part in elections.
Whoever manages to rally the rural population behind himself wins the majority.
Interestingly their support is not bound to personalities, while Wade was still in op-
position he gained the majority of support from the urban areas and especially from
Dakar. Once he was in office the results changed and he got more and more support
from the rural regions compared to the urban ones. Koter (2013) also shows in her
1The general meaning of talibe in Arabic is student, though especially in West Africa it is used
for Islam students or followers of a religious teacher.
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paper that her results are robust even if she controls for other social characteristics
like education, age and gender. Further, also religion and ethnicity do not decrease
the significance of the place of residence. Government policies are also not able
to describe the bias rural inhabitants have towards the incumbent. It seems that
although rural regions provide the votes for the incumbent, the urban areas gain
the reward. The urban bias described by Lipton (1977) reports that urban areas
gain a lot more public services and investments than rural areas. Hence, income
distribution is harmed and the gap between urban/rural and rich/poor is further
increasing in the future (Sahn and Stifel, 2003; Lipton, 1993). In addition a system-
atic discrimination of the rural population is present in African countries (Bates,
1981; Bezemer and Headey, 2008). In Senegal there is the case of the groundnut
sector, where farmers have to sell their products to the marketing boards, while the
government controls the prices. In the 1960s the prices for groundnuts were cut
dramatically, which heavily reduced the income of all farmers, as they had no other
distribution channels to sell their products. Until today farmers are dependent on
price policies for agricultural products by the government that systematically dis-
criminates them. Poteete (2013) describes another example from the fishing in her
paper. In 2011 Abdoulaye Wade and his minister responsible for fisheries granted
more then 40 authorization protocols for the 2012 fishing season, which allowed for-
eign trawlers to fish in Senegalese waters. The decision caused considerable harm for
the local fishing industry, because the foreign trawlers would fish in their territories
and hence reduce the local catch. These are only two examples for governmental
policies that directly harm the well-being in rural areas, by reducing the income of
the rural population, especially the income of farmers and fishermen. However, rural
voters are still supporting the incumbent who is implementing these policies. Ex-
planations for this behavior can only be found in clientelism and patronage. During
election campaigning the incumbent candidate has financial advantages compared
to his opponents. They have not only access to state money, but are also able to
allocate public goods, public resources and governmental jobs to their clientèle (Vi-
cente and Wantchekon, 2009). Clientelism is only possible with enough money and
resources and therefore strongly favors the incumbent. Comparing rural and urban
settings shows that clientelism works especially well in rural areas because of several
reasons. First, polling stations tend to be smaller in rural areas, which makes it
easier to monitor and also put pressure on a whole village. Thus, politicians can
easily promise rewards or threaten with punishment for a village, depending on the
outcome of the election (Koter, 2013). Second, religious and traditional leaders have
a better standing and are more important in rural regions compared to urban set-
tlements. Hence, they are used by politicians as bottle necks to influence the people
of a village or a community in their vote choice.
Though the elections in 2012 were different in many aspects, one critical difference
was the decreasing support of Wade in the rural regions which finally led to his loss
against the opposition leader Macky Sall. But why did the rural population withdraw
their votes from the incumbent? People in rural as well as in urban areas were
deeply dissatisfied with Wade’s governmental performance and behavior. Especially
his running for a third term turned people off. Additionally many Senegalese feared
that KarimWade, the president’s son would become his father’s successor (Sy, 2012).
89
Chapter 8 Senegal
Karim Wade had gained more and more power since 2007, but is rather unpopular
among the people, particularly because of financial mismanagement and corruption.
Traditional and religious leaders also refrained from the president and especially
the important religious figures stayed out of election campaigning. All these factors
led to the situation that after 12 years of PDS government the rural population
eventually noticed their own discrimination and voted for a change in 2012.
Further, the next presidential elections will be strongly influenced by the changing
demographic structure of Senegal. Currently already 63% of the population are
under 24 years old, and the trend will continue in the next few years. Additionally
more people are migrating from the rural areas to the urban centers and urbanization
will take place. Hence, future election campaigning needs to focus on the young
people and urban areas in particular (Resnick, 2013). In the next chapter we will
empirically analyze voting behavior in Senegal and later derive voting weights for
different groups of voters. Following the literature we expect policy voting to only
be of minor importance, while non policy factors will be dominant especially in
rural regions. Further, the political weights of the rural populations will be low,
as politicians have not been accountable towards them so far. In contrast to the
literature cited above we will actually estimate voting behavior econometrically using
a multinomial logit model (ML) and a latent class model (LC). As we include issue
voting as well as retrospective and non policy voting in our analysis we are able
to evaluate the importance of each of the voting motives. An econometric analysis
of voting behavior that includes policy voting, non policy voting and retrospective
voting has not been undertaken for the case of Senegal so far, hence we will close
this gap in literature.
8.3 Data Description
In Senegal we cooperated with Afrobarometer to collect the data necessary for an-
alyzing voting behavior. Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research
project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa. Since
1999 Afrobarometer is conducting public opinion surveys in Africa. Starting with
twelve countries in the first round, by now Round 5 covers 35 African countries. The
data on Senegal used in this paper was collected during the fifth round in 2013 over
a period of two weeks in late February. The timing of the survey is one year after
the last presidential election, hence vote choice is a rather theoretical construct for
the respondents as the next presidential election will not take place until 2017-2019,
depending on whether Macky Sall will restore the five year term of office for the
presidency or not (Poteete, 2013). Hence, the survey does not provide a forecast of
the next elections, but rather an evaluation of the election and voting behavior in
2013. Therefore, the timing is quite beneficial, by now the president has been in
office for one year and first evaluations of his performance are feasible. In Round 5
next to general sociodemographic data, special emphasis was put on taxation, gender
issues, crime, conflict and insecurity, globalization and social service delivery. Ad-
ditionally Afrobarometer offers some space to add country specific questions to the
questionnaire. In this context we added several questions focusing on policy issues
and the analysis of voting behavior. That is why Round 5 also covers questions on
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agricultural policy issues and a question identifying whether someone is employed
in the farming sector or not.
8.3.1 Sampling Procedure
Afrobarometer surveys are based on a national probability sample that is a repre-
sentative cross-section of all citizens of voting age. To guarantee that every adult
citizen has an equal chance of being interviewed, random selection methods are ap-
plied at every stage of sampling. Furthermore, the sampling design is corresponding
to probability proportionate to population size and the sample is stratified by region
and residential locality (urban/rural). The interview process includes four stages in
urban areas, and five stages in rural areas. In rural areas, first a secondary sampling
unit (SSU) is randomly chosen, before from each SSU two primary sampling units
(PSUs) are selected. In a next stage the sampling starting point is selected, from
where eight households are randomly picked. The last stage is the random selection
of an interview respondent. The gender of the respondent will be altered after each
interview to have an equal number of men and women in the sample. In urban
locations the first stage is dropped and the PSUs are selected straight away.
The interviews were conducted face-to-face in the respective first language of the
interviewee. All interviewers were intensively prepared and trained before the actual
survey, to guarantee a smooth interview procedure. For further information on the
sampling procedure of Afrobarometer surveys please consider the survey manual
(Afrobarometer, 2011).
8.3.2 Questionnaire and Variables
The total sample size of the Afrobarometer survey is 1200 individuals, the inter-
views were conducted in 150 PSUs all across Senegal. The questionnaire contains
100 questions measuring socioeconomic characteristics and individual attitudes and
behavior concerning: Democracy, Governance, Livelihoods, Macro-economics and
Markets, Social Capital, Conflict and Crime, Participation, National Identity, Taxa-
tion, Gender issues, Crime, Conflict and Insecurity, Globalization and Social Service
Delivery. So far Afrobarometer did not ask explicitly for policy issues in their sur-
veys, that is why we added three questions focusing on agricultural policy positions.
Further, another question was added to the questionnaire to determine the number
of people employed in the farming sector.
For additional analysis some observations were deleted from the sample. This
was especially due to missing values concerning the vote choice question, but also
missing values concerning the policy position of the voter. After data cleaning 667
complete observations were available for analyzing voting behavior. In the following
part variables used in the section are introduced and explained in more detail. For
comprehensibility the variables are split up into dependent and independent variables
and into their category of voting: policy, retrospective and non policy.
Dependent Variable In a probabilistic voter model the dependent variable is usu-
ally vote choice. Depending on the kind of data available actual or intended vote
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Table 8.1: Presidential election results from Senegal
PDS APR AFP PS REWMI FSDBJ others
2012-1st Round 34.81 26.58 13.2 11.3 7.86 1.93 4.31
2012-2nd Round 34.2 65.8 - - - - -
Afrobarometer 14.08 62.18 8.08 3.3 3.3 0.73 8.32
Source: African Elections Database (2014b); Afrobarometer (2013)
choice is used as the dependent variable. The typical Afrobarometer vote choice
question is:
Q99. If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would
you vote for?
The vote choice question is a very sensitive one, which often creates a lot of missing
values. In Senegal there are only three actual missing values, however 95 respondents
refused to answer the question. Furthermore, 225 people did not know who they
would vote for and 46 declared that they would not vote. In total only 817 respon-
dents mentioned a valid party name. Thirteen political parties were named, however
only three parties gained more than five percent and actually mattered for the elec-
toral outcome. We assume that the other parties gaining less than five percent do
not play a crucial role in Senegal and do not determine voting behavior significantly,
hence we excluded them from further analysis and remain with these three relevant
parties: Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), Alliance for the Republic (APR) and
Alliance of the Forces of Progress (AFP). Table 8.1 shows the distribution of votes
in the complete sample (n=1200) compared to the official election results from the
first and second round in 2012. The survey outcome resembles far more the second
round results, it almost perfectly hits the percentage of votes for Macky Sall’s APR.
It also reveals the decreasing support for Abdoulaye Wade’s PDS after he lost the
last election in March 2012.
Independent Variables
Policy Voting Voters rely on different voting motives when making their vote
choice. Policy voting is applied, when actual policy positions are considered. In a
country like Senegal, where 60% of the electorate are from rural regions, the policies
of interest are especially agricultural policies. Furthermore, a country that moved
from a autocracy to a democracy is generally interested in the issue of political
regime. When asking for policy positions in the questionnaire, each voter was con-
fronted with two opposite statements and had to answer whether he agrees very
strongly with statement one or two; agrees with statement one or two or agrees with
neither statement one or two. From the responses individual policy positions were
coded for each voter and issue, ranging from one (agree very strongly with statement
1) to five (agree very strongly with statement 2). The following issues were asked in
the Afrobarometer survey, while the first three were added by ourselves and hence
asked for the first time in Round 5, the last one has been part of the Afrobarometer
survey for several years already.
92
8.3 Data Description
1 2 3 4 5
Agricultural vs. Industrial Sector
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
Technical Progress vs. Market Access
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
Cash− vs. Foodcrops
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
Weak vs. Strong State
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
Agricultural vs. Industrial Sector
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
Technical Progress vs. Market Access
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
Cash− vs. Foodcrops
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5
Weak vs. Strong State
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Rural Urban
Figure 8.2: Voter positions in Senegal
Source: own data
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• Agricultural Sector vs. Industrial Sector (agrvsind)
S1: To promote economic growth it is best to focus on agriculture by devel-
oping rural regions and increasing support to farmers.
S2: To promote economic growth it will be more effective to focus on devel-
oping urban areas and building up the industrial sector.
• Technological Progress vs. Market Access (tpvsma)
S1: To promote economic growth it is best to focus on new technologies and
better inputs, like machinery, fertilizer, and better seeds.
S2: To promote economic growth it will be more effective to focus on improv-
ing access to markets with better infrastructure and communications.
• Promotion of Cash Crops vs. Promotion of Food Crops (cashvsfoodcrops)
S1: To promote economic growth it is best to focus on producing more cash
crops like peanuts, sugarcane and cotton.
S2: It is better to focus on producing more food crops like millet, rice, corn
and sorghum to increase economic growth and decrease hunger.
• Strong Government vs. Weak Government (strongvsweakstate)
S1: It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even
if we have no influence over what it does.
S2: It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government account-
able, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly.
In Figure 8.2 the distribution of voter’s policy positions is depicted for people from
urban and rural regions. Differences in their policy preferences are hardly visible, all
graphs are very similar independent of the area of residence. The result is especially
surprising for the issue of agrvsind, as promoting the agricultural sector would
clearly be more beneficial for rural regions than for urban regions. Generally one
can conclude that in Senegal people want to support the agricultural sector rather
than the industrial sector, 88% of the sample agree very strongly or agree with
statement one on the issue agrvsind. When promoting the agricultural sector,
rural as well as urban respondents think that economic growth can be achieved best
through technological progress rather than market access. Further, Senegalese think
that it is better to concentrate on the production of food crops to increase economic
growth and decrease hunger. Again there are no significant differences between rural
and urban respondents. The issue strongvsweakstate shows slight differences
between rural and urban people, urban respondents agree more with statement two
while rural respondents tend to agree with statement one. A possible explanation is
education, which is generally higher in urban regions, hence citizens want to have a
say in politics and hold government accountable.
As there is no explicit information on parties’ policy positions available from the
Afrobarometer survey, we estimated them from the individual voter positions, by
taking the mean policy position of each respondent that voted for that particular
party. The approach is known as partisan constituencies and is commonly used by
political scientists and in the literature on voting behavior (Schofield et al., 2011).
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Figure 8.3: Party positions in Senegal
Source: own data
Figure 8.3 shows that the party positions do not vary significantly from party to
party, which confirms the literature cited above. On the issue strongvsweak-
state all three parties are located in the center of the scale, though the AFP is fur-
ther to the right than APR and PDS, indicating that they favor a more accountable
government. Concerning the issue whether the agricultural or the industrial sector
should be supported, PDS and APR both hold the position 1.58, compared to the
AFP with 1.88. Hence, APR and PDS rather want to develop the rural regions and
the agricultural sector, while the AFP tends a bit more towards the industrial sec-
tor. The political parties agree on economic growth being mainly achieved through
technological progress, with the APR being most convinced (1.90) followed by the
AFP (1.94) and the PDS (2.04). On the last issue cashvsfoodcrops, both PDS
and AFP take the same position (4.12). They want to achieve economic growth by
promoting food crops rather than cash crops. The APR is oriented a little bit more
towards the promotion of cash crops (4.02). The similarity of the policy positions
suggests that policy oriented voting is not very important, as voters are not able to
differentiate the political parties on the basis of their policy programs. Addition-
ally there is no political party that is closer towards the rural or urban population
concerning their policy positions.
For the estimation of voting behavior, policy distances between voters and political
parties were calculated. We took the squared distance to further emphasize greater
distances and to get rid of the algebraic sign. In the estimation results we expect
the policy coefficients to be negative, as greater distances will reduce the probability
to vote for a certain party.
Retrospective voting The Afrobarometer questionnaire contains three questions
that ask the respondents to evaluate the economic conditions in Senegal and their
own personal living conditions. The question is asked for the present situation, the
situation compared to twelve month ago (past) and how the situation will change in
twelve month time (future). To decrease the amount of variables in the estimation
and because of collinearity, we conducted a factor analysis to reduce the number
of variables in the model2. We ended up with a three factor solution, with factors
2The models were also estimated with all variables included, which did not change the results.
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loading high on the time dimension. The factors can be titled: retro-future,
retro-present, retro-past.
Taking a closer look at the evaluations of the present situation, reveals that a
majority of voters thinks that the economic conditions of Senegal are very good or
fairly good. Only 19% consider them to be fairly bad and 1% thinks they are very
bad. Their own living conditions are evaluated more negative by the respondents.
While 45% consider their own living conditions as very good or fairly good, 26% are
neutral about their current situation and the remaining 29% describe it to be fairly
bad/very bad. When asked to compare the economic situation of the country today
with the situation twelve month ago, 60% respond that the situation is the same
or better. But there is also one third of the population that considers the situation
to be worse, and 4% that even say it is much worse. The results for their own
living conditions are slightly more positive, but generally very similar. The ques-
tion concerning the future economic situation of the country and the future living
conditions did only result in 9-10% missing values which is still a lot more than for
the other retrospective variables (1%), but low compared to other African countries.
The Senegalese look very positively towards the future, 78% expect the economic
situation of the country to be better/much better in twelve month time. Even 80%
anticipate the same for their own living conditions. The general atmosphere in Sene-
gal has changed, before the election in 2012, people were very unsatisfied with their
own living conditions and also with the economic situation of the country. They
blamed the former president Abdoulaye Wade for their misery and hooked up with
the opposition instead. With the new president Macky Sall being in office for one
year, people evaluate their own situation as well as the situation of the country much
better.
Non policy voting To account for non policy voting a whole set of sociodemo-
graphic variables as well as a variable that measures approval with the president
were included (approval). Whether someone approves or disapproves with the
president’s performance depends on many different factors. Following the theory de-
scribed in chapter 5 we assume that approval with the president is mainly a valence
issue, strongly manipulable by election campaigning. To measure the president’s
performance, Afrobarometer asks the following question in their survey:
Q71. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that president Macky Sall has
performed his job over the past twelve month, or haven’t you heard enough about
him to say?
Although many Senegalese are rather unsatisfied with the performance of their gov-
ernment, 79% of the people actually approve with president Macky Sall. The result
further confirms the hypothesis that a charismatic leader is a crucial factor in African
elections and far more important than the party he runs for.
Taking a look at the sociodemographic characteristics, which are displayed in
Table 8.2, shows that the ethnic composition of the sample is comparable to the
actual census data of the country. Although the Wolof tribe is underrepresented,
while Pulaar and Serer are overrepresented. However, the differences are not big
and will not restrict representativity of the data. Taking a look at the regional
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Table 8.2: Description of survey data
N mean sd se CI-left CI-right min max
Policy issues
autvsdem 667 2.972 1.614 0.062 2.849 3.094 1 5
agrvsind 667 1.627 1.128 0.044 1.541 1.712 1 5
tpvsma 667 1.939 1.407 0.054 1.832 2.045 1 5
foodvscashcrops 667 4.085 1.258 0.049 3.990 4.181 1 5
Retrospective variables
Senegal (present)1 667 2.504 1.015 0.039 2.427 2.581 1 5
Personal (present) 667 2.705 1.040 0.040 2.626 2.784 1 5
Senegal (past) 667 2.987 0.973 0.038 2.913 3.060 1 5
Personal (past) 667 3.051 0.938 0.036 2.980 3.122 1 5
Senegal (future) 667 3.907 0.748 0.029 3.850 3.964 1 5
Personal (future) 667 3.973 0.703 0.027 3.920 4.026 1 5
Government Performance
approval2 667 3.015 0.835 0.032 2.952 3.078 1 4
Sociodemographic Characteristics
rural3 667 0.568 0.496 0.019 0.531 0.606 0 1
farmer4 667 0.543 0.499 0.019 0.505 0.581 0 1
gender5 667 0.529 0.500 0.019 0.491 0.567 0 1
age 667 37.516 15.067 0.583 36.372 38.659 18 86
muslim6 667 0.948 0.223 0.009 0.931 0.964 0 1
lpi7 667 1.843 0.913 0.035 1.773 1.912 0 4
polint8 667 2.937 1.071 0.041 2.856 3.018 1 4
education9 667 2.205 1.921 0.074 2.060 2.351 0 9
Ethnicity
wolof 667 0.382 0.486 0.019 0.345 0.419 0 1
pulaar 667 0.288 0.453 0.018 0.253 0.322 0 1
serer 667 0.162 0.369 0.014 0.134 0.190 0 1
mandinka 667 0.067 0.251 0.010 0.048 0.087 0 1
diola 667 0.043 0.204 0.008 0.028 0.059 0 1
Region
dakar 667 0.270 0.444 0.017 0.236 0.304 0 1
diourbel 667 0.088 0.284 0.011 0.067 0.110 0 1
kaolack 667 0.076 0.266 0.010 0.056 0.097 0 1
louga 667 0.060 0.238 0.009 0.042 0.078 0 1
saint louis 667 0.070 0.256 0.010 0.051 0.090 0 1
thies 667 0.088 0.284 0.011 0.067 0.110 0 1
ziguinchor 667 0.058 0.235 0.009 0.041 0.076 0 1
1 1=very bad, 5=very good; 2 1=strongly disapprove, 4= strongly approve; 3 1=rural, 0=urban;
4 1=farmer, 0=no farmer;5 1=women, 0=men; 6 1=muslim, 0=other; 7 0=no lived poverty,
4=high lived poverty; 8 1=not at all interested, 4=very interested; 9 1=no formal schooling,
9=post graduate
Source: own data
97
Chapter 8 Senegal
distribution of the sample, shows that a majority, 27% is from Dakar, the other
regions are all represented with only 6-9% of the sample share. Furthermore, 57%
of the sample are from rural regions (rural) and 54% work in the farming sector.
The numbers are very close to the last census, which reported a rural population of
57.5%. The sample contains slightly more women than men (gender) and the mean
age is 38 years, with the youngest respondent being 18 years old at the interview and
the oldest being 86 years old (age). Further, 95% of the sample are Muslims, which
again resembles the census data from 2011 (muslim). The level of education is quite
low, 19% of the sample did not enjoy any formal schooling and another 28% only
got an informal education, which in Senegal mainly includes Koranic schools. Only
5% of the sample completed at least secondary school (education). Income was
measured with the Lived Poverty Index (lpi). The mean LPI of our sample is 1.84,
the mean of the total sample is slightly lower 1.76. Although the index appears to
be low, when comparing it to the other Afrobarometer survey countries, Senegal has
the highest lived poverty index after Togo, Burundi, Niger and Guinea and hence
belongs to the five poorest Afrobarometer survey countries. Finally, to measure
general interest in policies, respondents were asked How interested would you say
you are in public affairs? (polint). Most of the Senegalese are not interested in
public affairs (68%), only 14% are very interested and 18% are somewhat interested
in public affairs.
8.4 Estimation of Voting Behavior
8.4.1 Multinomial Logit Model
To gain further information on voting behavior in Senegal, we estimated a multi-
nomial logit model (ML)3. In Table 8.3 the output of seven model specifications is
displayed. From model one to model six, exogenous variables were added in groups
and estimated together with a party specific constant. Each group of added variables
corresponds to a voting motive respectively. Hence, model one only includes policy
oriented voting, in model two retrospective voting is added and model three further
includes party identity measured as general approval with the president (non policy
voting). In model four individual specific characteristics like gender, religion and
age were added; model five includes ethnicity as another individual specific charac-
teristic and model six further accounts for different regions. The goodness of fit of
each model is measured with McFadden’s R2 and the Log-Likelihood value. From
model one to model six the R2 increases from 0.009 to 0.25. Policy oriented voting
on it’s own is not able to explain voting behavior in Senegal, the goodness of fit
in model one is extremely poor and the likelihood ratio test is not even significant.
Still, two of the policy issues are significant and all of them have the right algebraic
sign. The only coefficient that is significant on the ten percent level throughout all
model specifications is the issue agricvsind. The result confirms the importance of
the agricultural sector, which is due to the quantitative dominance of the rural voter
that was already mentioned in the literature review of this section. The addition of
3Please note that the dummy variables for Farmer, Diola and Dakar were dropped from the model
because of collinearity.
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retrospective voting increases model fit significantly, the coefficients are alternative
specific and displayed for the opposition parties AFP and PDS. All alternative spe-
cific coefficients are interpreted in comparison to the incumbent party, Macky Sall’s
APR. Only the coefficient retro-past is significant throughout all model specifica-
tions. Neither the present nor the future situation of the country and the voter have
significant influence on vote choice. The negative coefficient for retrospective voting
indicates that the better people evaluate their own living situation and the situation
of the country compared to the past, the higher is the probability to vote for the
APR and the lower is the probability to vote for the AFP or the PDS. Although,
please note that the coefficient is only significant for the PDS. Still, the negative
sign confirms the hypothesis that Senegalese impute the positive development of
their own situation and the situation of the country to the current president. In
model three party identity, measured as the general approval with the president was
added. The variable is highly significant for both political parties and increases the
R2 from 0.031 to 0.14. Non policy voting measured through approval has strong
influence on voting behavior in Senegal. The stronger people approve with the cur-
rent president, the lower is the probability to vote for one of the opposition parties.
From model four to model six individual specific variables are added, starting with
model four most of the sociodemographic characteristics have no influence on vote
choice. Rurality, poverty and political interest are significant in at least one of the
model specifications. Living in a rural region has negative influence on voting for
the opposition. The effect is significant for the PDS in all model specifications,
hence the hypothesis that the incumbent is rather supported by rural voters can
be confirmed. Poverty has a positive significant effect for the AFP in model six,
hence poorer voters prefer the AFP compared to the APR. Political interest again,
is just like rurality in favor of the incumbent. The more someone is interested in
public affairs, the higher is the probability to vote for the APR. In model five and
model six, ethnicity and region are introduced. Most of the dummy variables have
no significant effect on either the one or the other political party. Please note that
the main ethnic group Wolof is not biased towards one of the political parties, the
coefficient is not significant. In contrast the smaller ethnic tribes have their favorite
political parties, Pulaar and Serer clearly favor the APR. Regional ties are stronger
towards the opposition parties, Diourbel and Ziguinchor have a strong tendency to
vote either for the PDS or the AFP. Kaolack prefers the AFP to the APR, but the
APR to the PDS.
For a better overview and to reduce the number of parameters in the model we
additionally estimated model seven. In this model, variables were stepwise dropped
from model six until model fit decreased significantly following a likelihood-ratio
test. Hence, model seven is the best fit model, which does not include insignificant
coefficients any more. We assume that the variables that were dropped from this
model do not explain voting behavior in Senegal, hence we do not consider them
any further. Model seven shows that the only sociodemographic variable apart from
ethnicity and region that influences vote choice significantly is rural. Further, vote
choice is driven by the policy issue agrvsind, retro-past, approval, ethnicity
(pulaar, serer) and region (kaolack, ziguinchor).
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8.4 Estimation of Voting Behavior
The coefficients of a logit model are not linear and hence not directly interpretable,
that is why we will also provide the marginal effects of model seven. A one unit
shift of a party’s policy position on the issue agriculture vs. industrial sector changes
the mean probability to vote for the incumbent by 2.2%, whereas the changes for
AFP and PDS are -0.08% and 1.3% respectively. The relatively low effects result
because the sign of the individual marginal effects is not the same for every voter,
a change of the policy position closer towards the industrial sector can increase
the distance between party and voter for some voters and decrease the distance for
others. Hence, the effects equalize each other and the mean effect is rather low.
In Figure 8.4 election probabilities were calculated for each party for the policy
positions one to five, c.p. constant policy positions of all other political parties. All
three political parties have their maximum at position two, which is close to their
empirical position. The changes in voting probability are small for PDS and AFP,
the range is 8% for the former and only 2% for the latter. Thus they are not able
to gain or loose many of their votes by changing their policy position on the issue
of agricultural policies. The results for the APR are different, moving away from
position two towards the left or the right reduces the probability to win the elections.
While a position closer to the rural population and the agricultural sector (policy
position one) would only reduce the election result by 3%, a movement towards the
urban population and the support of the industrial sector results in a loose of 60%
of the votes. Especially for the incumbent party policy oriented voting is important
and they have to adapt their policy program to the requirements of their electorate.
The mean marginal effect of retrospective voting is negative for the PDS and the
AFP, both political parties loose votes, when the evaluation of retrospective voting
increases (PDS 2.8% and AFP 0.1%). Contrariwise the effect of the APR is positive,
the party gains 2.9% when the evaluation of retrospective voting increases by one
unit. Marginal effects for non policy voting are considerably bigger than those of
policy and retrospective voting. When approval with the president increases, the
probability to vote for the APR increases by 15.4%, while the PDS looses 13% of
their votes. The effect for the AFP is also negative, but less severe only 2.4% of
the people refrain their vote. Finally, we calculated the effects of ethnicity and
region. Pulaar and Serer have positive effects to vote for the incumbent of 11.4%
and 9%. For the two regions included in the Model, we determine clear strongholds
of the opposition parties. The marginal effect of Ziguinchor is positive for the PDS
(15.8%) and Kaolack strongly favors the AFP (31.5%). The marginal effect of living
in a rural area is positive for the incumbent (7.8%) and negative for the opposition
parties. Hence, the expected incumbent advantage in the rural regions is confirmed
by our data.
The importance for the different voting motives in Senegal is displayed in Figure
8.5, non policy voting is most important in Senegal, followed by policy voting and
last is retrospective voting. The mean relative importance is 10.5% for retrospective
voting, 56% for non policy voting and 33.5% for policy voting. Especially the high
importance of policy voting is surprising and does not confirm the expectations we
had after studying the literature on voting behavior in Senegal. Also retrospective
voting is far less important than we expected beforehand.
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Figure 8.5: RI of non policy, policy and retrospective voting
Source: own data
8.4.2 Heterogeneity
In the previous section, voting behavior was described in general. In Senegal, non
policy voting plays an important role, followed by policy and retrospective voting.
However, the results presented always relied on average values and did not further
consider heterogeneity among individuals. Taking a closer look at Figure 8.5 shows
that voting motives differ strongly from person to person, hence voting behavior is
not homogeneous among the population of Senegal. Considering the literature as
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Source: own data
well as the first empirical results from the previous section, we expect that whether
someone lives in a rural or in an urban area strongly influences voting behavior.
While the hypothesis that rural voters are biased towards the incumbent could be
confirmed with our data in the previous section already, now we want to investigate
why they actually prefer the incumbent. If it is clientelistic voting motives that
drive the electorate, we will find evidence that non policy voting is more important
in rural regions than it is in urban areas. In Figure 8.6 we plotted the importance
of non policy voting as well as policy voting for urban and rural regions separately.
The graph shows that actually rural regions vote a bit more policy oriented than
urban areas, the opposite is true for non policy oriented voting which is more pro-
nounced in urban areas. The results point out that people from rural areas vote
for the incumbent in this case Macky Sall, because he provides the best policies for
them and not because of clientelistic behavior. However, the differences are only
small and do not fully explain heterogeneity in voting behavior. We will further
analyze the difference between rural and urban regions, another way to explore het-
erogeneity is the latent class analysis. We estimated the LC model by taking the
same variables already used in the ML estimation, but only included policy oriented
voting, retrospective voting and approval voting in the choice model and used all
personal characteristics in the class model. The estimation results of the two class
solution are printed in Table 8.4. Other model specifications were estimated as well,
but did not converge4 and are thus not presented at this point, but of course they
are available on request from the author.
Class membership is distributed unevenly in the sample, two thirds statistically
4The problem of local maxima, which leads to models that do not converge frequently occurs
in latent class models, especially when the number of estimated classes is high (Vermunt and
Magidson, 2005).
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Table 8.4: Latent class estimation results
Model for Choices
Class 1 z-value p-value Class 2 z-value p-value Wald(=) p-value
Attributes
afp:constant -7.149 -1.200 0.2306 2.640 2.180 0.0296 3.528 0.170
pds:constant 1.865 1.592 0.1119 4.752 2.781 0.0056
agrvsind -1.850 -1.420 0.1561 -0.394 -1.506 0.1326 1.180 0.280
Predictors
afp:retro-past 5.144 1.461 0.1445 -0.193 -0.865 0.3874 2.376 0.300
pds:retro-past -0.394 -1.039 0.2992 -0.352 -0.858 0.3912
afp:approval -1.753 -1.510 0.1315 -0.972 -2.795 0.0053 0.538 0.760
pds:approval -1.524 -2.500 0.0127 -1.773 -2.715 0.0068
Model for Classes
Class 1 z-value p-value Class 2 z-value p-value
Class Membership 0.6689 0.3311
Covariates
intercept 0.000 -0.081 -0.162 0.8714
rural 0.000 -1.121 -2.599 0.0096
pulaar 0.000 -1.411 -2.689 0.0074
serer 0.000 -1.086 -1.848 0.0651
kaolack 0.000 2.878 2.324 0.0204
ziguinchor 0.000 5.401 1.694 0.0907
Source: own estimation
belong to Class 1 and one third belongs to Class 25. The smaller size of Class
2 results out of three reasons, first, a negative intercept for Class 2 in the class
model, second a negative coefficient for rural regions and third negative coefficients
for Pulaar and Serer. The coefficients for Kaolack and Ziguinchor on the other
hand are positive for being in Class 2. All coefficients except for the constant are
significant on the ten percent level. More information on the composition of the two
classes can be found in Table 8.5 were the mean of each variable is presented for
Class 1 and Class 2 respectively. The p-value in the third column indicates whether
the differences between the classes are significant considering a t-test. Class 1 and
Class 2 do not differ from each other concerning their policy positions. But they
do differ in their perception of the economic situation of the country and their own
living conditions, independent of the timing, Class 1 evaluates both measures more
positive than Class 2. Although only the differences between the evaluation of the
present economic situation of the the country, the present living conditions and the
future situation of the country are statistically significant. Additionally Class 1 also
approves stronger with the performance of the president than Class 2. Considering
personal characteristics, the two classes do not differ very much, farming background,
gender, age, poverty and political interest are distributed equally between the two
classes. However, Class 1 lives more in rural areas and has a greater share of Muslims
compared to Class 2. Further, is Class 2 better educated than Class 1, which goes in
line with more people living in urban areas, where access to education is generally
better than in rural areas. Finally ethnicity and region also differ among classes,
5Class membership is probabilistic, hence every individual has a probability to be in Class 1 (pi1)
and a probability to be in Class 2 (1− pi1).
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Source: own data
while the share of Wolof, Mandinka and Diola is bigger in Class 2, the share of
Pulaar and Serer is significantly bigger in Class 1. The people of Dakar and Thies
split up evenly into both classes. In Class 1 more people are from Diourbel, Louga
and Saint Louis and in Class 2 more people are from Kaolack and Ziguinchor. To
summarize the composition of the two classes, Class 1 is the rural, lower educated
class which is more satisfied with the president, the situation of the country and their
own personal living conditions. Class 2 on the other hand mainly consists of urban
people, who are better educated and unsatisfied with the government, the situation
of the country and their own living conditions. Last we compare vote choice for
both classes. Class 1 is very close to the APR, 90% would vote for Macky Sall and
only 8.5% for the PDS and 0.6% for the AFP. In Class 2, 40% would vote for the
PDS, 36% for the AFP and only 24% for the APR. The results show once more that
especially people from urban regions vote for the opposition parties, because they are
unsatisfied with the performance of the current government. Hence, disregarding the
rural population will inevitably lead to a loss of votes for the APR and eventually to
loosing the next election. That is why Macky Sall will have to put special emphasis
on improvement of the rural areas during his presidency, if he wants to keep up his
current popularity and stay in office for another term.
The class model determined the composition of the two classes and showed that
they differ significantly in their characteristics. The particular about the LC model
is that not only the two classes differ from each other, but also the coefficients deter-
mining the choice situation. The upper part of Table 8.4 displays the just mentioned
choice model. It becomes immediately obvious that apart from the coefficient for
approval, no other coefficients are statistically significant for Class 1. Class 2 has
positive and significant party specific constants for AFP and PDS, all other coeffi-
cients are in favor of the APR. The policy issue agrvsind is not significant in the
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Table 8.5: Descriptive statistics by latent classes
Class 1 Class 2 p-value
Policy position
autvsdem 2.928 3.100 0.222
agrvsind 1.642 1.582 0.541
tpvsma 1.980 1.818 0.170
foodvscashcrops 4.056 4.171 0.280
Retrospective Variables
Senegal (present) 2.579 2.282 0.001
Personal (present) 2.748 2.576 0.074
Senegal (past) 3.004 2.935 0.449
Personal (past) 3.072 2.988 0.323
Senegal (future) 3.940 3.812 0.070
Personal (future) 3.994 3.912 0.213
Government Performance
approval 3.080 2.824 0.001
Sociodemographic Characteristics
rural 0.610 0.447 0.000
farmer 0.555 0.506 0.267
gender 0.539 0.500 0.379
age 37.523 37.494 0.983
muslim 0.958 0.918 0.082
lpi 1.852 1.815 0.638
polint 2.962 2.865 0.313
education 2.068 2.606 0.002
Ethnicity
wolof 0.342 0.500 0.000
pulaar 0.354 0.094 0.000
serer 0.199 0.053 0.000
mandinka 0.056 0.100 0.086
diola 0.006 0.153 0.000
Region
dakar 0.270 0.271 0.980
diourbel 0.107 0.035 0.000
kaolack 0.010 0.271 0.000
louga 0.076 0.012 0.000
saint louis 0.080 0.041 0.045
thies 0.097 0.065 0.169
ziguinchor 0.000 0.229 0.000
Source: own data
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Source: own data
LC model, neither for Class 1 nor for Class 2. The same holds true for retrospective
voting, which is also not significant. Still, the marginal effects of the LC model
are very similar to the effects from the ML model and are hence not further de-
scribed at this point. However, although the average marginal effects are almost the
same, the relative importance of the voting motives differs depending on the model
of choice. While the relative importance of retrospective voting is again 10.5%, the
importance of non policy voting is only 47.1% and the importance of policy voting is
42.4%. Consequently the results of the LC analysis further emphasize the important
role of policy voting in Senegal. Figure 8.7 shows the density plots for the relative
importance on the basis of the LC results. Especially the effects for policy and non
policy voting are a lot more equally distributed compared to the ML model. Also
the density plot for retrospective voting is less peaked and more widely distributed
for the LC model. Further, Figure 8.8 investigates whether the found heterogeneity
can be explained with the class membership variable. The plot shows a clear sepa-
ration of the sample into two groups, Class 1 and Class 2. While Class 1 votes far
more policy oriented, Class 2 heavily relies on non policy voting. Recalling the class
specifications, Class 1 was considered as the rural class and Class 2 as the urban
class. Hence, the results from the LC analysis confirm the results already obtained
in the ML model. Rural voters vote very policy oriented, while urban voters rely
more on non policy voting.
8.5 Voting Behavior and Government Performance
The main findings of the previous section are twofold, first, in Senegal voters rely
mainly on policy and non policy voting while retrospective voting is of minor impor-
tance. Second, voting behavior is not at all homogeneous, but very heterogeneous.
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The differences in voting behavior in the survey were identified with a latent class
analysis that discovered two groups of voters: a small, well educated, urban class
(Class 2) and a bigger, less educated, rural class (Class 1). The urban class relies
heavily on non policy voting and hence on clientelistic policies, while the rural class
votes because of policy issues, especially because of agricultural policy issues. In this
section we will take another step towards explaining not only voting behavior but
also its effects on government performance. From the results already achieved, we
expect that actually the rural population will have a higher voting weight in Senegal
and capture the government in their favor, because they vote more policy oriented
instead of non policy oriented. As policy voting is crucial in Senegal, we also expect
that accountability of the government towards the voter will be high.
8.5.1 Government Accountability
Just like in the previous section for the case of Ghana, we also calculated the three
already known government accountability indices for the case of Senegal. The results
are printed in Table 8.6 for the ML model as well as for the LC model. We assume
that the exact level of the index lies somewhere in between both model specifications,
probably further towards the LC result as it is rather able to sufficiently cope with
heterogeneity. GA1 equals 0.38 when the ML model outcome is used for the calcu-
lation and 0.5 for the LC model. Hence, interest groups and lobbying accounts for
up to 50-62% of the total power in the political process in Senegal. The remaining
38-50% belong to the voter. Considering the long history of democracy and multi-
party elections in Senegal, the accountability index and the political power of the
voter are low. When the political process is dominated by interest groups with more
than 50% of the total power, elections as the main mechanism to ensure democracy
are not working well. Interest groups are favored by the government at the expense
of the individual voter. Next to voters and interest groups also intrinsic policy pref-
erences of the governmental party determine the political process. GA2 measures
the importance of intrinsic policy preferences in the political process. As no data
on intrinsic policy preferences is available, the ratio of intrinsic policy preferences in
the current situation and intrinsic policy preferences in a situation with only policy
oriented and retrospective voting is calculated instead. Being below one generally
indicates low intrinsic policy preferences. But when considering the LC result the
index is very close to one, which actually complicates interpretation as no informa-
tion on the absolute level of intrinsic policy preferences is available. However, we
can conclude that the importance of intrinsic policy preferences does not differ very
much whether non policy voting is applied or not. A possible solution for that find-
ing is that intrinsic policy preferences are generally low in Senegal. The relative high
importance of policy voting and the fact that the government has to serve interest
groups as well as voters, leaves no leeway for their own intrinsic policy preferences.
The theory is supported by the high GA1 index. Further, the GA2 index calculated
from the ML model results indicates that the relative weight of intrinsic policy pref-
erences of the government is 0.45 times lower then in a hypothetical case when no
non policy voting exists, support the assumption that intrinsic policy preferences
are low in the political landscape of Senegal. Though for better interpretation and
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Table 8.6: Government accountability indices (ML and LC Analysis)
ML LC
GA1 0.38 0.50
GA2 0.55 0.99
GA3 agrvsind 0.45 0.30
Source: own calculations
classification of GA2, we would need explicit data on intrinsic policy preferences of
the political actors.
The third indicator GA3, measures the range within which policy positions can
be shifted by the incumbent without loosing office. Reasons for changing policy
positions are for example to please interest groups by taking policy positions that
are close to their interests or to please ones own intrinsic policy preferences. From
Figure 8.4 we already know that the APR has an electoral advantage compared to
the other two parties. We calculated an actual margin of 45% with the results of
the ML model and still 30% for the results of the LC model. Put differently, the
APR can choose a policy position between one (total support of the agricultural
sector) and 3.25 (ML) or 2.52 (LC) without loosing the majority of votes. The wide
range allows them to especially please special interests and lobbying groups. The
importance of agricultural policies and the possibility to move their policy position
totally towards the agricultural sector suggests that especially the agricultural lobby
has a big weight in the policy process in Senegal. For the individual voter a high GA3
index means that the government is not accountable towards them, as a change in
policy position does not harm a candidate’s chance of winning the election. Although
policy voting is important in Senegal, the government is not bound to specific policy
positions by voter’s political requirements.
Summarizing all three indicators results in a government that on the one hand
has relatively low intrinsic policy preferences (GA2), but on the other hand provides
accountability mainly towards interest groups and not towards the voter. Hence,
once more the mechanism of voting that is supposed to work as the main tool to
ensure a well functioning democracy is not working sufficiently in Senegal.
8.5.2 Government Capture
In the previous chapter we showed that government accountability is low towards
the voter but high towards interest groups. In this part we will further examine
which groups have higher weights and are hence able to capture the government
on the cost of other groups. In this context, groups are defined as people with the
same demographic characteristics e.g. people living in rural areas. They are not
synonymous with organized interest groups. To analyze capture we calculated an
individual voter weight. In a well functioning perfect democracy, everybody has
the same weight depending on his or her population share. In the present case
(n=667) the individual weight in an optimal situation would be 1/667. However,
the optimal situation is only a theoretic construct, voter weights are never totally
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Figure 8.9: Lorenz curve (left: ML - M7, right: LC)
Source: own data
equally distributed. In Senegal the Gini coefficient, which measures the statistical
dispersion of the voter weight, is 0.28 for the ML model results and 0.39 for the LC
model results. Both coefficients are relatively low and do not imply great inequality
in Senegal. In Figure 8.9 the Lorenz curves are plotted, they show the distribution
of the voter weights and the corresponding Gini coefficient.
Although the distribution is not heavily biased, it is still possible that certain
groups are less represented in the political process than others that is why we addi-
tionally calculated an index measuring capture among groups of voters. Therefore,
we took the average weight of one group in relation to the average weight of it’s
antagonistic group. In comparison to Ghana we would actually expect the poor and
rural people to have higher weights in Senegal, as they vote mainly policy oriented
compared to the urban voters that rely more on non policy voting. Figure 8.10 shows
the results of the capture indices. If the bar points towards the right side this group
has a greater average weight than the group on the left and vice versa. The capture
index between urban and rural regions is 1.27, which means that the average urban
weight is 27% higher than the average rural weight. Hence, the urban regions are
capturing the rural areas. An index of one would indicate that their average weights
are equal and no capture persists. The direction of the capture index is mostly the
same for the ML and LC model, the only time it points in opposite directions is in
the case of the Wolof tribe. While the ML model calculates that the Wolof tribe
captures all the other tribes, the LC model results in other tribes slightly capturing
the Wolof. Further, there is a bias towards the richer, well educated population. Sur-
prisingly in Senegal, a mainly Muslim country, women are actually capturing men
and not vice versa. Regional and ethnic inequalities are only displayed for Dakar
and the Wolof tribe. Dakar as the capital of Senegal and a mainly urban region that
displays the countries elite, is capturing all other regions. In the last row, the cap-
ture index is also displayed for the two classes identified in the LC model. The larger
rural Class 1 is capturing the smaller urban Class 2. The result is surprising as the
urban population is capturing the rural population. However, the difference is only
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Source: own data
small and further the composition of the classes is not one dimensional, rather the
classes are made up of many different characteristics. Class 2 is not only the urban
class, but also includes all the people from Ziguinchor, whose average voting weight
is 20% lower compared to everyone else. That among other reasons is responsible
for the lower average weight of Class 2.
Although the average political weight of the rural population is lower than that
of the urban population, they still make up almost 60% of the population. To
win the elections in Senegal, political parties have to rally the rural population
behind them. For rural people especially agricultural policies and the support of
the agricultural sector is important. In this sample the rural population has a mean
policy position of 1.52 on the issues agricultural vs. industrial sector compared to
1.77 for the urban population. The differences between the policy positions are
small, although theoretically they should strongly diverge. Agriculture plays an
important role in the rural regions, where it provides the means of subsistence for
most households. In urban areas people rather work in the industrial sector and
the service sector. However, also urban people favor the support of the agricultural
sector over the industrial sector. Caplan (2007) explains the misjudgment of their
own policy position as the irrationality of the voter. They are manipulated by
election campaigns and the media, which leads to biased ideas concerning economics
and hence policy positions.
The incumbent party APR is positioned in between the rural and the urban voters,
but closer to the rural people (1.58). The result is a first evidence that policy pro-
grams in Senegal are not only implemented to benefit the urban population, but that
politicians are actually moving closer towards the rural population. Although gov-
ernment accountability towards the voter is low in Senegal and the rural population
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is captured by the urban population, they are still very well represented concern-
ing agricultural policies. One reason therefore is government accountability towards
interest groups, when i.e. agricultural interest groups and farmer unions are well
organized the total weight of the rural interests can still be high although the indi-
vidual weight of a rural voter is low. Intrinsic policy preferences of the governmental
party or the president himself are another explanation that the APR positions itself
further to the left side of the scale, closer to the rural voters, although they have a
lower average political weight. The empirically optimal policy position of the APR
can be calculated by multiplying a voter’s weight with it’s individual policy position
and summing it up for all voters. The empirical policy position results in 1.73 with
the actual weights and 1.62 when equal voting weights are assumed (see equation
5.28 and 5.29). The position of the APR is actually much closer to the situation
with equal weights than it is to the empirical situation. The result reveals that
although the political process is biased towards urban interests, the policy positions
do not reflect this bias. Policy positions are further adjusted towards other interests
that were not measured by our data, namely special interests of lobbying groups
and intrinsic policy preferences of the government. Another conclusion that can be
drawn from this is that government accountability towards the voter can be low, but
that does not automatically mean that policy positions in the country are biased
as well. The case of Senegal shows that the bias is actually reduced because the
government behaves accountable towards itself and interest groups instead of being
accountable towards the voter. In this empirical application we did not focus on the
role of interest groups and intrinsic policy preferences in the political process, but
it is an interesting topic for future research how much policy positions are actually
influenced by these other factors. For the case of Senegal, it remains to be seen were
Macky Sall and the APR will position themselves in the policy space and whether
they will focus more on the urban or the rural interests in the near future.
So far we found out that voting behavior in Senegal is twofold, there is the rural
population that votes more policy oriented and the urban population that votes
more non policy oriented. Retrospective voting is less important for both groups.
Further, we investigated the individual weights of the two groups and saw that
in contrary to our expectations the urban population on average has higher voter
weights than the rural population although they vote more non policy oriented.
Hence, we analyzed the connection between voting behavior and voting weights, to
draw further conclusions on government performance in Senegal. In Figure 8.11 we
plotted the share of non policy voting in the representative utility on the x-axis
and the voter weight on the y-axis. The graph on the left side is plotted with the
results of the ML model, it shows a clear reversed U-shape with its maximum around
minus two. The maximum is not at zero for Senegal, because we do not have a two
party case and hence the voter weight is not equal to P*(1-P) anymore. The result
reveals that pure policy voting does not automatically lead to the biggest voting
weights, hence although the rural population votes more policy oriented than the
urban people their average weight is lower and they are being captured. The graph
on the right plots the results from the LC model, a very slight reversed U-shape is
visible. However, it seems that with the LC analysis it is very difficult to explain
voting weights in a multiparty case. Another reason is that while non policy voting
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Figure 8.11: Relationship between voter weights and voting behavior (left: ML,
right: LC)
Source: own data
includes also personal characteristics of the voter in the ML model specification,
in the Latent Class model only approval with the president is included because all
other individual specific characteristics are part of the class model and not of the
choice model. But, although the connection is not perfectly clear, both plots show
that a certain degree of non policy voting increases the political weight of the voter.
However, once a certain level of non policy voting is exceeded, the correlation is
negative.
8.6 Summary
Senegal is one of the oldest democracies in Africa, since 1978 it witnessed seven
multiparty elections and three peaceful turnovers of power. The last turnover took
place in 2012, when Macky Sall replaced Abdoulaye Wade as president. In this
chapter we analyzed the current voting behavior in Senegal, why people vote for a
certain candidate, what are their voting motives and finally how does voting behavior
translate in governmental performance, measured by government accountability and
capture. Compared to most other papers on voting behavior in Senegal we do not
analyze the last presidential election, but the current situation one year after Macky
Sall became president.
Senegalese voted for Macky Sall in 2012, because they were dissatisfied with Ab-
doulaye Wade and were hoping for a change. One year later there are three reasons
why more than 60% would do the same again. First, people agree that their personal
situation as well as the economic situation of the country has improved. Addition-
ally they expect the situation to improve even further in the near future. Second,
after only one year in office, almost 80% of the population approve with the way
President Sall has performed his job. Accordingly identification with the political
leader is already very pronounced. Finally the third reason is that the policy po-
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sitions of the APR are in line with the expected and requested policy positions of
the voters. While the last point corresponds to policy oriented voting, the first
is considered to be retrospective voting and the second point corresponds to non
policy voting. With a relative importance of 47-56% (depending on the estimated
voter model) non policy voting is most important in Senegal. Retrospective voting
only accounts for 11% and policy voting for 34-42%. Furthermore, voting behavior
is heterogeneous in Senegal, with a latent class analysis we identified two distinct
classes. Mostly rural, poor and less educated people belong to Class 1, they are
optimistic considering their evaluation of the economic situation of the country and
their own personal situation. The second class is smaller and contains the urban,
rich and better educated people. While Class 1 is very close to Macky Sall, Class 2
is more or less indifferent between PDS and AFP, but also not disinclined to vote for
the APR. Voting motives also differ between the two classes, actually the elite from
the urban regions votes far more non policy oriented than policy oriented, while the
rural and poorer Class 1 votes almost equally policy and non policy oriented.
Voting behavior influences government performance. In Senegal, government is
mainly accountable towards interest groups. We calculated an index GA1 of 38-50%,
which indicates that the voters have the same or less power than interest groups in
the political process. Furthermore, political parties can vary their policy position
by up to 45% to please interest groups or their own intrinsic policy preferences.
Considering the long history of democracy and the recent turnover of power, the
degree of government accountability we measured in Senegal is quite low. This
is especially due to the strong role of non policy voting. We do not call it party
identity, as people do not mainly identify with the APR but rather with the party
leader, Macky Sall. The party leader effect is more important than policy voting
and retrospective voting together. We could further identify that voting weights are
connected to voting behavior, while in a two party case voting weights are higher
when people vote mainly policy oriented, in the three party case of Senegal a low
degree of non policy voting actually leads to maximum voting weights. Though if
the absolute degree of non policy voting is too high, voting weights are decreasing
again. This leads to a situation, where voting weights are biased towards certain
groups. Although the distribution of voting weights is not heavily biased in Senegal,
the urban population captures the rural population and rich people capture poor
people. However, we also found out that the bias in actual policy positions is only
small, because of the power of interest groups and intrinsic policy preferences.
We conclude that on the positive side, voting weights are not heavily biased in
Senegal and the degree of capture present in the country is relatively low compared
to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, we also figured out that although
policy and retrospective voting are applied, non policy voting is dominant and leads
to low accountability towards the voter. Policy positions can further be altered
depending on the intrinsic preferences of the government or the demands of interest
groups. Fortunately, the pressure of interest groups actually leads to policy positions
that are less biased than without interest group interference. Nevertheless, if Senegal
wants to stay one of the showpieces of African democracies, the current government
under President Macky Sall has to increase accountability towards the voter and
reduce the power of interest groups in the political process.
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Uganda
Of the three case study countries compared in this book, Uganda is the only one
located in East Africa and further the only country that is landlocked. Uganda
shares a border with Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, South
Sudan and Tanzania. Lake Victoria, Africa’s largest lake is situated in the south
of the country and defines part of it’s southern boundary. Uganda is divided into
four administrative regions, the Central, Western, Eastern and Northern Region and
111 districts (see Figure 9.1). 35.9 million people live in Uganda, it has the largest
population compared to Ghana and Senegal and is further the second most populated
landlocked country in the world. Uganda is ethnically very diverse with more than
40 ethnic tribes, most of them speak their own tribal language. The largest and
politically and economically most important tribe are the Baganda people, 16.9% of
the population belong to that tribe. They live mainly in the Central Region around
the country’s capital Kampala. Other large tribes are the Banyankole (9.5%), the
Basoga (8.4%), the Bakiga (6.9%), Iteso (6.4%) and the Langi (6.1%). The ethnic
heterogeneity of the country that is due to the former colonial boundaries created
by Britain, is one reason for the political instability especially during the regimes of
Idi Amin and Milton Obote.
Uganda’s Economy is growing with a GDP growth rate of 4.6% in 2012 and
expected growth rates for the next years are between 6-7%. Those growth rates are
high, especially compared to the average growth rates of Sub-Saharan Africa that
will reach 4-5.5% in the following years. Uganda’s economy still strongly relies on
the agricultural sector, which has a share of 23.1% of the countries GDP and an
employment share of over 80%. The main export good is coffee, furthermore the
country is rich in natural resources, copper, gold and other minerals can be found
in Uganda. Lately, oil was also discovered in Uganda which will further increase
income from exports. The World Bank (2013) classifies Uganda as a low income
country with a GNI per capita (Atlas method) of $440 in 2012.
Compared to Ghana and Senegal, Uganda only has a short history of multi party
elections and has not witnessed any peaceful electoral turnovers yet. Freedom House
classifies Uganda as a partly free country, with a political rights ranking of five and
a civil liberties ranking of four. The polity IV score of Uganda is minus one, which
defines it as an anocracy (Marshall et al., 2012).
9.1 From Independence to Democracy
Uganda was a British colony until it gained independence in 1962. Milton Obote
leader of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) became the first prime minister of the
country. In 1966 he changed the constitution and removed the positions of president
and vice president, which gave himself even greater power. Additionally he abolished
the traditional kingdoms, which led to bloody riots all over the country. Five years
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Figure 9.1: Map of Uganda
Source: Map No. 3862 Rev. 4, May 2003, UNITED NATIONS
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later the leader of the armed forces, Idi Amin, led a military coup against Obote and
his government. Amin became the next president of Uganda and just like Obote
helped himself to absolute power with rather undemocratic methods. Henceforth
he ruled the country in a military way, the opposition was oppressed and former
supporters of Obote and other political opponents were prosecuted and murdered.
The number of victims during the Amin regime fluctuates between 100.000 and
500.000 (Harff and Gurr, 1989). The reign of terror went on until 1979, when finally
the Uganda National Liberation Front around Yusuf Lule captured Kampala and
ousted Idi Amin from power. Amin fled first to Libya and later to Saudi Arabia,
where he lived in exile until his death in 2003 (Keatley, 2003).
After the coup instability persisted. Uganda saw three presidents within a year,
first Yusuf Lule himself, who was replaced by Godfrey Binaisa and finally once more
Milton Obote. Actually in December 1980 the first elections since independence took
place (Brett, 1995), however they were neither free nor fair. When the result did
not resembled the intended result, Paulo Muwanga, the chairman of the governing
Military Commission, first declared himself to the leader of the election commission
and later declared Obote to be the new and old president of Uganda. Muwanga
himself became vice president and minister of defense (Tindigarukayo, 1988). There
were many groups that did not accept Obote as president, especially Lule’s National
Resistance Movement and it’s military arm the National Resistance Army (NRA)
under the lead of Yoweri Museveni kept on fighting against the government. It took
five years of war between the Ugandan army and the NRA, until finally Obote’s
own army rebelled against him, forcefully took over power and installed Tito Okello
a former army chief as new president. Although there were peace talks between
the new government and the NRA, once more peace only lasted a few month until
the NRA took over Kampala forcefully in January 1986 and declared Museveni the
new president of Uganda. The NRA was renamed to Uganda Peoples Defense Force
(UPDF) and still presents the armed forces of Uganda to this day.
After Museveni gained power, the activities of political parties were strongly re-
stricted. Although political parties still existed they were not allowed to actively
campaign in elections, instead candidates were running for office as individuals and
not as members of a political party (Carbone, 2003). Under the so called Move-
ment System, Museveni reigned the country for almost twenty years, until in 2005
a national referendum in Uganda decided to change the political system towards a
multi-party system. Simultaneously presidential term limits were abolished, which
cleared the way for Museveni to run for a third term in the elections in 2006. Before
that in a first referendum in 2000 the population had still voted against a multi
party system and in favor of the Movement system. In the meantime, Museveni
won the presidential elections in 1996 and 2001. In the first multi party elections
since Museveni gained power in 1986, six presidential candidates were listed. How-
ever, Museveni’s only serious opponent was the leader of the Forum for Democratic
Change (FDC) Kizza Besigye, who already stood for presidency in 2001. In the
end Museveni won the election in 2006 with 59.26% of the votes followed by Be-
sigye who still got respectable 37.39%. In 2011 Besigye challenged Museveni once
more, but also lost in his third attempt to gain presidency. Museveni even increased
his vote share by almost ten percent to 68.38% compared to the election in 2006,
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while Besigye only achieved 26.01%. The next presidential election will take place in
2016, that year Museveni will also celebrate 30 years of presidency which is even for
African standards a very long time. Although recently rumors were spread that Mu-
seveni has already chosen his first-born son Muhoozi Kainerugaba as his successor
and might not candidate for presidency again (Izama and Wilkerson, 2011).
9.2 Literature Overview
The presidential election in 2011 were only the second multiparty election in Uganda
since the Museveni Regime began in 1986. Hence, the amount of existing literature
is low compared to other countries with a longer history of multiparty elections.
So far, like in many other Sub-Saharan African countries most of the studies on
voting behavior are focusing on ethnicity and region as explaining factors. Uganda is
ethnically very diverse and belongs to the most heterogeneous countries in the world
(Alesina et al., 2003; Carlson, 2011). Furthermore, the history of ethnic cleavage is
long and has always influenced electoral competition, during the movement system as
well as under the multiparty system. President Museveni e.g., is a Banyankole, and
his tribe strongly identifies with him during elections (Carlson, 2011). Museveni’s
main challenger in the last three elections, Kizza Besigye is from the Bakiga ethnic
group. His political party the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) is a rather
young party and has no regional or ethnic background, they are claiming to be a
national party rather than a regional party (Kim, 2012). Carlson (2011) analyzed
the importance of ethnicity on voting behavior with an experiment. She created an
artificial voting situation, where the respondent could choose between two candidates
who differ in ethnicity, education, prior office, personal record and political platform.
The experimental set up allowed her to control for other variables like performance
or educational background, to solely analyze the effect of ethnicity. The results
show that ethnicity is only important for vote choice when it interacts with the
performance record of the candidate, ethnicity on its own is effectless. Voters are
more responsive to the actions of their co-ethnics and expect to gain future benefits
like public goods from them, once they are in office. When considering the large
amount of different ethnic groups in Uganda and the fact that only two candidates
were seriously competing for presidency, voting for co-ethnics cannot be the only
factor determining vote choice. To understand the outcome of the 2011 election,
other factors have to be considered too.
Another well known phenomenon in African elections is the incumbent advantage
(Rakner and van de Walle, 2009; Lynch and Crawford, 2011). Museveni heavily
relied on the incumbent advantage in the election in 2011. He had access to the
state apparatus and state finances and used them effectively for election campaigning
(Helle and Rakner, 2013b), hence the political parties were acting on an unleveled
playing fields (Gibb, 2012). The election was known to be the most expensive in the
history of Uganda (Izama and Wilkerson, 2011; , EU-EOM). The money was used for
traditional election campaigning, but also for direct vote buying and the provision
of public goods. Conroy-Krutz and Logan (2012) analyzed Afrobarometer data and
found no significant effects of vote buying on the results of the presidential election.
The existing literature suggests that there are actually two main reasons that account
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for the outstanding victory of Museveni and the NRM. First the inability of the
opposition to unite and support a common candidate and second the satisfaction
of the population with their current president. Prior to the election the opposition
parties were hopeful that Uganda will soon witness its first electoral turnover, but
instead of building a strong coalition each party fought it’s own battle and they
finally lost valuable votes not only to the NRM but also to each other (Helle and
Rakner, 2013a). Museveni on the other hand looked back on five partially very
successful years. He had put an end to the war against Joseph Kony and the Lords
Resistance Army (LRA). The people in the north could finally settle back to their
homes, after they have lived in refugee camps for many years to protect themselves
from Joseph Kony and the LRA. Further, the infrastructure, such as roads schools
and health centers improved during the era of the NRM (Juma, 2011). Carlson
(2011) puts it this way "Despite valid criticism of his regime, it is difficult to dispute
that security and development have improved under Museveni.". Conroy-Krutz
and Logan (2012) agree that most Ugandans and especially those of the North are
actually better of with President Museveni now than they have been a few years
ago. Hence, they did not bother voting for the opposition but rather gave their vote
to the incumbent.
But what were the political issues of the election in 2011? In Uganda just like
in most other African countries, agriculture provides the livelihood for the majority
of the population. Only 15.6% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013) of all Ugandans
live in urban areas, that is why the rural population and the agricultural sector
plays a crucial role for the election outcome. Urban people are often closer to the
opposition than their rural counterparts. Another advantage that Museveni used
for his purposes and finally for his election victory. The NRM had always kept
strong ties to the rural areas and never stopped emphasizing the importance of
agriculture for the reduction of poverty, especially for the rural population (Helle
and Rakner, 2012, 2013a). Although, when reading the NRM’s party manifesto it is
not obvious that agriculture is an important sector for them, further they only spent
3.2% of the national budget for 2012/2013 on agriculture (Naluwairo, 2011). Hence,
there is still unused potential concerning spending on agriculture and agricultural
policies. This potential has to be used to cope with future challenges. With an
already high population density and a further growing population, the development
of the agricultural sector and the implementation of the right agricultural policies
will be crucial for the development of Uganda and equally important for the ongoing
political success of president Museveni and the NRM.
9.3 Data Description
When we decided to include Uganda in our country sample, Afrobarometer had
started their fifth survey round in Uganda already. Hence, it was not possible
to cooperate with them anymore. That is why we decided to do our own voter
survey in Uganda, just like we did in Ghana before. The survey was conducted in
collaboration with Wilsken Agencies Ltd. during June 2013. Wilsken Agencies Ltd.
is a very experienced agency that has also conducted the Afrobarometer surveys for
Round 4 and Round 5. The survey questionnaire was almost identical to the one
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used in Ghana, only some small country specific modifications were made. The last
presidential election in Uganda took place in 2011 and the next one will be in 2016,
hence the timing of the survey is not optimal concerning the vote choice question.
Although, while it is not suitable for a forecast, mid term evaluation of Museveni’s
performance during his fourth term of presidency is possible.
9.3.1 Sampling Procedure
The sample of the voter survey in Uganda is based on the 2002 National Housing
and Population (UBOS) census and the 2012 district-level single year population
projections. The survey covered the whole country, including the formerly insecure
areas of North East and Northern Uganda. To give every Ugandan citizens of voting
age an equal chance of being chosen for the sample, respondents were selected with
probabilities proportionate to the population size. Furthermore, the sample was
stratified across the five regions (Kampala, West, East, North and Central) and
urban-rural divides. At every stage of sampling methods of random selection were
applied. In total 624 interviews were conducted in 52 Primary Sampling Units
(PSUs). The PSUs are at the Parish level, one level above the official EA level and
constitute the smallest administrative unit where reliable census population data is
available. In each PSU twelve households were randomly selected for interviews. To
ensure that women are not under represented, there is a gender stratum of an equal
number of men and women in the overall sample. To accomplish this stratum, the
gender of respondent is alternated after each interview.
The English questionnaire was translated into nine local languages, namely Lu-
ganda, Runyankole-Rukiga, Runyoro-Rutooro, Lugbara, Alur, Luo, Ateso, Ngakiri-
mojong, and Lumasaba. The interviews were conducted face-to-face in the respec-
tive first language of the interviewee. All interviewers were intensively prepared and
trained before the actual survey, to guarantee a smooth interview procedure.
9.3.2 Questionnaire and Variables
The sample contains 620 individuals, who were interviewed in 26 different districts
all across Uganda. The questionnaire includes questions on socioeconomic character-
istics, voting behavior, policy positions and network characteristics. It is very similar
to the Afrobarometer surveys in many ways but also includes additional questions
and abandons some of the questions that are not necessary for analyzing voting
behavior. Especially missing questions asking for policy positions have strongly re-
stricted the application of probabilistic voter models in former surveys. Thus policy
positions were explicitly included in this survey. The seven different policy issues, in-
clude general economic/social issues but also issues focusing on agricultural policies
(e.g. taxation or support of agricultural sector).
For further analysis some observations were deleted from the sample. This was
especially due to missing values concerning the vote choice question, but also missing
values concerning voters’ own policy position. After data cleaning 325 complete
observations were available for the analysis of voting behavior. In the following
part variables used in the section are introduced and explained in more detail. For
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comprehensibility the variables are split up into dependent and independent variables
and into their category of voting: policy, retrospective and non policy.
Dependent Variable A probabilistic voter model is estimating vote choice. De-
pending on the kind of data available actual or intended vote choice is used as the
dependent variable. Just like in the Afrobarometer survey, in our questionnaire
respondents were asked:
B2. If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would
you vote for?
In Uganda 77% of the respondents answered the vote choice question correctly nam-
ing a political party. 15.65% refused to answer the question, 6.77% said that they
don’t know who they would vote for and another 0.81% replied they would not vote
at all. In Table 9.1 the official results of the presidential election 2011 and the survey
results are displayed. The candidates of the four parties all gained more than one
percentage of the vote, for the NRM the incumbent Yoweri Kaguta Museveni ran for
his fourth presidency, the FDC challenger was once again Kizza Besigye, following
the elections in 2001 and 2006, Norbert Mao was the candidate of the DP and Olara
Otunnu ran for office for the UPC. The smaller parties candidates were combined
in the category others1. Although the last presidential election is more than two
years ago, the survey result resembles still very much the official election result of
2011. The two main parties both lost some votes, while especially the Democratic
Party (DP), but also the other small parties gained additional votes. Just like in
Ghana, in Uganda electoral competition is a duel between two parties the NRM and
the FDC. While the other parties only play a marginal role and do not have any
realistic chance to win the election. Hence, for the empirical part of this section
we will treat Uganda as a two party case and assume that dropping those individu-
als that vote for another political party does not change the results of the analysis
significantly.
Table 9.1: Presidential election results from Uganda
NRM FDC DP UPC other
Presidential elections 2011 68.38 26.01 1.86 1.58 2.17
Own survey 2013 67.94 24.63 3.40 1.27 2.76
Source: African Elections Database (2014c), own data)
Independent Variables
1Beti Kamya for the Uganda Federal Alliance (UFA), Abed Bwanika for the People’s Development
Party (PDP), Jaberi Bidandi Ssali for the People’s Progress Party (PPP) and Samuel Lubega
as independent candidate
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Policy Voting To measure policy voting in Uganda, we took the same approach
already introduced for the case of Ghana. In the questionnaire respondents were
confronted with seven different policy issues, for each issue they were requested to
place themselves and the four main parties (NRM, FDC, DP and UPC)2 on a five
point scale. Each issue was presented with two endpoint statements (The exact
phrasing of the questions can be found in the questionnaire printed in the annex of
this book).
• 1-Agree with liberal policies, 5-Disagree with liberal policies liberal
• 1-Tax revenues should be used to provide public goods, 5-Tax revenues should
be used to improve economic growth economic
• 1-Economic growth shall be achieved through the agricultural sector, 5-Economic
growth shall be achieved through the industrial (non-agricultural) sector agrvsind
• 1-Economic growth through technological progress, 5-Economic growth through
better market access tpvsma
• 1-Promotion of cash crops, 5-Promotion of food crops cashvsfoodcrops
• 1-Agricultural sector should be taxed, 5-Agricultural sector should be sup-
ported taxvsprotect
• 1-Governmental decision making process without the population, 5-Governmental
decision making process including the population strongvsweakstate
While the first two statements measure general policy issues, the latter are specific
for the study of agricultural policy positions in developing countries. In Figure 9.2
the distribution of voters’ policy positions is plotted separately for urban and rural
respondents. Depending on the issue at hand we would expect that the policy posi-
tions differ, depending on the area of residence. While inhabitants of rural regions
will be more oriented towards the agricultural sector, as it provides their means of
livelihood. People from urban areas will rather support the industrial sector. The
hypothesis can be confirmed for the issue agricultural vs. industrial sector. While
58% of the rural population strongly agree that the agricultural sector should be
further developed, only 42% of the urban population have the same opinion. When
they were asked how economic growth in the agricultural sector should be achieved,
the rural population wants to rely more on technological progress (54%) and the
urban population thinks that improving market access is the right way (50%). Fur-
ther, the support of food crops is more important in urban areas (75%) than it is
in rural areas (54%). The result is surprising, as rural people depend strongly on
food crops for their own consumption. In cities and urban areas, people buy their
products at local markets and do not grow them themselves. Hence, we would have
expected that the urban population is more focused on cash crops than on food
crops. Both groups agree that the agricultural sector should be protected, although
the number of rural people agreeing with the statement that the agricultural sector
should be taxed is larger than the number of urban people. This finding is also con-
tradictory to the hypothesis stated before. The perception of liberal policies is very
2For later analysis only responses for the NRM and FDC were taken into account as the election
campaign is almost solely a duel between the two parties.
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similar in rural and in urban areas, more than 75% disagree with liberal policies, like
legalization of abortion or homosexuality. The usage of tax revenues is again seen
differently in urban and rural areas. The rural population would rather invest tax
revenues in public goods (75%), while only 61% of the urban population agree with
this statement. Most Ugandans independent of their place of living want a political
decision making process that includes the citizens and provides more accountability.
In general, the differences between respondents from urban and respondents from
rural areas in their preferred policy positions are small.
Besides their own policy positions, respondents were also asked to evaluate the
policy positions of the main political parties. In the case of Uganda we assume that
the true party position is the mean of the perceived party positions of all voters.
But as people are not fully rational they make mistakes when estimating policy
positions, with the survey data we are able to calculate the cognition error for each
voter. Figure 9.3 shows the positions of NRM and FDC as well as the distribution
of the voters perceived positions of both parties. Especially for the issue strong vs.
weak state the two parties are perceived very different from each other. The long
term ruling party NRM has a position much closer to the strong state, without much
interference of the citizens. The opposition party FDC on the other hand is located
further towards the weak state that allows citizen participation and leads to more
government accountability. In contrary to the literature overview, the FDC seems to
be closer to the rural population, as they rather support the agricultural sector and
also want the sector to be protected instead of taxed. On all other issues voters do
not see any significant differences between the two political parties. Further, apart
from the issue of liberal policies, where both parties take a more extreme position
towards disagreeing with liberal policies, they mainly take neutral policy positions
at the center of the scale.
Retrospective voting In the questionnaire we approximate retrospective voting by
asking the respondents to evaluate the economic situation of the country and their
own personal living conditions. While retrospective voting usually only considers
the evaluation of the past economic situation, we further add two time dimensions.
The respondents are asked to assess the present situation, the situation compared
to twelve month ago and the situation in twelve month time. Hence, we have three
variables measuring the perception of the economic situation of the country (present,
past, future) and another three variables measuring the perception of people’s own
living conditions (present, past, future). As those variables tend to be highly cor-
related and to decrease the amount of variables included in the model, we factor
analyzed these six variables and gained one common factor. In contrary to Senegal
and Ghana where the variables loaded high on the three time dimensions, in the
case of Uganda all variables loaded equally high on only one factor (retro).
Considering the general perception of the situation of the country and Ugandan’s
own living conditions, the respondents have rather pessimistic evaluations. 63%
consider the present economic condition of Uganda as very bad or fairly bad, only
23% think it is fairly good or very good. The remaining 14% responded that the
conditions are neither good nor bad. Their own present living conditions are per-
ceived slightly better, 25% consider them as neither good nor bad and 53% as bad.
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Figure 9.2: Voter positions in Uganda
Source: own data
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When asking the interviewees how they think the situation has changed compared
to twelve month ago, the answers are very similar to the present situation. Though
the personal situation took a turn to the better, 43% think that the situation is
worse now, 32% said that it is the same and 25% think that the situation is better
now. For the economic condition of the country, only 17% answered that the situ-
ation is better than twelve month ago, while 56% replied the contrary. At last we
asked every respondent to think how the situation will change in twelve month time.
At this point people are more optimistic, more than one third (36%) replied that
they think the situation of the country as a whole will improve and even 44% think
the same of their personal situation. Although there are still 33% that worry that
the situation will get worse for Uganda’s economy and 28% that fear the same for
their personal situation. Summarizing the results shows that a majority of Ugan-
dans is unsatisfied with the economic conditions of the country as well as with their
own personal living conditions. Looking ahead, the perceptions are more optimistic,
more than one third of the population expects things to improve in the near future.
Non policy voting Non policy voting is measured with two kinds of variables, first
we included sociodemographic characteristics, ethnicity and region, and second we
measure party identity with the following question (approval):
C14. Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Museveni has performed
his job over the past twelve month, or haven’t you heard enough about him to say?
Although people are not very satisfied with the current situation of the country and
with their own living conditions, they approve with their president. 71% of the
people approve or strongly approve with the way President Museveni has performed
in his job and only 12% strongly disapprove with him. Once more the differences
between rural and urban areas are of special interest, while 73% of the rural peo-
ple approve or strongly approve with president Museveni, only 58% of the urban
population think so. The result confirms the general assumption that people from
urban areas are rather unsatisfied with the government and hence tend to support
the opposition candidate.
The sociodemographic characteristics of the sample are displayed in Table 9.2.
The majority of respondents is from rural regions, they represent 89% of the sample
(rural). The number is comparable to the latest census, which measured that
84.4% of the population live in rural settlements. The gender stratum also worked
out well, 48% of the sample are women and 52% are men (gender). The mean age
of the sample is 36 years, the oldest respondent is 83 years old and the youngest is
just 18 years old (age). The education level of the sample is quite high, only 11% did
not enjoy any formal schooling, 43% went to primary school, 34% visited secondary
school and 12% have post secondary school qualifications (education). Uganda is
a mainly Christian country and the data affirms that with 83% of the sample be-
ing Christians (religion). The average household expenditures are 205591 Ugan-
dan Shilling/UGX which corresponds to $823, the minimum household expenditures
are 1000UGX ($0.40) and the maximum household expenditures are 3500000UGX
31UGX=$0.0004
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($1397) (expenditures). Wealth was further measured with the Lived Poverty
Index (LPI). In the sample the mean LPI is 1.13. The index is quite low compared
to other Sub-Saharan African countries and denotes a low degree of lived poverty.
In Round 5 of the Afrobarometer survey Togo has the highest LPI with 1.89 and
Mauritius the lowest with 0.2. Further, the LPI of Uganda measured with the Afro-
barometer data is 1.41 (lpi). Political interest is rather high in Uganda especially in
comparison to Senegal and Ghana, 18% of the population are very interested, and
41% are at least interested in public affairs (polint). The distribution of the sample
to the different regions is evident from Table 9.2, roughly 20-25% of the sample are
from each region with the exception of Kampala, where only 4% of the sample live.
Finally, the different ethnic groups of Uganda, the Baganda4 are the largest tribe in
Uganda. They represent 21% of the sample and are slightly over represented com-
pared to the official census data. The rest of the sample divides relatively equally
into the other five big tribes, which is evident from Table 9.2 as well.
9.4 Estimation of Voting Behavior
Voting behavior influences not only the election outcome but also government per-
formance and hence the development of a country. In the former sections we learned
that especially in developing countries non policy voting plays an important role.
Further, we could show that in Ghana as well as in Senegal next to non policy
voting also policy oriented voting is important. To get a first impression, we asked
respondents in Uganda directly for their voting motives:
C17. When you consider voting for a certain candidate, which of the following
things are important for your choice?
In the Table 9.3 the outcome of the question is displayed. There are only three
characteristics that more than 80% of the sample consider as important or very
important: character, political knowledge and past political performance. While
character is a difficult construct that consists of policy as well as non policy voting,
past political performance and political knowledge can both be considered as policy
voting, the former more specifically as retrospective voting. The typical non policy
explanation factors like outer appearance, ethnic and regional origin are considered
unimportant by two thirds of the sample. Further, it strikes out that party affili-
ation is considered as unimportant by almost 40% of the respondents, the number
confirms that it is not the political party people vote for but rather the party leader.
Another non policy factor which is considered to be important by almost 70% of the
sample is election campaigning, hence a costly and elaborate campaign is effective in
gathering votes and definitely privileges the incumbent. Of course the results have
to be considered with care, as people are always biased when answering questions
with desirable outcomes. That is why in the following sections we econometrically
estimate voting behavior in Uganda and analyze which voting motives are important
and how they influence government performance.
4The singular of Baganda is Muganda.
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Table 9.2: Description of survey data
N mean sd se CI-left CI-right min max
Retrospective Voting
retro 325 0.169 0.914 0.037 0.097 0.241 -1.728 2.357
Uganda (present)1 325 2.348 1.182 0.047 2.255 2.441 1 5
Personal (present) 325 2.434 1.152 0.046 2.343 2.525 1 5
Uganda (past) 325 2.421 1.023 0.041 2.340 2.501 1 5
Personal (past) 325 2.671 1.070 0.043 2.587 2.755 1 5
Uganda (future) 325 2.902 1.159 0.047 2.811 2.993 1 5
Personal (future) 325 3.081 1.178 0.047 2.988 3.173 1 5
Government Performance
approval2 325 2.795 0.906 0.036 2.723 2.866 1 4
Sociodemographic characteristics
rural3 325 0.889 0.314 0.013 0.864 0.914 0 1
gender4 325 0.477 0.500 0.020 0.438 0.516 0 1
age 325 35.692 13.516 0.543 34.628 36.753 18 83
education5 325 2.428 1.099 0.044 2.341 2.514 0 5
religion6 325 0.834 0.373 0.021 0.793 0.874 0 1
farmer7 325 2.218 0.789 0.032 2.156 2.281 1 4
expenditures8 325 205591 389235 15632 174953 236229 1000 3500000
LPI9 325 1.132 0.765 0.031 1.072 1.192 0 3
polint10 325 2.625 0.927 0.037 2.552 2.698 1 4
Regions
kampala 325 0.043 0.203 0.008 0.027 0.059 0 1
central 325 0.215 0.412 0.017 0.183 0.248 0 1
east 325 0.246 0.431 0.017 0.212 0.280 0 1
north 325 0.255 0.437 0.018 0.221 0.290 0 1
west 325 0.240 0.428 0.017 0.206 0.274 0 1
Tribes
lugbara 325 0.083 0.276 0.011 0.061 0.105 0 1
muganda 325 0.206 0.405 0.016 0.174 0.238 0 1
mugishu 325 0.117 0.322 0.013 0.092 0.142 0 1
munyankole 325 0.105 0.307 0.012 0.080 0.129 0 1
musoga 325 0.095 0.294 0.012 0.072 0.119 0 1
mutooro 325 0.083 0.276 0.011 0.061 0.105 0 1
1 1=very bad, 5=very good; 2 1=strongly disapprove, 4= strongly approve; 3 1=rural, 0=ur-
ban; 4 1=women, 0=men; 5 1=no formal schooling, 7=University; 6 1=Christian, 0=other; 7
1=farmer, 0=no farmer;8 in UGX; 9 0=no lived poverty, 4=high lived poverty; 10 1=not at all
interested, 4=very interested
Source: own data
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Table 9.3: Voting motives in Uganda
very very
unimportant unimportant important important
character 5.54 6.15 33.23 55.08
outer appearance 34.46 35.08 16 14.15
ethnic origin 36.31 32 18.77 12.92
regional origin 31.38 33.85 20.92 13.85
political knowledge 7.69 10.15 43.08 37.85
party affiliation 12.31 25.85 34.15 27.38
past political performance 3.38 9.85 44.31 42.46
election campaign 10.46 18.46 51.38 18.46
Source: own data
9.4.1 Multinomial Logit Model
After Table 9.3 provided a first impression of the importance of different voting
motives in Uganda, we estimated a multinomial logit model (ML) to dig deeper
and econometrically estimate voting behavior. Table 9.4 shows the output of seven
different model specifications. While model one only includes policy oriented voting
and an alternative specific constant, in models two to six further explaining variables
corresponding to different voting motives were added. The goodness of fit of each
model specification was measured with McFadden R2 and the Log-Likelihood value.
From McFadden R2 it becomes obvious that model quality increases steadily from
model one to model six. For all individual specific variables an alternative specific
coefficient is estimated, the coefficients of the NRM are normalized and set to zero.
Hence, all other coefficients have to be interpreted compared to the incumbent party,
Museveni’s NRM.
Model one includes all the policy issues introduced in section 9.3, except from the
issue taxvsprotect all variables are in line with literature and have a negative sign
indicating that the probability to vote for a certain party decreases when the distance
between political party and voter increases. Further, only two of the seven issues
have significant influence on vote choice, these issues are economic and cashvs-
foodcrops. Although cashvsfoodcrops is an agricultural issue it is surprising
that besides neither agrvsind nor taxvsprotect are significant. From the im-
portance of agriculture mentioned in the literature overview we were expecting that
the agricultural issues are primarily responsible for vote choice. Nevertheless model
one already provides a R2 of 16.3 and is on it’s own able to explain voting behavior
quite well. In model two retrospective voting was added, the common factor of the
six retrospective variables - retro - is not significant in any model specification.
Once more the result is unexpected, especially when considering that almost 90%
of the respondents mentioned past political performance as an important factor for
their vote choice. Past political performance of the president (approval) on the
other hand is highly significant and increases model fit from R2=16.6 to R2=32.5.
The coefficient is negative, which indicates that the more someone approves with
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the performance of President Museveni the higher is the probability to vote for him.
Model four to model six include sociodemographic variables, like gender, age and
education (model four), but also ethnicity (model five) and home region (model six).
Neither ethnicity nor region are significant in model specifications five and six. Even
the coefficient for the presidents own ethnic tribe the Munyankole is insignificant and
hence has no influence on vote choice. The same is true for rural, whether someone
lives in a rural or urban area has no significant impact on voting behavior. Fur-
thermore, vote choice is influenced by gender, age, education and religion.
Women rather vote for the NRM, while men are supporting the FDC. Additionally
age impacts the probability to vote for the NRM positively, the older someone is the
higher is his probability to support Museveni. Older people experienced the time
after independence, when Milton Obote and also Idi Amin ruled as dictators and
Uganda was in very bad shape. They also experienced that the NRM and Musev-
eni brought stability and economic revival to the country. Hence, their situation
improved and they continue to support the incumbent. Education on the contrary
has a positive effects on voting for the FDC, the effect is common in developing
countries. The better educated and often urban elite is unsatisfied with the current
government and supports the opposition instead. Finally there also exists a religious
bias, Christians vote for the NRM with a higher probability or put the other way
around, Muslims favor the FDC over the NRM when they make their decision at
the ballot box.
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In the last column you find model seven, which is a reduced model specifica-
tion. In this model variables that did not significantly add value to the model were
dropped stepwise. After dropping a variable a likelihood ratio test was conducted
to review whether the reduced model differs significantly from the complete model.
Hence, model seven only includes variables that significantly explain voting behavior.
Among the variables are three policy issues, economic, cashvsfoodcrops and
taxvsprotect, the non policy variable approval and sociodemographic char-
acteristics of the interviewee, gender, age, education and religion. In the
following parts we will use model seven for further analysis and interpretations.
To get an enhanced overview about the effects of the variables and also because
the coefficients of a logit model are not linear to interpret, we calculated marginal
effects for all variables from model seven. When a political party changes it’s policy
position, as a matter of fact the probability to vote for that particular party also
changes. Depending on the position of the voter, the effect can be positive or
negative. When we measure the average marginal effect of a one unit change in
the policy position, the effect is negative for the issue economic and positive for
cashvsfoodcrops and taxvsprotect. The average effect for all three issues is
small. The probability to vote for the NRM decreases by 2% when they increase
their policy position on the economic issue by one unit. An increase in the position
cash crops vs. food crops results in an increase of the probability to vote for the
NRM of 0.4% and when the position is moved towards protection of the agricultural
sector, the probability increases by 1.6%. Figure 9.4 shows the effect graphically
for the issue taxvsprotect, it is obvious that changing the policy position hardly
effects the voting probability for either of the two political parties. Independent of
the policy position on this issue, the NRM gains more than 60% of the vote and will
always win the election. When plotting the other two issues, the figure looks very
much alike. Hence, moving the policy position is not an efficient way to gain further
votes for the opposition party.
The effect of approval is considerably larger, when approval with the president
is increased by one unit, the probability to vote for the NRM increases by 15.6%
while the probability to vote for the FDC decreases by the same percentage. Also
the effects of the individual specific variables are reasonable. The probability to vote
for the incumbent increases by 13.5% when someone is female and by 15.6% when
someone is a Christian. The effect of education is negative for the NRM, when the
level of education increases by one unit, the probability to vote for the FDC increases
by 3.3%, in a hypothetical scenario where the whole population would increase their
education level from no education to a university education, the FDC would gain
additional 16.5%. Age is another factor that increases the probability to vote for
the NRM, an additional year of age increases the probability to vote for the NRM
by 0.7%. The marginal effects show, just like the model output that most factors
are in favor of Museveni and the NRM. The only way for the FDC to improve it’s
results in elections is to raise the general education level or to convince the voter
that Museveni is not performing very well in his job. To know how important the
actual voting motives are, we calculated relative marginal effects (RIs). Usually the
RIs are calculated for policy oriented, non policy oriented and retrospective voting.
However, in the case of Uganda, retrospective voting does not influence vote choice,
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Figure 9.4: Changing policy positions: taxvsprotect
Source: own data
hence only the RIs for policy oriented and non policy voting are calculated. Because
there are only two voting motives, RIP equals 1 − RINP . The distribution among
individuals is displayed in Figure 9.5. The average RI of policy voting is 28.5%
and the average RI of non policy voting is 71.5%. The results point towards very
non policy oriented voting behavior in Uganda, which would in turn lead to low
government accountability.
9.4.2 Heterogeneity
In the ML model it is assumed that every voter behaves the same, the coefficients do
not differ from one person to another. However, when taking a look at Figure 9.5 it
becomes obvious that voting behavior partially differs heavily between individuals.
Policy voting has a relative importance of zero for some Ugandans, but for others
it is around 60% and hence even more important than non policy voting. These
differences are interesting, as they suggest that there exist certain groups of voters
that vote policy oriented compared to other groups that vote rather non policy
oriented. Combining the results with government performance would lead to a bias
towards the groups that vote more policy oriented. While we will concentrate on
finding out more about heterogeneity in voting behavior in Uganda at this point,
the connection to government performance will be drawn in the following section.
Although the rural/urban divide was not significant in explaining vote choice
in the ML model, it might have an influence on voting behavior in general. In
the literature it is widely accepted that policy oriented voting is cognitively more
demanding and hence needs a better educational background. That is why urban
areas usually vote more policy oriented than rural areas, as a result of better schools
and education in the cities. Hence, we hypothesize the same for the case of Uganda.
In Figure 9.6 relative importance is plotted depending on the area of living. The
results are contrarious to the assumptions we just made. The urban population
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Figure 9.5: RI of non policy and policy voting
Source: own data
relies more heavily on non policy voting, while the rural population actually votes
more policy oriented. The average RI for policy oriented voting is 28.9% for the
rural respondents and 25.6% for the urban respondents. Although the differences
are not huge, they give another hint that voting behavior differs among individuals
and is by no means homogeneous.
To identify the heterogeneity in voting behavior in Uganda further, we estimated
a latent class (LC) model. The LC model contains two sub models, a choice model
that is similar to the ML model and determines which political party is chosen and a
class model that estimates class membership. For the choice model we only included
the voting motives already identified in the former section, policy voting in terms of
policy distances (economic, cashvsfoodcrop, taxvsprotect) and non policy
voting , measured as the general approval with the president (approval). Retro-
spective voting is once more left out, as it could be shown in the ML model that it
does not influence vote choice significantly. All personal characteristics are included
in the class model, where they determine class membership. While the choice model
was held constant in all model specifications, we estimated different class models.
The overview results are displayed in Table 9.5. In the first row we replicated the
ML model from the former section. The second model is a two class model but
without any covariates explaining class membership. Model three also resembles the
ML model, as it includes the same variables, but with all personal characteristics
(gender, age, religion and education) in the class model instead of in the
choice model. Models three and four are variations of model two, in model three
education was dropped from the class model, as it was not significant and model four
also contains region and ethnicity. Compared to Senegal, in Uganda except from the
four class models most other model specifications converged. Considering once more
the AIC3 criterion to choose the best fit model results in the two class solution of
model three which has apart from the model without covariates the smallest number
of parameters but the highest model fit. Classification and prediction errors are low
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Table 9.5: Comparison of different LC model specifications
LL BIC AIC AIC3 CAIC Npar df Class.Err. Pred.Err Conv.
MCL Model
1-Class -106.37 264.80 230.74 239.74 273.80 9 315 0.00 yes
Model 1: no covariates
1-Class -128.65 286.22 267.31 272.31 291.22 5 297 0.00 0.18 yes
2-Class -121.19 306.00 264.38 275.38 317.00 11 291 0.33 0.08 yes
3-Class -117.23 332.79 268.47 285.47 349.79 17 285 0.38 0.04 yes
4-Class -116.87 366.76 279.73 302.73 389.76 23 279 0.55 0.03 no
Model 2: gender, age, religion, education
1-Class -128.65 286.22 267.31 272.31 291.22 5 319 0.00 0.18 yes
2-Class -104.76 296.28 239.52 254.52 311.28 15 309 0.08 0.11 yes
3-Class -90.39 325.37 230.77 255.77 350.37 25 299 0.11 0.09 yes
4-Class -81.02 364.47 232.04 267.04 399.47 35 289 0.17 0.07 no
Model 3: gender, age, religion
1-Class -128.65 286.22 267.31 272.31 291.22 5 319 0.00 0.18 yes
2-Class -105.08 291.14 238.16 252.16 305.14 14 310 0.09 0.11 yes
3-Class -95.51 324.05 237.02 260.02 347.05 23 301 0.21 0.07 yes
4-Class -90.02 365.12 244.04 276.04 397.12 32 292 0.30 0.05 no
Model 4: gender, age, religion, rural, central, east, north, muganda, munyankole
1-Class -128.65 286.22 267.31 272.31 291.22 5 320 0.00 0.18 yes
2-Class -97.01 309.69 234.02 254.02 329.69 20 305 0.04 0.11 yes
3-Class -84.32 371.07 238.64 273.64 406.07 35 290 0.13 0.06 no
4-Class -68.91 427.01 237.82 287.82 477.01 50 275 0.13 0.03 no
Source: own estimation
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Table 9.6: Latent class estimation results
Model for Choices
Class 1 z-value p-value Class 2 z-value p-value Wald(=) p-value
Attributes
fdc:constant 0.139 0.165 0.869 6.568 4.372 0 12.765 0.000
economic -0.117 -2.407 0.017 -0.114 -2.168 0.031 0.002 0.970
cashvsfoodcrop -0.087 -1.724 0.086 -0.066 -1.133 0.258 0.065 0.800
taxvsprotect -0.055 -1.339 0.182 -0.027 -0.536 0.592 0.180 0.670
Predictors
fdc:approval -1.086 -3.248 0.001 -2.591 -4.684 0 4.760 0.029
Model for Classes
Class 1 z-value p-value Class 2 z-value p-value Wald p-value
Class Membership 0.5771 0.4229
Covariates
intercept 0 18.127 1.386 0.167 1.920 0.170
gender 0 -6.402 -1.901 0.058 3.613 0.057
age 0 -0.298 -1.673 0.095 2.800 0.094
religion 0 -6.035 -1.215 0.225 1.477 0.220
education 0 -0.130 -0.162 0.871 0.026 0.870
Source: own estimation
for most two class models, only model one is unable to correctly classify individuals
into classes. This is however due to the missing covariates. The distribution among
classes is quite even, with the first three models having an average class membership
for Class 1 of 58% and for Class 2 of 42%. In model four the average class member-
ship is 50% for both classes. Because the issue of this book is also to compare the
results of the ML and LC model, we only display the output of model two at this
point (see Table 9.6), however all other model outputs are available from the author
on request. Furthermore, apart from model one, which does not include any covari-
ates, the coefficients of the choice model for the other three models are very similar.
In the class model of model two all coefficients except from the intercept are negative,
however most of them are insignificant except from gender and age, which have
a significant positive effect for being in Class 1. The positive intercept shows that
there is a bias towards being in Class 2 which cannot be explained by the variables
included in the model. Table 9.7 shows the mean values of all descriptive variables
for Class 1 and Class 2, additionally the p-value of a t-test is displayed to find out
whether the means for the two classes differ significantly from each other. Taking
a look at the sociodemographic characteristics allows us to further characterize the
two classes, from the model output we were already aware of the fact that women
and older people are rather represented in Class 1 than in Class 2. Further, there
are significant differences in education, religion, farming background and the level of
poverty. The share of poorer and less educated people is greater in Class 1, further
there are more Christians and farmers in that particular class. The two classes do
not differ from each other concerning rural/urban, political interest and household
expenditures. More respondents are from Kampala in Class 2, while the West is
more represented in Class 1. Additionally there are significantly more Lugbara and
Muganda in Class 2 and more Munyankole in Class 1. Summing up Class 1 rather
consists of the poorer, less educated, farming households in the Western region, while
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Class 2 is dominated by richer, better educated people from Kampala that belong
to the Lugbara and Muganda tribe. Finally, concerning their policy positions, the
two classes only differ significantly in their position on the issue agrvsind. The
Kampala class (Class 2) positions itself further towards the Industrial sector, while
the poorer, farming class rather wants to support the rural, agricultural sector. Vote
choice also varies strongly between the two classes, the NRM is the dominant party
in Class 1, people vote for Museveni with a probability of 88%. Although Museveni
would also win the majority in Class 2, the result would be much closer. Only 51%
of Class 2 favor the NRM and remarkable 49% would actually vote for the opposition
party FDC.
After having a better idea of the composition of the two classes and their vote
choice, we will next investigate the choice model printed in the upper part of Table
9.6. The signs of the coefficients are identical in both classes and also the values of
the policy issues are very similar. What distinguishes both classes are the values
of the constant as well as of the coefficient for approval with the president. The
alternative specific constant of Class 2 is almost 50 times larger than the constant
of Class 1 and also the coefficient for approval with the president is more than
twice as high for Class 2. Taking a look at the marginal effects for both classes
reveals that they hardly differ for the three policy issues, they are between 0.3%
for Class 2 (cashvsfoodcrop) and 2.1% for Class 1 (economic). The combined
effect of both classes is close to the effects from the ML model, further the result
is independent of the choice of LC model (M2, M3, M4). The marginal effect for
approval with the president is only 8.6% for Class 1, but 29.3% for Class 2. Hence,
non policy voting in terms of approval with the president is more important in Class
2 than it is in Class 1. The combined effect is 17.6%, which is two percentage points
higher than the result from the ML model. Furthermore, the relative importance of
non policy voting for both classes is 73.4% consequential the relative importance of
policy voting is 26.6%. Again, the results are very much alike to the outcomes of the
ML model. In Figure 9.7 the relative importance of both voting motives is plotted
for Class 1 and Class 2 separately. While Class 1 relies much more on policy voting,
Class 2 votes non policy oriented. Recalling the composition of the two classes and
combining it with the outcome of Figure 9.7, shows that the "Kampala Class" (Class
2) with it’s well educated and wealthier members votes actually less policy oriented
than its more simple, rural counterparts.
9.5 Voting Behavior and Government Performance
In the previous section we analyzed voting behavior in Uganda applying a multino-
mial logit and a latent class model. The results showed that non policy voting is
the dominant voting motive with a relative importance of more than 70%. Retro-
spective voting on the other hand does not have any influence on voting behavior,
the coefficient was insignificant in all model specifications. Accordingly, the relative
importance of retrospective voting is zero. Finally policy voting has a relative impor-
tance of 28%. The dominance of non policy voting already suggests that government
accountability is low, as voters do not choose their political party because of their
policy position but because of good election campaigning and hence strong party
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Table 9.7: Descriptive statistics by latent classes
Class 1 Class 2 p-value
Policy Position
social 4.342 4.163 0.276
economic 1.858 2.081 0.189
agricvsind 2.021 2.385 0.038
tpvsma 2.663 2.807 0.451
cashvsfoodcrop 3.511 3.437 0.691
taxvsprotect 4.416 4.252 0.247
accountability 4.100 3.993 0.530
Governmental Performance
approval 2.941 2.588 0.000
Sociodemographic Characteristics
rural 0.900 0.874 0.472
gender 0.721 0.133 0.000
age 39.800 29.911 0.000
education 2.316 2.585 0.023
religion 0.953 0.667 0.000
farmer 2.305 2.096 0.021
expenditures 208274 201815 0.885
lpi 1.254 0.961 0.001
polint 2.595 2.667 0.482
Region
Kampala 0.021 0.074 0.035
Central 0.205 0.230 0.602
East 0.242 0.252 0.842
North 0.242 0.274 0.519
West 0.289 0.170 0.011
Ethinicity
Lugbara 0.042 0.141 0.004
Muganda 0.174 0.252 0.094
Mugishu 0.121 0.111 0.783
Munyankole 0.132 0.067 0.048
Musoga 0.100 0.089 0.736
Mutooro 0.084 0.081 0.930
Source: own data
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Figure 9.7: RI of voting motives in latent classes
Source: own data
identification. Furthermore, Uganda is basically a two party state, with a domi-
nant incumbent president who gained more than two thirds of the votes in the last
presidential election. While government accountability seems to be low in Uganda,
we will further investigate government capture. Capture is due to different average
voting weights between groups of voters. In the latent class analysis we already
identified two groups that differ in their voting behavior: the rural and poor people
(Class 1) and an urban elite (Class 2). From the theory we assume that especially
groups that vote more non policy oriented are vulnerable to capture by other groups
that vote more policy oriented. Taking the results from the previous section that
would result in rural people capturing the urban elite, as the former vote far more
policy oriented. However, the hypothesis is not in line with the general literature
on developing countries, which assumes that the urban elite captures the rural and
poor population (urban bias). Further, it has to be kept in mind that the rural
population has a population share of more than 80%, even if their average weight
in elections is low, they still provide the majority of votes and consequently their
power in the political process is of special interest.
9.5.1 Government Accountability
We hypothesized from the results in the former section that government account-
ability will be low in Uganda. To verify this assumption we calculated the already
known government accountability indices. The results can be found in Table 9.8.
The first government accountability index (GA1) ranges between 10% and 14% de-
pending on the model of choice. Government policies do only correspond to the
needs and desires of voters to a very low extend, while lobbying groups dominate
the political process. Their total political weight accounts for around 90% of the sum
of the political weight of all voters and lobbying groups. Although being accountable
towards lobbying groups is not per se a bad sign for the government performance
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Table 9.8: Government accountability indices (ML and LC Analysis)
ML Latent Class Model
M7 M2 M3 M4
GA1 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.10
GA2 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.23
economy 1 1 1 1
GA3 cashvsfoodcrops 1 1 1 1
taxvsprotect 1 1 1 1
Source: own calculations
of a country, it indicates that the pure mechanism of voting does not function well
in Uganda. Some of the literature argued that Museveni and the NRM only won
the last election because of the incumbent advantage and the very expensive elec-
tion campaign. We can confirm this results partly, as we measured empirically that
the government is not accountable towards the voter, but rather serves organized
interest groups, which in turn give campaign contributions to the NRM.
The second index, GA2, measures the degree of intrinsic policy preferences of the
governmental party. For the case of Uganda data on θ is not available, hence we
use the short cut introduced in chapter 5 and calculate the ratio of intrinsic policy
preferences that are achieved in the current situation compared to the percentage
of intrinsic policy preferences that are achieved if all voters based their vote choice
solely on policy indicators and observed economic performance. For Uganda GA2
ranges from 23.5% to 28.7%, which indicates that intrinsic voting is actually less
important in the real case scenario compared to the pure policy oriented scenario.
There are good reasons to believe that the low degree of intrinsic policy preferences
present in the political process is also due to the dominance of organized interest
groups in Uganda. However, the index GA2 is suffering from the missing information
on actual intrinsic policy preferences, so far it’s interpretation is not straight forward
and the index needs further improvement.
Finally the last index, GA3, measures the leeway the governmental party has when
choosing their policy positions, without loosing the majority of votes. In the case of
Uganda, the index is one for all policy issues and all model specifications. Figure 9.4,
which shows how the probability to vote for the NRM and the FDC changes when the
political parties change their policy position on the issue tax vs. protect, already
suggested that changing policy positions hardly influences the electoral outcome.
Independent of the policy position, the NRM always gains more than 50% of the
votes. The same is true for all other policy issues included in the model. If GA3
equals one for all policy issues, it means that the governmental party can change
it’s policy positions arbitrarily without any implications on it’s electoral success.
The result is a president and a ruling party that have absolutely no incentives to
implement good policies, which again leads to missing governmental accountability
towards the voter. The president can rather choose it’s policies to serve his self
interests or to please special interests and lobbying groups. Especially the later is
important for Museveni, as it will provide him with further campaign contribution
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Figure 9.8: Lorenz curve (left: ML - M7, right: LC - M2)
Source: own data
by interest groups, which are in turn taken to convince non policy voters to give
their vote to the incumbent.
9.5.2 Government Capture
Government accountability towards the voter is low in Uganda, but accountability
towards interest groups is high. Hence, there must be some interests that are favored
over others. In a perfect democracy, without lobbying the government would be
only accountable towards the voter. If this is the case, every voter is of the same
importance for the ruling party, quasi one man one vote. In this study with a
sample size of 325, every individual would have a weight of 1/325. Taking a look
at the actual distribution of the voting weights, reveals that they are not at all
equal for everybody. Figure 9.8 shows the Lorenz curve and the corresponding Gini
coefficient. In Uganda about 20% of the people own 45% of the total weight and
the Gini Coefficient is around 0.45, depending on the corresponding model. There
exist individual voters in Uganda that have a significantly bigger weight than others,
further we assume from the theory that the political process is biased towards those
voters that possess the highest voting weights.
The capture index gives further information about this bias, it relates the average
voting weight of one group with the average voting weight of it’s antagonistic group.
If the ratio equals one, both groups have the same average weight and no capture
exists. In the LC analysis we already identified two groups of voters, of which one
was voting rather policy oriented compared to the other. Hence, we are expecting
that Class 1 is capturing Class 2. When considering the composition of the two
classes that would mean that poor people, who live in rural regions are capturing
the rich people from urban settlements. Figure 9.9 shows the results for Uganda.
Independent of the model of choice, the capture indices always point in the same
direction with only one exception which is capture between rich and poor people.
The different LC models are further very similar in their magnitude of the index,
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the exact results are available from the author on request.
Although Class 1 votes more policy oriented, they cannot capture Class 2. It is
the other way around, the average weight of Class 2 is 15% lower than the average
weight of Class 1, which is depicted by the bar pointing towards Class 2. Voters
from Kampala have a very high average weight, which is about 90% higher than the
average weight of all other voters. In the sample there are only 14 observations from
Kampala, but when projecting the result on the whole population of Kampala, the
city has a lot of power in the political process. Generally the urban population has
higher voting weights than their rural counterparts. The same is true for men, who
are capturing women and young people who are capturing the older population. The
capture index for poor and rich is not distinct, depending on the model either the
poor have a higher weight or the rich. However, their weights are very similar and
the degree of capture is small. The biggest ethnic group of Uganda, the Muganda
are also able to capture all other ethnic groups, while the Munyankole, which is the
tribe of President Museveni are captured by the other tribes. The capture indices
reveal a different picture from what we expected, although we could identify groups
that vote policy oriented, those were not the groups with the highest average weight.
On the contrary, the results actually describe very well the general literature about
power distributions in Africa. The urban, well educated, male elite is capturing the
less educated, female and rural population.
As capture is present in Uganda, the policy positions of the governmental party
should be biased in favor of the groups with higher weights, in this case the urban
and educated population. Recalling Figure 9.3, the NRM took a policy position
on the issue taxation vs. protection of the agricultural sector of 3.19 compared to
3.69, which is the position oft the FDC. Considering the voters preferred policy
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positions, they all demand protection of the agricultural sector. The average policy
position of a rural voter is 4.34, but the position of the average urban voter is
even further to the right (4.44). Even the respondents from Kampala are in favor of
protecting the agricultural sector, their position is the most right in the whole sample
(4.79). Overall differences in policy positions are small and the pro agricultural
policy position of the urban population is hard to explain with existing theories.
One possible explanation is the irrationality of the voter, missing information or
education and convincing election campaigning lead to systematically biased ideas
concerning economics and hence policy positions (Caplan, 2007). Going one step
further, when the voter’s policy positions are compared with positions of the two
political parties, the distance between voter and FDC is always smaller than the
distance between voter and NRM, anyway Ugandans continue to vote for the NRM.
Strictly speaking that means that the NRM could actually increase their already
outstanding election result further by moving its own policy position closer towards
the policy positions of the voter. There are three possible explanations why the NRM
is not trying to do so. The first and simplest solution is that there is just no need
for additional votes, GA3 equals one for all policy issues, whichever policy position
Museveni takes does not change the fact that he wins the election. The marginal
effect of changing the policy position on the issue tax vs. protect and also on all
other issues is very small, because policy oriented voting is not important in Uganda.
The cost of moving the policy position further towards the voter, would probably
exceed the gained utility of additional votes. Hence, as long as Museveni is confident
that he will win the election with a clear margin, it is rational for him and his party
to keep the current policy positions instead of changing it. The second reason goes
back to the very low GA1 index, which indicates that the Ugandan government is
only accountable towards the voter to a very low degree. It is further lobbying and
interest groups that have around 90% of the political power and shape the political
process. A policy position of the NRM further towards taxation of the agricultural
sector could also be due to pressure from certain lobbying groups, e.g. the oil or gold
industry. These industries might claim additional support for the industrial sector,
instead of supporting the agricultural sector. Unfortunately we have no information
on the power of interest groups in Uganda, which could shed further light on this
issue. The last possible explanation for the gap between the mean policy position of
the voters and the NRM’s policy position is that the intrinsic policy preferences of
the NRM are to tax the agricultural sector instead of supporting it. Once more we
have no data on the intrinsic preferences of the ruling party, but when the NRM’s
policy position neither converges with the voter’s position nor with interest groups
position’s, their intrinsic policy preferences might be a good explanation for that.
With the political weights of each voter at hand, we are able to calculate the
optimal empirical policy position the NRM should take if they would act only ac-
countable towards the voter (see equation 5.28). Further, we can also calculate
the situation when voter weights are not biased and one man one vote applies (see
equation 5.29). With equal weights, the optimal policy position equals 4.35. When
the calculated weights are consulted the position is be further to the right, 4.45. In
more specific terms, this means that although government is not acting accountable
towards the voter and capture is present in Uganda, the actual policy position of the
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NRM is closer to the unbiased situation where all voters have the same weight and
no capture persists. Whether it is the pressure of lobbying groups or the intrinsic
policy preferences of the political party cannot be exactly determined, but whoever
is influencing the NRM’s policy position is actually reducing the bias which would
otherwise be induced by unequal voting weights.
The connection between voting behavior and government performance is not quite
clear yet. In Figure 9.10 we linked both of them, plotting the voting weight on the
y-axis and the utility share of non policy voting on the x-axis. In the left part
the outcome of the ML model is depicted, it shows a clear reversed U-shape with
its maximum close to zero. Hence, non policy voting, in this case measured by
the personal characteristics included in the model as well as by approval with the
president, has a negative effect on the personal weight of a voter, once a certain
threshold is passed. The results from the latent class model resemble the results
from the multinomial logit model very much, though the maximum of the curve is
shifted even further to the left. While in the left picture non policy voting includes
personal characteristics as well as approval with the president, the LC case does
only include the alternative specific constant and approval with the president as non
policy voting, because all personal characteristics are part of the class model and
not of the choice model anymore. The plots also explain why the poor and rural
class does not capture the rich, Kampala class, although they are voting more policy
oriented. Especially in the LC plot, but also in the ML plot the maximum of the
curve is not exactly at zero, hence a certain amount of non policy voting actually
increases the personal voting weight. Urban people capture rural people and the
rich capture the poor, because they vote partly non policy oriented. The results
show that voting behavior and policy weights are related, but the exact relationship
is not yet discovered. It requires further research and more data to fully understand
this complex connection. Especially the threshold level, when the influence of non
policy voting changes from positive to negative is of special interest.
9.6 Summary
Uganda only experienced two real multiparty elections and never witnessed a peace-
ful turnover of power so far. While the economy is growing at a promising growth
rate, the country is still a low income country with restrictions in political rights and
civil liberties. Museveni has been in power for almost 30 years and is the dominant
figure in the political playing field in Uganda. He won the last two elections with 59%
and 68% of the vote leaving the opposition far behind. Uganda is further affected
by many different ethnic groups and hence great heterogeneity within the country.
When we estimated a probabilistic voting model, interestingly neither ethnicity nor
region had significant influence on vote choice. Additionally, retrospective voting
is not applied in Uganda and proved to be insignificant in the model. Most of the
literature agrees that the situation of the country has improved since Museveni is
in power. However, when only considering the current situation of the country and
the situation compared to twelve month ago, people are very unsatisfied. But they
do not punish the government for their disaffection, in our sample still 68% would
vote for the NRM, although 63% consider the current economic situation to be very
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Figure 9.10: Relationship between voter weights and voting behavior (left: ML - M7,
right: LC - M2)
Source: own data
bad or fairly bad. Ugandan’s strongly identify with President Museveni and also
approve with the way he has performed in his job during the last twelve month. It
seems that presidential performance and the economic situation of the country are
perceived as independent of each other. The coefficient for approval with the presi-
dent is significant and heavily in favor of the NRM. Voters choose Museveni because
they strongly approve with him and they do not blame him for their pessimistic
views on the situation of the country and on their own personal living situation.
The power of the party leader effect is also obvious when taking a look at the im-
portance of different voting motives. Non policy voting, which is measured through
approval with the president, has a relative importance of more than 70% compared
to only 30% for policy voting. However, not everyone acts the same way in Uganda,
we found that voting behavior is heterogeneous depending on the personal charac-
teristics of the voter. With the Latent Class Analysis we identified two classes of
voters, Class 1 consists of the poorer, less educated farming households that almost
exclusively votes for the NRM. Class 2 on the other hand, votes almost equally for
NRM and FDC and consists of the urban and rich people. Further, we identified that
Class 1 votes rather policy oriented compared to Class 2. Nevertheless, Class 1 has a
lower average voting weight compared to Class 2. Voting weights are unequally dis-
tributed in Uganda, and some groups have higher average weights than others. The
urban population is capturing the rural population, men are capturing women and
people from the capital, Kampala, have more than 50% higher voting weights than
those from the rest of the country. Hence, the political process is Uganda is biased
towards special interests. However, the bias is not decisive when the governmental
party chooses it’s policy positions. Quite on the contrary, the policy position of the
NRM is actually closer to the unbiased situation, where all voters have the same
weight, than to the empirically optimal position, when voting weights are taken into
account. This inconsistency is due to a very low level of accountability towards the
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voter. Policy voting and policy positions do only influence the outcome of elections
marginally. The NRM can choose any position on the policy scale without loosing
the majority of the votes. Hence, Museveni is not accountable towards the voter,
but only towards his party’s own intrinsic policy preferences and towards interest
groups. The power of interest groups and lobbying is high in Uganda, with the right
amount of money they are able to move policy positions towards their own interests.
In Uganda the mechanism of elections to ensure democracy does not work well
yet. So far there has been a dominant leader, who reigns the country at his will.
Museveni’s dominance is only possible because people strongly identify with him
and have accepted him as their unchallenged leader. The majority of the population
have not yet realized that policy voting and retrospective voting are tools to hold
government accountable. Another reason is fear, especially the older generation still
remembers the time before Museveni took over power and they are afraid that things
will take a turn for the worse when turnover takes place. However, there are already
some voters that are aware of the connection between government performance and
the situation of the country, the educated, urban population. It remains to be seen,
whether the rest of the population will start blaming Museveni for poor performance
in the future or if they continue to prefer that everything stays the same.
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A Comparative Perspective
Ghana, Senegal and Uganda, three developing countries located in Sub-Saharan
Africa, but very different in geographic location, ethnic diversification, economic
development and level of democracy. While in Ghana the process of democratiza-
tion is already very advanced, in Uganda it has just begun and although Senegal
is known to be one of the oldest democracies is Sub-Saharan Africa, it is behind
considering it’s democratic consolidation. In the previous three chapters we ana-
lyzed voting behavior empirically in these three countries. Further we identified
the relative importance of different voting motives, namely policy, non policy and
retrospective voting, and drew a connection to government performance, measured
by government accountability and capture. In each of the countries we conducted
an individual voter survey and interviewed between 600 (Ghana, Uganda) and 1200
(Senegal) citizens. The surveys in Ghana and Uganda were organized and super-
vised by ourselves, while the survey in Senegal was conducted by Afrobarometer.
Hence, the questionnaires held in the former two countries are very similar, with
only some country specific modifications. The most important difference compared
to the Afrobarometer questionnaire regards the measurement of party’s policy posi-
tions. In Senegal, only voters policy positions were requested, which likewise served
to calculate the party’s policy positions. In our own surveys, respondents indicated
their own policy positions, but also their perceived party positions. When issue dis-
tances between political parties and voters are calculated, the first approach takes
constant party positions and varying voter positions, while the second approach
takes varying voter positions as well as varying party positions, hence it includes
more variability. Furthermore, the timing of the voter surveys was very different in
the three countries. In Ghana the survey was conducted two month before the presi-
dential elections in 2012 which represents an optimal timing to gather election data,
accordingly the reliability of the data is very good. In Uganda, the last election took
place in 2011 and the next one will be held in 2016. Our survey was conducted in
June 2013, which represents a rather suboptimal timing. Similar issues have an im-
pact on the survey in Senegal, further as it was conducted by Afrobarometer we had
no influence on the timing of the survey. Afrobarometer went to the field in February
2013, exactly one year after the last presidential election. Although survey timing
was not optimal in Senegal and Uganda, and further the Afrobarometer data differs
to some extent from our own survey data, we still assume that the empirical results
from the three countries are comparable. Especially the main results concerning our
theretically derived indices are not significantly affected by these drawbacks.
The results of our analysis are summarized and depicted for Ghana, Senegal and
Uganda in Table 10.1. The first row shows the sample size and the second row
indicates the share of respondents from rural areas. In all three studies our fo-
cus was not simply on explaining the election outcome, but why people voted the
way they did and which were their main voting motives. The importance of the
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Table 10.1: Comparism of the results of Ghana, Senegal and Uganda
Ghana Senegal Uganda
N 333 667 325
Rural 0.261 0.568 0.889
Voting Motives
Policy Voting 0.315 0.335 0.285
Policy Voting - LC 0.330 0.424 0.266
Non Policy Voting 0.602 0.560 0.715
Non Policy Voting - LC 0.559 0.471 0.734
Retrospective Voting 0.083 0.105 0.000
Retrospective Voting - LC 0.111 0.105 0.000
Accountability
GA1 0.421 0.383 0.143
GA1-LC 0.450 0.495 0.109
GA2 0.601 0.554 0.287
GA2-LC 0.563 0.986 0.248
GA3 0.135 0.451 1.000
GA3-LC 0.131 0.303 1.000
Capture
Urban/Rural 0.878 1.267 1.330
Rich/Poor 0.765 1.124 1.065
Gini 0.613 0.288 0.468
Source: own data
different voting motives was measured by their relative importance. The relative
importance of policy voting is approximately one third in all three countries. In the
literature voting behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa has often been described as non
policy oriented, with voters that are unaware of politics and rather rely on ethnicity
or regional identity when voting. Our result shows that voters from Sub-Saharan
Africa, just as voters from industrialized countries gather information on policy po-
sitions and party platforms when making their vote choice. Though the issues of
interst are different. While in industrialized countries traditionally issues on social
and economic policies are considered, in developing countries agricultural policies
play an important part. Further in European and American voter studies, often
the ideological left-right scale is considered. In the surveys in Ghana and Uganda,
we asked the respondents whether they were familiar with the term left-right in
the context of politics. The majority of respondents had never heard of the terms.
Important issues were, whether to support the agricultural or the industrial sector,
the taxation or support of the agricultural sector and the promotion of either cash
crops or food crops. However, although similar policy issues are of interst in Ghana,
Senegal and Uganda, differences in the degree of policy oriented voting exist. The
lowest importance of policy voting was measured in Uganda, with a relative impor-
tance of only 0.285. Further does retrospective voting, which also depends on policy
platforms, not influence vote choice of Ugandan voters at all. Hence, non policy
voting is the dominant voting motive with a relative importance of 0.715. Policy
voting and especially retrospective voting is more important in Senegal and also in
Ghana. Combining retrospective voting and policy oriented voting and comparing
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it to non policy oriented voting, results in a ratio of 40:60 in Ghana and 44:56 in
Senegal. The results go in line with the historical development of democracy in the
three countries, Senegal has the longest history of multiparty elections and votes
most policy oriented. Ghana has also experienced several multiparty elections and
also votes quite policy oriented. Finally, Uganda which only experienced two multi-
party elections so far, is behind concerning the degree of policy voting. Elections in
Uganda are still dominated by non policy voting motives instead.
Further theoretically derived indices were calculated measuring government per-
formance. From the calculated indicators, GA1, which measures the degree of ac-
countability towards the voter is most suitable to represent the level of democracy
in a country. The index is very low for Uganda, which goes in line with the very low
Polity IV Score, but also with the low degree of policy voting in the country. Ghana
and Senegal have an index that is close to 50%, hence in both countries government
acts accountable towards the voter. However, the weight of special interests is still
higher and provides interest groups with the bigger part of power in the political
process. Additionally, we calculated GA3, an index that measures the possibility of
the governmental party to shift it’s policy position to please intrinsic policy prefer-
ences as well as the political preferences of interest groups. An index of 1, which was
calculted for the case of Uganda, basically allows the ruling government to take any
policy position they wish, without consequences on the electoral outcome. While
Museveni is the dominant figure in Uganda and can do as he likes, in Ghana and
Senegal, President Mahama and President Sall hold less power. Especially in Ghana,
the policy position of the NDC can only be moved by up to 13.5% without loos-
ing the majority of votes. Hence, the leeway of President Mahama and the NDC
to move their policy position towards the interests of lobbying groups is relatively
limited. Once more the Index of Senegal is in between the indices of Ghana and
Uganda, GA3 equals up to 45%. Government is not only very accountable towards
interest groups in Senegal, but also has the possibility to actually change its policy
positions to please their demands without fearing to loose the election. While the
level of democracy is usually measured with macroeconomic figures like GDP per
capita or with indices like the Polity IV democracy index and the Freedom House
index, with our approach we are able to produce very similar outcomes, by taking
micro data and the electoral process into account. Elections are considered to be
the main mechanism for promoting democracy, which is why analyzing the level
of democracy should always involve analyzing electoral competition. Especially the
first government accountability index, GA1, seems to be an appropriate measure and
should be applied more widely to evaluate democratic development and government
performance within a country and also between countries.
However, showing that our accountability indicators are in line with macroeco-
nomic variables is just one outcome of the empirical application. Further we explic-
itly analyzed heterogeneity by applying latent class models in all three countries. The
approach is especially important when analysing capture, as heterogeneity among
voters is a necessary condition for the existance of capture. The latent class esti-
mations always resulted in a two class solution, in which one class would represent
the rural, poor part of the population and the other class the urban rich. While
the rural and poor people are very close to the incumbent, the other class favors
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the opposition. The result is the same in Ghana, Uganda and Senegal and con-
firms what is already known from the literature on voting behavior in developing
countries. Further, we calculted personal voting weights for each voter and also
group specific indices. In contrary to the existing literature, which assumes that
in developing countries there exists a bias towards the urban population (Lipton,
1977, 1993), in Ghana the rural and poor people actually have higher average voting
weights in the political process and are hence able to capture their urban and rich
counterparts. Also the distribution of the weights is most unequal in the case of
Ghana with a Gini coefficient of 0.61. In comparison, the Gini coefficient in Senegal
is only 0.29 and in Uganda it equals 0.47. Further, in Uganda and Senegal the urban
and rich people have higher average voting weights and are capturing the rural and
poor part of the population. The result is much more in line with the already men-
tioned literature on developing countries. In comparison to many other studies, with
our approach we are actually able to empirically measure capture. We also partly
explain the connection between voting behavior and government performance, i.e.
the connection between non policy voting and the individual voting weights. The
relationship illustrates a reversed U-shape in all three countries, for the results of the
latent class analysis as well as for the results of the multinomial logit model. The
functional form was expected, as the individual voter weight is equal to PjG(1−PjG)
in the two party case and also in the multiparty case both terms are closely related.
Further, from the linear utility function it follows that the probability to vote for
the incumbent party increases (decreases), when the degree of non policy voting in
favor of (against) the incumbent increases. As the voter weight is maximized when
PjG = 0.5, it will decrease when the absolute level of non policy voting increases,
which is why the relation between non policy voting and individual voting weights
will resemble a reversed U-shape. However, the location of the maximum of the
function is not clear. Especially in the two party cases (Uganda, Ghana) the voting
weight is maximised, when non policy voting is close to zero. But in the three party
case of Senegal the weight is maximised at around minus two, which corresponds
to a small degree of non policy voting. It seems that there is a certain level of non
policy voting that does not harm an individual’s voter weight. However, once this
level (threshold) is passed, non policy voting influence voter weights negatively. The
result can also be transfered from the individual voter level to the whole electorate,
the more non policy oriented a country votes, the lower is the average voting weight
and consequently government accountability towards the voter. The level that max-
imises a countries average voting weight does not correspond to zero non policy
voting, but to a country specific threshold that is not known to us yet.
Interestingly, we did not find a clear relationship between the individual weights
and the policy position of the governmental party. While we would theoretically
expect that the political parties locate their policy positions at the weighted mean
of the voters’ policy positions, to please those voter groups with the highest weights,
we did not find any empirical evidence for it in our data. For Uganda and Senegal,
we actually find that the policy position of the governmental party is closer to
the unbiased situation, where everybody has the same voting weight than to the
situation with the empirical weights taken into account. We conclude that the fact
that party’s policy positions do not coincide with the empirical voter positions is due
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to the fact that government is not only accountable towards the voter, but to an even
greater degree towards organized interest groups. Accountability towards interest
groups results in policy positions that differ from the empirical voter position, but the
results show that interest groups do not per se bias the political process negatively.
Like in Senegal and Uganda, interest groups are actually able to reduce the bias from
unequally distributed voting weights. Although we have to admit that especially the
missing information on the influcence of interest groups and also on intrinsic policy
preferences is a weak point of our analysis. In this study we assumed that interest
groups determine voting behavior through party identification and we estimated the
degree of intrinsic policy preferences with the index GA3. For future research we
will explicitly collect data on the influence of interest groups and on intrinsic policy
preferences, and integrate the data in the empirical application.
Compared to most other papers that estimate voting behavior we did not only
apply a simple multinomial mogit model, but also a latent class model. The la-
tent class model is used when a sample is suspected to be very heterogeneous and
when the researcher is especially intersted in measuring capture. It is an explorative
analysis that explicitely includes covariates to determine different groups within a
sample. But, although the latent class model is very suitable in explaining hetero-
geneity in voting behavior, it also suffers from a few drawbacks. Depending on the
data and the number of classes estimated, latent class models tend to suffer from
local maxima which lead to solutions that do not converge (Vermunt and Magid-
son, 2005). Further the estimation of latent class models is more complicated, takes
more time and requires special computer programs. Last but not least, when we
compared the outcome of the multinomial logit model and the latent class model,
the results were almost identical. Especially the marginal effects and also the in-
dicators we calculated from the estimation results hardly differed from each other.
Hence we conclude that heterogeneity in voting behavior does not call for the latent
class model. Furthermore, heterogeneity can also be detected with multinomial logit
model, e.g. by including individual specific sociodemographic variables.
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During the Millennium Summit in 2000, all United Nations member states1 com-
mitted to help achieve the so called Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The
participating countries agreed on achieving the eight main goals, which range from
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, to combat of HIV/AIDS, to the ensuring
of environmental sustainability, until 2015. Especially the first MDG, eradicate ex-
treme poverty and hunger, is intimately connected with economic development and
increasing personal income, particularly in rural areas. These factors on the other
hand go along with democratic development. It is a commonly accepted view that
democracy when compared to other non-democratic systems is a superior political
system promoting economic growth and well-being (Przeworski et al., 2000). Hence,
the promotion and consolidation of democracy especially in developing countries is
crucial for economic development and to achieve the MDGs. However, controlling
for demographic and economic structures a large variance regarding policies, implied
growth and well-being can be observed across democratic countries. The question
arises how these differences across economically similar democratic countries can be
explained. We assume that it is an incentive problem that especially governments in
developing countries are facing. Depending on the political system, different incen-
tive mechanisms exist. In democratic systems, electoral competition is understood
as a fundamental mechanism to guarantee that governmental policies reflect society’s
interests. But, although multiparty elections take place in most African countries
by now, electoral competition is often restricted and leads to biased policy outcomes
as well as poor government performance. Basically, policy biases result from two
major mechanisms: government capture and a lack of governmental accountability.
Consequently, there exists a relationship between individual voting behavior and
government performance.
In this thesis, we measure voting behavior in Ghana, Senegal and Uganda and
empirically analyze the implications on government performance, in particular on
government accountability and capture. The comparative approach of the three
Sub-Saharan African countries required an extension of the already existing theo-
retical models and the application of econometrical methods that are novel in the
analysis of voting behavior. The extended Baron-Grossman-Helpman (BGH) model
of Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) forms the basis of the theoretical model applied
in this thesis. In their paper, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) model the relation-
ship between voting behavior and government performance theoretically, but also
emphasize the need for empirical verification. To comply their request and apply the
model empirically to our three case study countries, we conducted the following mod-
ifications: (1) assume that voter specific preferences are extreme value distributed;
(2) include variables measuring policy voting, non policy voting and retrospective
voting; (3) account for heterogeneous voting behavior; and (4) derive indices from
12000 the UN had 189 member states, currently there are 193.
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the theoretical framework that measure government accountability and capture. In
the second part of the thesis we analyzed the relationship between voting behavior
and government performance empirically, by estimating a multinomial logit model
and a latent class model. While the former is the standard model in empirical voter
studies, the latter also provides a methodological contribution to the existing liter-
ature. The latent class analysis explicitly includes heterogeneity in the probabilistic
voter model. In comparison to the multinomial logit model, it estimates different
classes of voters with class specific coefficients and allocates each voter a class mem-
bership probability. It follows that the coefficients are unique for every observation.
The inclusion of heterogeneity in the sample is a necessary condition when measur-
ing capture, hence it is crucial for the analysis of voting behavior and government
performance.
Probabilistic voter models were estimated for the presidential elections in Ghana,
Senegal and Uganda. All three countries conduct multiparty elections and are more
or less described as democracies. While in Ghana and Uganda electoral competition
is mainly a two party contest, in Senegal there exist three important political parties.
Hence, we compared two two-party systems and a three-party system with each
other. As described in detail in chapter 6 the countries differ from each other not
only in their history of multiparty elections but also in their economic development
and democratic consolidation.
The results of the probabilistic voter models estimated in the three countries can
be interpreted at the micro, meso and macro level. On the micro level we found
that in Ghana and Senegal citizens vote policy oriented, non policy oriented and
retrospective. The relative importance of the three voting motives differs strongly
from person to person. While some people vote mainly policy oriented and only
marginally non policy oriented, others vote just the other way around. In Uganda
retrospective voting is not significant, hence only policy voting and non policy vot-
ing determine vote choice. Furthermore, although Uganda is ethnically very diverse,
neither ethnicity nor regionality do influence the election outcome. The result is in
contrast to many existing studies, which assume that voting behavior in developing
countries is mainly driven by ethnicity and regionality (Ferree, 2006; Horowitz, 1985;
Lever, 1979; McLaughlin, 2008). In Ghana and Senegal we find some evidence for
the assumption. For example in Senegal, the Serer tribe and Pulaar tribe have a sig-
nificantly greater probability to vote for the opposition candidate than the country’s
largest tribe, the Wolof, and in Ghana, the Akan tribe traditionally supports the
incumbent, NDC, while the Ewe tribe supports the opposition party, NPP. Similar
patterns are visible for different regions in Senegal and Ghana. However, apart from
ethnicity and regionality, in all three countries policy issues significantly determine
vote choice. Just like in industrialized countries, the probability to vote for a party
decreases when the distance towards that particular party increases. Important
issues in Ghana and Uganda are agricultural policies, like the taxation of the agri-
cultural sector or the promotion of food crops or cash crops. In Senegal in turn the
issue whether the agricultural sector or the industrial sector should be supported is
significant. The most important variable in all three countries is approval with the
president, which we consider as non policy voting and strongly manipulable by elec-
tion campaigning. The marginal effect of the variable approval with the president is
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considerably larger than the effect of the variables for retrospective voting or policy
oriented voting. Considering the meso level, we also analyzed group specific voting
behavior. From the literature it is well known that voting behavior differs strongly
between the rural population and the urban population. Mostly, the incumbent was
supported by voters from rural regions, while the opposition gained the majority of
votes from urban settlements. Although we can confirm that the election outcome
differs between rural and urban inhabitants, we only found very small differences
between the voting motives of rural and urban voters, further other than expected
the rural population votes more policy oriented than the urban population. The
result is the identical in Ghana, Senegal and Uganda. Next to social groups, we can
also analyze voting behavior in the different classes identified with the latent class
analysis. The classes consist of individuals with similar characteristics, but not with
equal characteristics2. While Class 1 represents the poorer part of the population
that lives in rural regions and has a lower education level. The country’s elite, who
lives in urban settlements, has a higher education level and higher household income
is more present in Class 2. Voting behavior differs more heavily between the two
classes than it differs between rural and urban voters. The results show that class
allocation does not only depend on regionality, but on a variety of variables. Class
1 votes more non policy oriented in Ghana, but more policy oriented in Senegal and
Uganda. For Class 2 it is the other way around. Finally on the macro level, we
found that policy voting and retrospective voting together are most important in
Senegal with about 44%, followed by Ghana with 40% and last is Uganda, where
the relative importance of policy voting is only 29%. However, as already mentioned
retrospective voting is not significant in Uganda, hence the relative importance of
retrospective voting is zero. While it is 11% and 8% in Senegal and Ghana, respec-
tively.
Next to measuring voting behavior, we further derived indicators from the theo-
retical framework to calculate government accountability and capture. Government
accountability is especially low in Uganda, where voters possess only 14%3 of the
total political weight, compared to 86% that belong to organized interest groups.
Furthermore, we calculated how far the incumbent party can shift its policy position
without loosing the majority of votes in the election. In Uganda, President Museveni
can shift his policy position to wherever he pleases, without any consequences on
the electoral outcome. Hence, he is missing any incentives to act on behalf of society
and as a consequence, government accountability is extremely low. The results are
biased policy outcomes in favor of organized interest groups that do not correspond
to the needs and desires of the population. In Senegal, government accountability
towards the voter is 38% and policy positions can be shifted by up to 45%. Finally,
in Ghana government is most accountable towards the voters (42%) and also the
range for shifting policy positions is small (14%). Although government account-
ability is considerably larger in Ghana and Senegal, still organized interest groups
2Please note that class membership is stochastic, hence every observation has a probability pi1j to
belong to Class 1 and (1− pi1j ) to belong to Class 2. However, for the descriptive statistics we
assigned a person to Class 1 when pi1j ≥ 0.5 and to Class 2 when pi1j < 0.5.
3In the conclusion we refer to the results of the multinomial logit model. The latent class model
results are very similar and explained in more detail in the respective country chapters.
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hold the majority of power in the political process and are the dominant players in
the democratic system. While government accountability is measured on the macro
level, capture is group specific (meso level). Following once more the literature, we
expected that the urban population will be privileged in the political process, as
they present the country’s elite, are more aware of policies and usually better edu-
cated (Lipton, 1977). However, empirically we can only confirm this hypothesis for
the cases of Senegal and Uganda, where an urban bias exists and the urban popu-
lation captures the rural population. Further, we also find a capital bias in these
two countries. Inhabitants from Dakar and Kampala have on average greater voter
weights than the rest of the population. In Ghana it is the other way around, the
well educated, urban elite is captured by poor people from rural areas.
Combining the results from voting behavior and government performance, our
central hypothesis is that the absolute degree of non policy voting influences voting
weights negatively. The individual voter weight is equal to PjG(1− PjG) in the two
party case and also in the multiparty case both terms are closely related. Further,
from the linear utility function it follows that the probability to vote for the incum-
bent party increases (decreases), when the degree of non policy voting in favor of
(against) the incumbent increases. As the voter weight is maximized when PjG = 0.5,
it will decrease when the absolute level of non policy voting increases, which is why
the relation between non policy voting and individual voting weights will resemble
a reversed U-shape. In the empirical application, we find the reversed U-shape for
Ghana, Senegal and Uganda. Further, the relationship is observable with the results
of the multinomial logit model as well as with the latent class model results, although
it is less pronounced for the latter. Another interesting fact is that the maximum
of the curve is not the same in the three countries. While it is located at zero for
the case of Ghana, in Senegal it is shifted further towards minus two and in Uganda
it is situated between minus one and zero depending on whether the results of the
multinomial logit model or the latent class model are considered. Hence, depending
on the country, onpurely policy oriented voting does not always maximize the voting
weight. Instead, there exists a range, where the degree of non policy voting and the
personal voting weight are actually positively related. That non policy voting does
not necessarily imply a disadvantage, is obvious when considering once more voting
behavior and capture indices on the meso level. In Senegal and Uganda, the urban
population votes more non policy oriented than the rural population, nevertheless
they have the greater average voting weights. Further, in Ghana Class 1 votes more
non policy oriented than Class 2, but still captures them. Consequently, the effect
found on the micro level cannot directly be transfered the meso level. When we
consider the macro level, which corresponds to the country level, we find a negative
correlation of non policy voting and government accountability. In Uganda, where
non policy voting is least pronounced, also government accountability is lowest. In
addition, we found that for example the age of a democracy is positively related to
policy oriented voting, which in turn leads to government accountability. Senegal is
the oldest democracy in the sample, followed by Ghana and Uganda. The order is
the same for the relative importance of policy voting4. Hence, it seems that political
awareness and the ability to vote policy oriented only develop over time and are not
4In this case policy voting is considered as policy voting and retrospective voting together.
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immediately present at the first or second multiparty election. However, with only
three country studies, we do not have enough data points to verify the relationship
statistically.
When the political process is biased because of missing government accountability
or capture, observed policy positions do not correspond to the optimal policy posi-
tions anymore. While missing accountability leads to policies that that are in favor
of organized interest groups or intrinsic policy preferences, capture results in poli-
cies that are biased towards those groups of voters with the highest average weights.
For example, in Senegal and Uganda, due to urban people capturing rural people,
we expected the political process to be biased towards the urban population. With
the calculated weights, we were able to calculate the theoretical government policy
position, when political parties act only accountable towards the voter. In this case,
the policy position corresponds to the weighted mean of the voters’ policy positions.
The scenario ignores the bias induced by missing accountability. Further, we also
calculated the policy position, when the bias induced by capture is also set to zero.
In that case the governmental policy position would be equal to the simple mean
of all voters’ policy positions, with equal weights. The latter is considered to be
the theoretically optimal policy position, that maximizes the welfare of the society.
In Senegal and Uganda, the observed policy position of the governmental party is
actually closer to the policy position with equal weights than to the position with
empirical weights. As the existence of capture is not responsible for the biased policy
outcomes, it must be the fact that government is rather accountable towards interest
groups and intrinsic policy preferences instead of towards the voter. Taking a look
at the discrepancy between observed policy positions and calculated policy positions
with empirical weights, reveals the degree of distorted policy outcomes. Once more
the difference is largest in Uganda, followed by Senegal and last Ghana. We conclude
that it is possible that although the political process suffers from missing government
accountability and unequal voter weights, the political outcome does not have to be
biased, as both effects might equalize each other. In the cases of Ghana, Senegal
and Uganda this is not the case, as the observed policy position and the optimal
policy position are not conform. However, the results only apply if we assume that
voters act rational and know which policy positions maximize their welfare. Ca-
plan (2007) argues that voters are not aware of the utility they derive from certain
policy positions and act irrational instead. Further, they have biased policy beliefs
that result from missing information, low education levels and convincing election
campaigning. If Caplan is right, we cannot evaluate whether the policy positions
we defined as optimal are in fact optimal. Instead, also the policy positions that
are biased because of the dominance of organized interest groups might be the best
choice. To clarify the point, exogenous knowledge about optimal policy positions is
necessary, which could be compared with observed and theoretical policy positions.
In the previous paragraphs we described the main results from the thesis. We ap-
plied a theoretical model, conducted an empirical application and utilized innovative
econometric methods. All three parts were essential to provide important insights
into the analysis of voting behavior and government performance. However, we also
have some critical points to make about each of them. Starting with the theoretical
part, we focused on the empirical verification of the theoretical model and did not
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derive the relationship between voting behavior and governmental performance the-
oretically yet. This has to be challenged in future work and will improve the value of
our approach even further. Also, we assumed the assistance of local Nash equilibria.
However, we only partly specified the data generating system, as we do not have
any information on lobbying activities or intrinsic policy preferences. Hence, the
observed policy positions will always correspond to a LNE as the unknown parame-
ters are not estimated, but can be determined residually. If information on lobbying
and intrinsic policy preferences are available in future studies, the political support
function has to be estimated under the constraint that empirical policy positions are
in fact LNEs. As constrained maximization is often complicated with the maximum
likelihood approach, more advanced estimation techniques like Bayesian maximiza-
tion have to be consulted. Considering the empirical application, we have to address
the issue of data quality. While we collected perceived party positions in Ghana and
Uganda, this was impossible in Senegal and deteriorates the comparability of the
three case studies. Further, the timing of the survey was only optimal in Ghana,
where we went to the field shortly before the last election. In Senegal and Uganda,
the timing was less optimal and hence affects the reliability of the data. Another
point of criticism is the neglect of nonvoters, which play an important role when
analyzing voting behavior. We did not incorporate nonvoters in our study, as we
hardly identified any nonvoters in our samples. In future work, we will put more
emphasis on the phrasing of the questionnaire to better distinguish nonvoters and
include them in the analysis. Methodologically this could be achieved via a nested
logit model. The last points of criticism addresses the latent class analysis, which
was applied as it explicitly allows the consideration of heterogeneous voting behav-
ior. However, the model also presents some disadvantages and weaknesses. First,
the application of a latent class model is more complicated than a multinomial logit
model and asks for more computer capacities and special software. Second, quite
often the problem of local maxima occurred and our model specifications would not
converge. This problem is well known and especially appeared when many variables
were included, or more than two classes were estimated. Finally, in this thesis we
compared the results of the latent class analysis and a multinomial logit model with
individual specific variables and did not find any significant differences between the
results. Especially the marginal effects of both models, and the calculated gov-
ernment performance indicators hardly differed from each other. We have major
doubts that the latent class analysis is actually advantageous to the multinomial
logit model. Heterogeneity can just as good be incorporated in the model via the
inclusion of individual specific variables.
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Zusammenfassung
Im Jahr 2000 einigten sich 189 Mitgliedstaaten der Vereinten Nationen auf die so-
genannten Millenniums-Ziele. Die internationale Gemeinschaft verpflichtete sich in
der Millenniumserklärung dazu acht Oberziele bis zum Jahr 2015 zu erreichen. Der
Fokus liegt dabei auf der Armutsbekämpfung, der Friedenserhaltung sowie dem
Umweltschutz. In diesem Zusammenhang fällt auch immer wieder die Forderung
nach mehr Demokratie sowohl als Ergebnis, aber auch als Mittel um die bereits er-
wähnten Ziele zu erreichen. Allgemein wird davon ausgegangen, dass demokratische
Regierungsformen nicht demokratischen überlegen sind (Przeworski et al., 2000).
Dies ist besonders auffällig wenn es um den allgemeinen Wohlstand und die ökono-
mische Entwicklung eines Landes geht. In vielen internationalen Studien wird der
positive Zusammenhang zwischen Demokratisierung und ökonomischer Entwicklung
bestätigt (Gerring et al., 2005; Feng, 1997, 2003; Arif et al., 2012).
Weltweit hat die Anzahl der demokratisch regierten Länder in den letzten Jahrzehn-
ten stets zugenommen. Insbesondere auf dem Afrikanischen Kontinent kam es mit
der dritten Demokratisierungswelle Anfang der neunziger Jahre zu einigen Sys-
temwechseln weg von der Autokratie hin zur Demokratie (Manning, 2005; Gib-
son, 2002). Obwohl der Wohlstand in einigen Ländern gestiegen ist, nachdem sie
demokratisiert wurden, unterscheiden sich diese Länder trotzdem noch erheblich
voneinander was das Einkommensniveau, das ökonomische Wachstum und die po-
litischen Prozesse betrifft. Betrachtet man beispielsweise agrarpolitische Prozesse
in Afrikanischen Demokratien ist immer wieder festzustellen, dass Politiken imple-
mentiert werden, die nachgewiesenermaßen nicht effizient sind um den Agrarsektor
bzw. den Wohlstand der ländlichen Bevölkerung zu steigern (Anseeuw et al., 2012;
Zimmermann et al., 2009). Daher stellt sich wiederholt die Frage, warum ineffiziente
Politiken weiterhin implementiert und nicht durch effizientere Maßnahmen ersetzt
werden. Grundsätzlich kann es sich hierbei um ein sogenanntes knowledge Problem
oder um ein incentive Problem handeln. Ersteres beschreibt mangelndes Fachwissen
und Kenntnisse als Ursache für die Implementierung ineffizienter Politiken, wogegen
letzteres fehlende Anreizmechanismen in den Vordergrund stellt. In dieser Arbeit
wird angenommen, dass Regierungen über ausreichend Informationen und Kennt-
nisse zum politischen Prozess verfügen, so dass wir nicht von einem knowledge Prob-
lem ausgehen können. Vielmehr sind es mangelnde Anreizmechanismen, die immer
wieder zu verzerrten und suboptimalen Politiken führen.
Abhängig von der politischen Regierungsform existieren unterschiedliche Anreiz-
mechanismen. In demokratischen Systemen stellenWahlen den zentralen Anreizmech-
anismus dar. Sie sollen sicherstellen, dass politische Entscheidungen das allgemeine
Interesse der Gesellschaft widerspiegeln. Tatsächlich funktioniert dieser Mechanis-
mus aber nicht immer und überall gleichermaßen gut, so dass es zu verzerrten Poli-
tikergebnissen kommen kann. Als verzerrte Politikergebnisse sind beispielsweise inef-
fiziente agrarpolitische Maßnahmen zu bezeichnen. Diese Verzerrungen ergeben sich
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hauptsächlich aufgrund von zwei Problemen: Capture und fehlende Government
Accountability. Letzteres entspricht der Tatsache, dass gewählte Politiker keine aus-
reichenden Anreize haben um die geforderten Politiken ihrer Wählerschaft zu imple-
mentieren. Stattdessen vertreten sie primär ihre eigenen Interessen um so ihren per-
sönlichen Nutzen zu maximieren. Capture beschreibt das Verhalten von Politikern,
die in erster Linie die Interessen von bestimmten Gruppen vertreten und somit eben-
falls nicht dem Gemeinwohl dienen. Die Gründe für diese Art von Politikversagen
sind vielfältig, Keefer and Khemani (2004) nennen beispielsweise soziale Polarisa-
tion, fehlende Information und mangelnde Glaubhaftigkeit seitens der Politiker als
Erklärungsfaktoren. In Entwicklungsländern und insbesondere in Sub-Sahara Afrika
sind alle drei Punkte stark ausgeprägt. Viele Staaten sind ethnisch gespalten, das
Bildungsniveau ist häufig niedrig und die Informationsdichte beziehungsweise der Zu-
gang zu Informationen besonders in ländlichen Regionen gering. Viele Länder haben
darüber hinaus bisher nur instabile politische Systeme erlebt, Jahre der Diktatur
aber auch ständig wechselnde Regierungen, die teilweise gewaltsam durch das Mili-
tär eingesetzt und auch wieder abgesetzt wurden. Daher fehlt es einigen politischen
Akteuren an Glaubhaftigkeit. Die Aussicht auf eine kurze Regierungstätigkeit führt
außerdem dazu, dass Politiker versuchen in kurzer Zeit möglichst viel für sich und
ihr Klientel zu erreichen und nicht für die Gesellschaft als solches. Die Identifika-
tion mit bestimmten Parteien ist in Afrika oft kaum ausgeprägt, stattdessen gibt
es starke individuelle Persönlichkeiten, mit denen sich die Bevölkerung identifiziert.
Yoweri Museveni, der Präsident von Uganda ist ein sehr gutes Beispiel dafür. Seine
Präsenz als Präsident und Oberhaupt des Staates ist so stark, dass die Opposition
auch bei fairen und freien Wahlen kaum eine Chance hat die nächste Regierung zu
stellen. Soziale Polarisierung, fehlende Informationen und auch mangelnde Glaub-
haftigkeit verringern somit die Anreize, die eigentlich durch demokratische Wahlen
gegeben sein sollten. Anstatt auf politische Maßnahmen zu setzen, besinnt sich ein
erfolgreicher Kandidat eher auf seine eigene ethnische Gruppe, investiert in eine
groß angelegte Wahlkampfkampagne und versucht ein bestimmtes Klientel zu be-
friedigen. Auf diese Weise kann er seine Wiederwahlwahrscheinlichkeit erhöhen,
ganz ohne bestimmte Politiken zu implementieren. Somit erklärt sich der Mangel
an effizienten Politiken in Entwicklungsländern. Die jeweiligen Regierungen kön-
nen keinen Zusammenhang zwischen effizienten politischen Maßnahmen und ihrem
Wahlergebnis erkennen und fokussieren sich daher auf Maßnahmen die von der Poli-
tik unabhängig sind (Klientelismus, Wahlgeschenke, Wahlkampfkampagnen).
Der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Wählerverhalten und dem daraus resultieren-
den Regierungsverhalten (Government Performance) ist Hauptgegenstand dieser
Dissertation und soll empirisch analysiert werden. In der Literatur existieren bereits
einige theoretische Arbeiten, die sich vor allem auf das Wählerverhalten konzentrie-
ren, allerdings gelingt es den Autoren meist nicht auch noch einen theoretischen
Zusammenhang zum Regierungsverhalten herzustellen. Eine Ausnahme stellt die
Arbeit von Bardhan und Mookherjee dar, die sowohl Wählerverhalten als auch die
Implikationen auf das Regierungsverhalten theoretisch modellieren (Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2000). Sie nutzen hierfür ein erweitertes Baron-Grossman-Helpman
Modell, erwähnen aber bereits, dass es bisher an der empirischen Überprüfung ihrer
Theorie mangelt. Unser Ansatz konzentriert sich daher darauf das Modell von
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Bardhan und Mookherjee so weiter zu entwickeln, dass es empirisch angewendet
werden kann. Hierfür wird davon ausgegangen, dass es sich bei den empirischen
Politikpositionen der betrachteten Parteien um ein Lokales Nash Equilibrium, nach
dem Konzept von Schofield (2007) handelt. Außerdem wird die Annahme von
gleichverteilten Politikpräferenzen durch extremwertverteilte Politikpräferenzen er-
setzt. Die Gleichverteilung stellt eine eher unrealistische Annahme dar, die auch
in der empirischen Wählerforschung kaum Anwendung findet. Stattdessen werden
in der angewandten Forschung fast ausschließlich logistische Modelle verwendet, die
von einer Extremwertverteilung ausgehen. Mit Hilfe der Gleichgewichtsbedingung
kann die Unterstützungsfunktion der Regierungspartei abgeleitet werden. Unter
der Annahme, dass ein politischer Akteur seine Wiederwahlwahrscheinlichkeit und
somit seine Unterstützungsfunktion maximiert, ergibt sich eine gewichtete additive
Wohlfahrtfunktion. Die Gewichte sind durch die Wähler, Interessengruppen und in-
trinsische Präferenzen der Politiker gegeben. Mit Hilfe dieser wurden dann wiederum
im Gleichgewicht lokal Indikatoren abgeleitet, die sowohl Government Accountability
als auch Capture empirisch messen.
Um Bardhan und Mookherjee in der Forderung nach empirischer Überprüfung
ihrer Theorie gerecht zu werden, wurden in Ghana, Senegal und Uganda Wählerum-
fragen durchgeführt. Der bisherige Mangel an empirischen Wahlstudien in Afrika ist
hauptsächlich auf fehlende Datensätze zurückzuführen und selbst bei den vorhanden
Studien sind die genutzten Daten häufig nicht optimal. Dies zeigt sich insbeson-
dere durch fehlende Politikpositionen, die nur in sehr wenigen Studien überhaupt
Berücksichtigung finden. Bedenkt man, dass Politikdistanzen in der europäischen
Wählerforschung zu den Haupterklärungsdeterminanten für die Wahlentscheidung
gehören, ist das Fehlen eben dieser, in Studien zu Wahlverhalten in Entwicklungslän-
dern kritisch zu betrachten. Demzufolge haben wir einen besonderen Fokus auf
die Gestaltung des Fragebogens gelegt, um qualitativ hochwertige Datensätze zu
generieren. Die Ergebnisse der Studien aus den drei Ländern zeigen zuallererst,
dass Wählerverhalten in Sub-Sahara Afrika ebenso ökonometrisch modelliert werden
kann wie in Industrieländern. Zwar unterscheiden sich die Modelle in den Ländern
in ihrer Prognosegüte, alle leisten jedoch einen signifikanten Beitrag zur Erklärung
der Wahlentscheidung. In allen drei Ländern sind Politikdistanzen signifikant, dabei
spielen insbesondere die agrarpolitischen Issues eine wichtige Rolle. Neben Poli-
tikdistanzen ist retrospektives Wählen in Senegal und Ghana signifikant. In Uganda
dagegen konnte kein Einfluss von retrospektiven Variablen auf die Wahlentscheidung
festgestellt werden. Als besonders wichtig stellte sich der Einfluss nicht Politik ori-
entierter Faktoren, sogenannter non policy Issues, heraus. Dabei ist vor allem die
subjektive Bewertung der Regierung von großer Wichtigkeit. Wir gehen davon aus,
dass diese subjektive Wahrnehmung insbesondere durch Wahlkampfkampagnen und
somit finanzielle Mittel beeinflusst wird. In allen drei Ländern sind die Koeffizienten
dieser Variable hoch signifikant und erhöhen den Erklärungsgehalt der Modelle er-
heblich. Des Weiteren wurden persönliche Charakteristika als individuenspezifische
Variablen berücksichtigt. Hier zeigte sich vor allem in Ghana und Senegal, dass
ethnische sowie regionale Zugehörigkeit einen erheblichen Erklärungsbeitrag liefern,
wogegen diese Faktoren in Uganda nicht signifikant sind und somit keinen Einfluss
auf die Wahlentscheidung haben. Stattdessen sind das Geschlecht, Alter, Bildung
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und Religion signifikante Faktoren in Uganda. In Ghana hat von den persönlichen
Charakteristika nur Bildung einen signifikanten Einfluss und im Senegal macht es
einen Unterschied ob der Wähler in ländlichen oder städtischen Gegenden lebt.
Als zentrales Maß zur Bewertung des Wählerverhaltens, definieren wir die relative
Wichtigkeit der verschiedenen Wahlmotive, Politik orientiertes, nicht Politik orien-
tiertes und retrospektives Wählen. In den drei Ländern ist die relative Wichtigkeit
von Politik orientierten Wählen jeweils etwa ein Drittel, in Uganda fallen darüber
hinaus 70% auf nicht Politik orientiertes Wählen zurück. In Ghana sind es ungefähr
60% und im Senegal nur 55%. Außerdem hat retrospektives Wählen im Senegal eine
Wichtigkeit von 10% und in Ghana von 8%. Wie bereits erwähnt ist retrospektives
Wählen in Uganda nicht signifikant und hat somit eine relative Wichtigkeit von null.
Betrachtet man retrospektives Wählen ebenfalls als Politik orientiert, ist zu erken-
nen, dass das Alter der Demokratie positiv mit der relativen Wichtigkeit von Politik
orientierten Wählen korreliert ist. Sowohl Senegal als auch Ghana haben eine lange
Geschichte demokratischer Wahlen, in beiden Ländern wird daher auch deutlich
Politik orientiert gewählt. In Gegensatz dazu steht Uganda, wo Yoweri Museveni
seit fast 30 Jahren an der Macht ist und erst 2006 die ersten Mehrparteienwahlen
stattfanden. Politik orientiertes Wählen findet daher in Uganda kaum statt. Die
berechneten Indikatoren für Government Accountability zeichnen ein sehr ähnliches
Bild. Betrachtet man den Anteil, den die Wähler im Vergleich zu Interessengruppen
und intrinsischen Präferenzen der Politiker, am politischen Prozess haben (GA1),
so ist dieser in Ghana am höchsten, gefolgt von Senegal und Uganda. Gemeinsam
mit dem Index GA3, der die mögliche Variabilität der Politikpositionen bestimmt,
lassen sich gute Schlüsse über die Government Accountability der einzelnen Länder
ziehen. In Uganda ist der politische Prozess von organisierten Interessengruppen
dominiert, ihr Anteil beträgt über 70%. Des Weiteren kann die Regierung Ugan-
das ihre Parteiposition variieren wie es ihr gefällt, da dies nur minimale Effekte auf
ihre Wiederwahlwahrscheinlichkeit hat. Ganz unabhängig von der eingenommenen
Parteiposition würde Museveni auch die nächste Wahl souverän gewinnen. Daraus
resultiert, dass Politiker keinerlei Anreize haben sich für die allgemeinen Interessen
der Gesellschaft einzusetzen, stattdessen kooperieren sie eher mit Interessengrup-
pen bzw. befriedigen ihre eigenen intrinsischen Präferenzen. Betrachtet man das
Ergebnis im Kontext zur politischen Entwicklung in Uganda sind ganz klar noch
autoritäre Züge zu erkennen. Präsident Museveni ist die dominante Figur im poli-
tischen Geschehen Ugandas und obwohl viele Wähler mit ihrer eigenen Situation und
auch mit der ökonomischen Situation des Landes unzufrieden sind, wählen sie weit-
erhin für den Amtsinhaber und nicht für die Opposition. Wahlen wirken daher nicht
als Kontrollmechanismus und können auch nicht sicherstellen, dass die Regierung die
Interessen der Gesellschaft vertritt. In Senegal und Ghana ist die Situation weniger
dramatisch, zwar ist die Wichtigkeit der Wähler gegenüber Interessengruppen auch
hier unter 50%, allerdings sind die Regierungen in der Wahl ihrer Politikpositionen
viel stärker eingeschränkt. Insbesondere in Ghana ist die mögliche Variation der Poli-
tikposition mit 13% sehr gering. Im Senegal kann die Position um 45% verschoben
werden, was deutlich mehr Spielraum bietet als in Ghana, aber die Regierung im-
mer noch zu einem gewissen Grad an die Politikpositionen der Wähler bindet. Wie
bereits beim Anteil Politik orientierten Wählen zu erkennen war, handelt es sich
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sowohl bei Ghana als auch bei Senegal um Länder die bereits einige Jahrzehnte
demokratisch sind und Wahlen durchführen. Daher ist der Grad an Government
Accountability auch deutlich höher als in Uganda. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen die
Erwartungen an die Studie, Länder die stärker Politik orientiert wählen (wie Ghana
und Senegal) weisen auch eine deutlich höhere Government Accountability auf als
solche die eher nicht Politik orientiert wählen (Uganda). Diese Schlussfolgerung auf
der Makroebene lässt sich jedoch aufgrund der geringen Stichprobe mit nur drei
Ländern nicht statistisch überprüfen.
Um auch auf Mikroebene den Zusammenhang zwischen Wählerverhalten undGov-
ernment Performance zu untersuchen, müssen die Wähler individuell betrachtet
werden. Dies wurde in der Arbeit ebenfalls berücksichtigt, neben Government Ac-
countability wurden die individuellen Gewichte der Wähler aus der Support Funktion
der Regierung berechnet. Die Gewichte variieren stark von Person zu Person und
sind insbesondere in Ghana enorm verzerrt. Der Gini Koeffizient der Wählergewichte
beträgt dort 0.61, was bedeutet, dass etwa 40% der Bevölkerung 60% des absoluten
Gewichts besitzen. In Uganda ist der Gini Koeffizient geringer (0.47) und im Sene-
gal mit 0.28 am geringsten. Ungleich verteilte Gewichte sind eine notwendige, aber
noch keine hinreichende Bedingung für das Vorhandensein von Capture. Damit
Capture existiert müssen bestimmte Gruppen relativ höhere Gewichte besitzen als
andere, denn nur so können sie den politischen Prozess zu ihren Gunsten beein-
flussen. Um die Existenz von Capture empirisch zu überprüfen wurde ein weiterer
Index hergeleitet, der die durchschnittlichen Gewichte von verschiedenen Gruppen
miteinander ins Verhältnis setzt. Bei diesen Gruppen handelt es sich nicht um or-
ganisierte Interessengruppen, sondern um soziale Gruppen wie beispielsweise arme
und reiche Bürger, Gebildete und Ungebildete oder solche die in ländlichen Regio-
nen leben und andere die in städtischen Regionen leben. Der Capture Index misst,
welche dieser Gruppen im Mittel das höhere Gewicht besitzt. Besonders Entwick-
lungsökonomen gehen davon aus, dass in Entwicklungsländern ein Ungleichgewicht
zwischen Reichen und Armen und ländlicher sowie städtischer Bevölkerung besteht.
Lipton (1977) prägte mit seiner Theorie den Begriff Urban Bias und somit auch
die Hypothese, dass die städtische Bevölkerung bevorzugt behandelt wird. Häufig
wird von einer Elite ausgegangen, die sich aus der gebildeten, urbanen Oberschicht
zusammensetzt und sowohl den politischen als auch den ökonomischen Prozess eines
Landes dominiert. Bezogen auf das Wählerverhalten und das relative Gewicht in
politischen Wahlen, konnten wir die Hypothese für Uganda und Senegal bestäti-
gen. In beiden Ländern besitzen die städtischen und gut ausgebildeten Bürger ein
höheres durchschnittliches Gewicht als weniger gebildete Bürger aus ländlichen Ge-
bieten. Des Weiteren ist in beiden Ländern festzustellen, dass die Bewohner der
Hauptstädte Kampala und Dakar die Elite stellen, welche andere Regionen poli-
tisch dominiert. Betrachtet man die absoluten Werte der Capture Indizes, so ist
zu erkennen, dass Capture im Senegal am geringsten ausgeprägt ist, gefolgt von
Uganda und Ghana. Ghana stellt einen besonderen Fall dar, da hier nicht die ur-
bane Elite bevorzugt wird, sondern die ländliche, schlechter ausgebildete und ärmere
Bevölkerung. Das Ergebnis ist somit nicht nur konträr zu den Ergebnissen unserer
Studie im Senegal und in Uganda, sondern auch zu der gängigen Literatur. Es
scheint, dass in Ghana die ökonomisch benachteiligten Gruppen inzwischen zumin-
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dest politisch aufgeholt haben. Unter der Annahme der Korrektheit der theore-
tischen Implikationen des Modells, führt die politische Verzerrung zugunsten der
armen, ländlichen Bevölkerung zu politischen Maßnahmen, die eben diese Gruppen
fördert und unterstützt. Langfristig sollte daher das Ungleichgewicht und die Ein-
kommensschere zwischen arm und reich geringer werden. Dieser Effekt tritt jedoch
nur dann ein, wenn Politiker ihre Politikentscheidungen tatsächlich aufgrund der
Wähler treffen und nicht vorrangig aufgrund von organisierten Interessengruppen
und ihren eigenen intrinsischen Präferenzen. Die Politikposition, die von Parteien
eingenommen werden müsste, wenn sie sich nur an den Wählern orientieren, lässt
sich als gewichteter Mittelwert der individuellen Politikpositionen einfach ausrech-
nen. Als Gewichte dienen die berechneten Wählergewichte. Außerdem ist es möglich
die Position zu berechnen, die sich ergibt, wenn keine Verzerrung der Gewichte vor-
liegt und sie stattdessen für jeden Wähler identisch sind (one man one vote). Die
Ergebnisse aus den drei Ländern zeigen, dass sich die Regierung bei der Wahl ihrer
Politikposition kaum am Wähler orientiert. Die empirischen Politikpositionen sind
tatsächlich näher an der kalkulierten Position mit einheitlichen Gewichten, als an
der kalkulierten Position mit den beobachteten Gewichten. Eine Ausnahme bildet
Ghana, wo dies nicht der Fall ist. Am weitesten entfernt von der empirischen Posi-
tion ist die Regierung Ugandas. Dieses Ergebnis war so zu erwarten, da wir bereits
durch die Accountability Indizes zeigen konnten, dass besonders in Uganda die Inte-
ressen der Wähler kaum berücksichtigt werden. Stattdessen orientiert sich Präsident
Museveni an den Positionen von Interessengruppen und an seinen eigenen intrinsi-
schen Präferenzen. Im Senegal ist die Parteiposition der APR deutlich näher an der
gleichgewichtigen Position (identische Gewichte für jeden Wähler). Es zeigt sich,
dass obwohl die Gewichte der einzelnen Wähler in der Realität nicht identisch sind,
sondern einige Gruppen systematisch präferiert werden, die tatsächlichen Politikpo-
sitionen der Parteien nicht zugunsten von bestimmten Wählergruppen verzerrt sind.
Ganz im Gegenteil, es scheint dass die Dominanz von Interessengruppen und intrinsi-
schen Präferenzen die Politikpositionen näher an die unverzerrte Position und somit
näher an die gesellschaftlich optimale Position heranrückt. Die Hypothese, dass
fehlende Accountability per se zu verzerrten Politikergebnissen führt konnte somit
für die drei Fallstudien nicht bestätigt werden. Außerdem soll an dieser Stelle kurz
erwähnt werden, dass die Annahme, dass es sich bei der unverzerrten Politikposi-
tion um die optimale Politikposition handelt durchaus kritisch hinterfragt werden
kann. So geht Caplan (2007) beispielsweise davon aus, dass Wähler nicht in der Lage
sind ihren Nutzen aus bestimmten Politiken korrekt einzuschätzen. Somit handeln
sie irrational und die mittlere Wählerposition würde nicht zur gesellschaftlich op-
timalen Position führen. Ist die Annahme von Caplan korrekt, können durchaus
Politikpositionen, die aufgrund von Interessengruppen eingenommen werden, den
Politikpositionen von Wählern überlegen sein. Eine Überprüfung der Hypothese ist
jedoch nur möglich, wenn Daten über die tatsächlichen optimalen Positionen ver-
fügbar sind. Diese könnten dann sowohl mit den Positionen der Wähler als auch mit
den Positionen der Interessengruppen verglichen werden.
Die Beziehung zwischen Wählerverhalten und Government Performance wurde
auch auf Mikroebene genauer untersucht. Es zeigt sich, dass der Zusammenhang
zwischen den individuellen Gewichten und nicht Politik orientierten Wählen eine
164
umgekehrte U-Kurve beschreibt. Der Zusammenhang war so erwartet wurden, da
das individuelle Gewicht von PjG(1− PjG) abhängt und die Wahrscheinlichkeit PjG
wiederum teilweise durch den Anteil nicht Politik orientierten Wählens bestimmt
wird. Das Maximum der Kurve befindet sich bei allen drei Ländern links vom
Nullpunkt. Somit erhöht ein gewisses Maß an nicht Politik orientierten Wählen
das politische Gewicht. Ab einem bestimmten Grenzwert, ist das absolute Ausmaß
an nicht Politik orientierten Wählen jedoch negativ mit dem persönlichen Wähler
Gewicht korreliert. Das Ergebnis ist in der Analyse mit den geschätzten Parametern
der multinomialen Logit Analyse stets eindeutiger als das Ergebnis, welches aus der
Latent Class Analyse hervorgeht. Des Weiteren ist der Zusammenhang weniger klar
für den drei Parteien Fall im Senegal als für die zwei Parteien Fälle Ghana und
Uganda.
Neben dem bereits beschriebenen theoretischen und empirischen Ergebnissen,
wurde in der Arbeit außerdem die Methode der Latent Class Analyse angewendet.
Die Latent Class Analyse integriert explizit Heterogenität in das Modell und ist somit
dem multinomialen Logit Modell überlegen, da dieses von homogenen Akteuren aus-
geht. Die Methode wurde bisher nur sehr selten in politikwissenschaftlichen Studien
angewendet und ist insbesondere in der Analyse von Wählerverhalten sehr innova-
tiv. In dieser Arbeit konnte durch die Anwendung der Latent Class Analyse gezeigt
werden, dass sich Wähler systematisch in ihrem Wählerverhalten voneinander unter-
scheiden. Das Modell enthält sogenannte Kovariaten, welche die Klassenzusammen-
setzung erklären. Somit ist die Latent Class Analyse vor allem bei explorativen An-
sätzen sehr zu empfehlen. In allen drei Fallstudien wurde eine zwei Klassen Lösung
präferiert, die Klassen unterscheiden sich dabei in den bereits genannten Faktoren:
Bildung, Einkommen undWohnort. Während eine Klasse stets aus ärmeren, weniger
gebildeten Individuen aus ländlichen Regionen besteht, zeichnet sich die andere
Klasse durch reichere, gebildetere Individuen mit Wohnhaft in städtischen Regio-
nen aus. Dabei ist zu bedenken, dass die Klassenzugehörigkeit als Wahrscheinlichkeit
gemessen wird, d.h. dass jedes Individuum mit einer bestimmten Wahrscheinlichkeit
zu der einen Klasse und mit der jeweiligen Gegenwahrscheinlichkeit zu der anderen
Klasse gehört. Klassenzugehörigkeit ist somit probabilistisch und nicht determinis-
tisch1. Anders als mit der multinomialen Logit Analyse lassen sich mit der Latent
Class Analyse individuenspezifische Koeffizienten berechnen, die von den im Modell
enthaltenen Variablen und dabei insbesondere von den Kovariaten, abhängig sind.
Während die Latent Class Analyse sehr gut dafür geeignet ist Heterogenität in einem
Datensatz nicht nur aufzuspüren, sondern diese auch entsprechend zu erklären, birgt
sie jedoch auch einige Komplikationen und Probleme. Besonders die Existenz von
lokalen Maxima erschwert die Latent Class Analyse erheblich. Wenn lokale Maxima
existieren, konvergiert das Modell nicht und kommt somit zu keiner eindeutigen Lö-
sung. Dieses Problem ist in der Literatur bekannt und tritt insbesondere dann auf,
wenn viele Klassen geschätzt werden und die Anzahl an Variablen hoch ist (Ver-
munt and Magidson, 2005). Des Weiteren ist die Schätzung der Modelle deutlich
aufwendiger als die Schätzung von normalen Logit Modellen, es wird entsprechende
Software benötigt und die Anforderungen an Rechnerkapazitäten aber auch an die
1Für deskriptive Vergleiche wurde jedoch von einer diskreten Klassenzugehörigkeit ausgegangen.
Ein Wähler gehört zu Klasse 1, wenn pi1j ≥ 0.5 und zu Klasse 2, wenn pi1j < 0.5.
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Datenstruktur sind höher. In dieser Arbeit konnten wir außerdem zeigen, dass ob-
wohl die Methode komplizierter ist und Heterogenität explizit mit einbezieht, die
Ergebnisse sich nicht stark von den Ergebnissen des Multinomialen Logit Modells
unterscheiden. Betrachtet man die marginalen Effekte von beiden Modelltypen, so
konnten wir zeigen, dass diese nur geringfügig voneinander abweichen, wenn iden-
tische Variablen in den Schätzungen berücksichtigt werden. Die Kovariaten der La-
tent Class Analyse werden im Multinomialen Logit Modell als individuenspezifische
Variablen mit einbezogen und ermöglichen so ebenfalls die teilweise Berücksichti-
gung von Heterogenität. Auch die von uns berechneten Indikatoren unterscheiden
sich nur in geringem Maße voneinander. Daher kommen wir zu dem Schluss, dass
die Latent Class Analyse ein sehr gutes Mittel ist, um Heterogenität in Datensätzen
zu erklären, aber der zusätzliche Nutzen der Methode dem zusätzlichen Aufwand,
zumindest in den vorliegenden Analysen nicht entspricht, da die multinomiale Logit
Analyse mit geringerem Aufwand zu sehr ähnlichen Ergebnissen kommt.
Neben der methodischen Kritik an der Latent Class Analyse, sollen an dieser
Stelle noch einige weitere Kritikpunkte an der vorliegenden Arbeit erwähnt wer-
den. Erstens wurde der Zusammenhang zwischen Wählerverhalten und Govern-
ment Performance bisher nur empirisch untersucht, die theoretische Herleitung der
Beziehung steht noch aus. Des Weiteren, wird die Gleichgewichtssituation in der
theoretischen Modellierung der Wahl bisher als Black Box betrachtet. Dabei wird
davon ausgegangen, dass sich das System im Gleichgewicht befindet. Allerdings ist
der datengenerierende Prozess nicht vollständig beobachtbar, es fehlen Informatio-
nen sowohl zu den Aktivitäten von Interessengruppen als auch zu intrinsischen Poli-
tikpräferenzen. Die unbekannten Parameter werden nicht geschätzt, sondern können
residual so bestimmt werden, dass es sich bei den beobachteten Politikpositionen im-
mer um ein lokales Nash Gleichgewicht handelt. Liegen in Zukunft Informationen
zu Interessengruppen und intrinsischen Präferenzen vor, kann die politische Unter-
stützungsfunktion unter der Nebenbedingung, dass es sich bei den beobachteten
Politikpositionen um ein lokales Nash Gleichgewicht handelt, geschätzt werden. Da
die Maximierung unter Nebenbedingungen mit Maximum Likelihood Modellen häu-
fig zu Problemen führt, muss in zukünftigen Arbeiten eventuell auf kompliziertere
Schätzmethoden, wie die Bayesianische Ökonometrie zurückgegriffen werden. Ein
weiterer Kritikpunkt ist die Vergleichbarkeit der drei Fallstudien. Es wurde zwar
versucht möglichst ähnliche Datensätze zu benutzen um die Vergleichbarkeit sicher
zu stellen, dies ist allerdings nur bedingt gelungen. Insbesondere die Tatsache, dass
im Senegal keine Parteipositionen abgefragt wurden erschwert die Vergleichbarkeit.
Es wurde außerdem bereits in Kapitel 10 diskutiert, dass der Zeitpunkt der Befra-
gung für die Qualität der Daten extrem wichtig ist. Leider konnte nur in Ghana
zum optimalen Zeitpunkt befragt werden, wogegen der Zeitpunkt in Uganda und
im Senegal nicht optimal für eine Wählerbefragung war. Als letztes sollte noch er-
wähnt werden, dass Nichtwähler bisher nicht in die Analyse eingeschlossen wurden.
Dies liegt insbesondere an der Datengrundlage, die kaum Nichtwähler enthält. Für
die empirische Analyse von Wählerverhalten sind aber auch jene Bürger wichtig
die nicht zur Wahl gehen, daher wird in zukünftigen Forschungsarbeiten die Rolle
der Nichtwähler stärker mit einbezogen werden. Das probabilistische Wählermodell
kann dann beispielsweise als Nested Logit Modell geschätzt werden.
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Trotz dieser Beeinträchtigungen leistet die Arbeit sowohl in theoretischer, em-
pirischer als auch methodischer Hinsicht einen wichtigen Beitrag zur vorhandenen
Literatur. Die ökonometrische Anwendung von probabilistischen Wählermodellen
in Afrika unter Einbeziehung von Politik orientierten, nicht Politik orientierten und
retrospektiven Wahlmotiven wurde so bisher noch nicht durchgeführt. Die Weiter-
entwicklung des BGHModells ermöglicht außerdem aus Wählerdaten direkt Schlüsse
auf die Government Performance zu ziehen. Weitere empirische Anwendungen der
Theorie, nicht nur in Entwicklungsländern, sondern auch in Industrieländern soll-
ten in Zukunft folgen. Denn erst durch den Vergleich von mehreren Länderstudien
ist eine vollständige Evaluierung des Ansatzes auch auf Markoebene zu gewährlei-
sten.
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Appendix A
Terminology
Theory of Voting Behavior
Term Description
P Probability that one’s vote is decicive
B Utility difference between the policies of two candidates
C Cost of voting
D Utility gained from the act of Voting (civic duty)
j voter
i district
k political parties (A, B)
Vjk Deterministic utility component
- P Policy oriented voting
- R Retrospective voting
- NP Non policy oriented voting
d policy dimension
kj Probabilistic utility component
n number of districts
c(j) social class of each voter
- p poor
- m middle income
- r rich
βic population share
αc share of informed voters
pik policy platform
Uc(j)(pi) Utility function
aj party preference
- a nationwide preference
- j individual specific preference
C campaign expenditures
h marginal effectiveness of C
χ hβrαr − βmαm − βpαp
Gk distribution function of party preference
g density of Gk
WI welfare of informed voters
Sk vote share of party k
V (pik, Ck) net effectiveness of the electoral strategy of party k
l citizens contributing to interest groups
pk win probability of party k
Table A.1: Terminology of Chapter 3
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Appendix A Terminology
Methodology
Term Description
j decision maker, voter
J number of decision makers
k, l alternatives, political parties
K,L number of alternatives
Ujk Utility
Vjk representative utility
xjk alternative specific characteristics
sj individual specific characteristics
jk error term
f() joint density function
Pjk probability function
I(·) indicator function
αk alternative specific constant
β generic coefficient
δk alternative specific coefficient
Ljk() logit probability
c class
C number of classes
pic population share in class c
zj covariates
djk choice variable
t number of simulation run
η contains all estimated parameters
yj choice variable
Table A.2: Terminology of Chapter 4
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Theory and Derivation of Government Performance Indices
Term Description
j voter
NV set of voters
n number of voters
k, l political party
NP set of political parties
K number of parties
Uj utility of voter j
Vjk observable utility
jk stochastic error
Ψ cumulative distribution of error terms
Sk vote share
αj individual relative weight of non policy voting
βj individual relative weight of policy voting
δj individual relative weight of retrospective voting
γdk policy position of party k
d policy dimension
xdj policy position of the voter
zk party characteristics
G index of government party
Cl campaign spending
αLjkl efficiency of campaign spending and lobbying
αjkl efficiency of party characteristics
Zrj observable welfare indicators
δjkr efficiency of observed welfare indicators
i, h interest group
I,H number of interest groups
uk intrinsic policy preferences of political party
ϑk relative importance of intrinsic policy preferences
αG welfare weight non policy voting
βG welfare weight policy voting
δG welfare weight retrospective voting
ϑG welfare weight intrinsic policy preferences
GA1, GA2, GA3 government accountability indices
T, T ′ social group
wj individual voter weight
GC government capture index
γ∗dG optimal policy position when GA1=1
γ∗∗dG optimal policy position when GA1=1 and wj =
1
n
κ indicator variable
Table A.3: Terminology of Chapter 5
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Appendix B
Voter Questionnaire Uganda
• The questionnaire used in the Ghana voter survey is not printed, but is very
similar to the Uganda questionnaire with only minor country specific modifi-
cations.
• The Senegal questionnaire was taken from Afrobarometer and can be viewed
at the Afrobarometer Homepage (www.afrobarometer.org).
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PROMOTING PARTICIPATORY AND EVIDENCE-BASED AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
PROCESSES IN AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
 
  Questionnaire: Voter survey 
-UGANDA- 
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PSU/EA (Code): ______________________________ 
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INTRODUCTION 
This questionnaire is part of a research project financed by the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. The project is conducted in joint work with IFPRI 
and the University of Kiel, Germany. It aims at understanding the political process and 
especially voting behaviour in Ghana in more detail. Before we begin, I would like to point 
out, that all data we collect in this interview will be treated absolutely anonymously and 
confidential. No individual data will be published and all data will only be used for research 
purposes. Further, we have designed the questionnaire in such a way, that you answer the 
questions as an expert for yourself. That is, what you answer is absolutely important and 
sufficient for us, i.e. there are no wrong answers.   
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PART A.  PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 
A1. Please specify the following characterisation of yourself 
Characteristics Interviewee 
Name: ____________________ 
Gender: ♀  female ♂ male 
 
Age/Birth year: _____years old (Birth year:_____) 
Marital status: 
      
single married separated divorced widowed other, please specify: 
____________ 
 
Number of children: ____________________ 
Household size: ____________________ 
Head of household:  yes  no 
 
Ethnic group: 
 Muganda  Alur  Kakwa 
 Munyankole  Lugbara  Kumam 
 Munyoro  Madi  Mululi 
 Musoga  Japhadhola  Mwamba 
 Mugishu  Musamia  Nubian 
 Mukhonjo  Mugwere  Mufumbira 
 Munyole  Mukiga  Munyarwanda 
 Ateso  Mutooro  Kupsabiny 
 Acholi  Langi  _______________ 
 
Religion: 
 Christian 
 Muslim 
 Traditional 
 None 
 _______________ 
 
Occupation: 
 Professional/tech/mgt  Unskilled manual 
 Clerical  Student 
 Sales and Services  Retired 
 Skilled manual  Unemployed 
 Agriculture  _______________ 
 
Education:  No formal schooling 
 Informal Schooling only (including Koranic schooling) 
 Primary schooling 
 Secondary school/high school 
 
Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or 
degree from a technical or college 
 University 
How old were you, when you finished your highest level of education? 
_____ years old 
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A2. Are you working in the farming sector? 
 No 
 Yes, produce primarily for own consumption 
 Yes, produce for both own consumption and for market 
 Yes produce primarily for market 
 Yes, work on someone else’s farm 
 
A3. How high are your average monthly household expenditures? 
 _______________UGS 
 Not appropriate 
 Don’t know 
 
A4. Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without 
(Do not read out the don’t know option):  
 Never 
Just 
once or 
twice 
Several 
times 
Many 
times 
Always 
Don’t 
know 
Enough food to eat?       
Enough clean water for home use?       
Medicines or medical treatment?       
Enough fuel to cook your food?       
A cash income?       
 
A5. Which of these things do you personally own? 
 No (Don’t own) Yes (Do own) 
Radio   
Television   
PC   
Motor Vehicle, Car or motorcycle   
 
A6. How often do you get news from the following sources (Do not read out the don’t know 
option)? 
 Every day 
A few times 
a week 
A few times 
a month 
Less than 
once a 
month 
Never Don’t know 
Radio       
Television       
Newspapers        
Internet       
 
A7. Would you say you are very proud, quite proud, not very proud, not at all proud, to be 
a Ugandan (Do not read out the don’t know option)? 
     
Very proud Quite proud Not very proud Not at all proud Don’t know 
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PART B. VOTING DECISION 
 
B1. With regard to the most recent, 2011 national elections, which statement is true for 
you? (Do not read out the don’t know option) 
 You were not registered or you were too young to vote 
 You voted in the elections 
 You decided not to vote 
 You could not find the polling station 
 You were prevented from voting 
 You did not have time to vote 
 Did not vote for some other reason 
 Don’t know 
 
B2. If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote 
for? (Do not read out the don’t know option)  
 National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
 Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) 
 Democratic Party (DP) 
 Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) 
 Other, please specify _______________ 
 Don’t know 
 
B3. Do you feel close to any particular political party? (Do not read out the don’t know 
option) 
 No, (not close to any party)  Skip to B5 
 Yes, (feel close to a party) 
 Refused to answer 
 Don’t know 
 
B4. Which party is that? (Do not read out the don’t know option)  
 National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
 Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) 
 Democratic Party (DP) 
 Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) 
 Other, please specify _______________ 
 Don’t know 
 
B5. To what extent would you say you are interested in politics? (Do not read out the don’t 
know option) 
     
Not at all 
interested 
Not very 
interested 
Somewhat 
interested 
Very interested Don’t know 
 
B6. When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss 
political matters? (Do not read out the don’t know option) 
     
Never Occasionally Frequently Don’t know  
 
B7. When you (yourself) hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your 
friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen...? (Do not 
read out the don’t know option) 
     
Often From time to time Rarely never Don’t know 
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PART C. POLICY ISSUES 
 
In the following questions we would like to ask you about your own political position on 
several issues as well as your assessment of parties/candidates positions on these issues. 
 
C1. Some people agree with liberal policies like legalizing abortion, homosexuality etc. Others 
disagree with such liberal policies.  
Where would you place yourself and the following candidates/parties on this issue? 
(Do not read out the don’t know option) 
 
C2. Some people say that tax revenues should be used mainly to provide public goods like 
health care services, educational services or social security. Others say that tax revenues 
should be rather invested in further economic development via promoting Technical 
progress, market access etc.  
Where would you place yourself and the following candidates/parties on this issue? 
(Do not read out the don’t know option) 
 
C3. To develop a country it is necessary to increase economic growth, which will lead to poverty 
reduction and generally a higher income. This aim can be achieved either by agricultural 
growth (helping the rural regions and increasing the farming sector) or non-agricultural 
growth (spending money on the urban region, increasing the industrial sector).  
Where would you place yourself and the following candidates/parties on this issue? 
(Do not read out the don’t know option) 
 
C4. There are different ways to achieve economic growth. One way is the promotion of 
technological progress, like improved fertilizers, new machinery etc.; the other one would be 
to improve market access via improved infrastructure and efficient market channels.  
Where would you place yourself and the following candidates/parties on this issue? 
(Do not read out the don’t know option) 
Technological progress and innovative 
inputs, like fertilizer, new machineries, 
genetic material etc. are the only way to 
1 2 3 4 5 
Economic growth can only be 
promoted with better market 
access, like improved 
Don’t 
know 
Agree with liberal policies 
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree with liberal policies 
Don’t 
know 
A. Yourself        
B. National Resistance Movement (NRM)        
C. Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)        
D. Democratic Party (DP)        
E. Uganda People’s Congress (UPC)        
Tax revenues should be mainly used to 
provide public goods 
1 2 3 4 5 
Tax revenues should rather be 
used to further improve 
economic growth and 
economic development 
Don’t 
know 
A. Yourself        
B. National Resistance Movement (NRM)        
C. Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)        
D. Democratic Party (DP)        
E. Uganda People’s Congress (UPC)        
Economic growth shall be achieved through 
development of the agricultural sector 
1 2 3 4 5 
Economic growth shall be 
achieved through development of 
the industrial (non-agricultural) 
sector 
Don’t 
know 
A. Yourself        
B. National Resistance Movement (NRM)        
C. Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)        
D. Democratic Party (DP)        
E. Uganda People’s Congress (UPC)        
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promote economic growth infrastructure and efficient market 
channels 
A. Yourself        
B. National Resistance Movement (NRM)        
C. Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)        
D. Democratic Party (DP)        
E. Uganda People’s Congress (UPC)        
 
C5. In Ghana agricultural products can be split into so called cash crops, like coffee, cotton, tea 
and tobacco and food crops, like plantains, cassava, sweet potatoes, millet, sorghum, corn, 
beans, and groundnuts. Agricultural output can be increased with the extension of either one 
of them. 
Where would you place yourself and the following candidates/parties on this issue? 
(Do not read out the don’t know option) 
It is important to promote the growth of 
cash crops like coffee, cotton, tea and 
tobacco to achieve economic growth 
1 2 3 4 5 
Food crops like plantains, 
cassava, sweet potatoes, millet, 
sorghum, corn, beans, and 
groundnuts should be grown 
more intensively to decrease 
hunger and increase economic 
performance 
Don’t 
know 
A. Yourself        
B. National Resistance Movement (NRM)        
C. Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)        
D. Democratic Party (DP)        
E. Uganda People’s Congress (UPC)        
 
C6. A state generally faces two ways to deal with Agriculture, it can tax or protect the agricultural 
sector.  
Where would you place yourself and the following candidates/parties on this issue? 
(Do not read out the don’t know option) 
 
Agricultural sector should be taxed 1 2 3 4 5 
Agricultural sector should be 
protected and supported by the 
state 
Don’t 
know 
A. Yourself        
B. National Resistance Movement (NRM)        
C. Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)        
D. Democratic Party (DP)        
E. Uganda People’s Congress (UPC)        
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C7. Concerning the government, there are different ways to rule a country. One would be to 
mainly decide on political matters without including the population, this way decision making 
can be very fast. The other way is to include the citizens in the decision making progress, 
which provides more participation but also slows the process down. 
Where would you place yourself and the following candidates/parties on this issue? 
(Do not read out the don’t know option) 
It is more important to have a government 
that can get things done, even if we have 
no influence over what it does (Decision 
making process without population) 
1 2 3 4 5 
It is more important for citizens to 
be able to hold government 
accountable, even if that means it 
makes decisions more slowly 
(Decision making process with 
population) 
Don’t 
know 
A. Yourself        
B. National Resistance Movement (NRM)        
C. Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)        
D. Democratic Party (DP)        
E. Uganda People’s Congress (UPC)        
 
C8. In general, how would you describe (Do not read out the don’t know option):  
 
Very 
bad 
Fairly 
bad 
Neither 
good 
nor bad 
Fairly 
good 
Very 
good 
Don’t 
know 
The present economic condition of 
this country? 
      
Your own present living conditions?       
 
C9. Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago (Do not 
read out the don’t know option):  
 
Much 
worse 
Worse Same Better 
Much 
better 
Don’t 
know 
Economic condition of this country?       
Your living conditions?       
 
C10. Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse (Do not read out the 
don’t know option):  
 
Much 
worse 
Worse Same Better 
Much 
better 
Don’t 
know 
Economic conditions in this country 
in twelve months time? 
      
Your living conditions in twelve 
months time? 
      
 
C11. Looking ahead to next year, 2013, do you think: it will be a peaceful year more or less 
free of international disputes, a troubled year with much international discord, or 
remain the same? (Do not read out the don’t know option) 
     
Peaceful year Remain the same Troubled year Don’t know  
 
C12. Looking ahead to next year, 2013, do you think: strikes and industrial disputes in this 
country will increase, decrease, or remain the same? (Do not read out the don’t know 
option) 
     
increase Remain the same decrease Don’t know  
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C13. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Uganda? Are you (Do 
not read out the don’t know option): 
      
Very satisfied Fairly satisfied 
Not very 
satisfied 
Not at all 
satisfied 
Ghana is not a 
democracy 
Don’t know 
 
C14. Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their 
jobs over the past twelve month, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say (Do 
not read out the don’t know option): 
 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
Disapprove Approve 
Strongly 
Approve 
Don’t know/ 
Haven’t 
heard 
enough 
President Museveni      
Your Member of Parliament      
Your elected local council 
(LCV) chairman 
     
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C15. In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that 
government should address? 
 1
st
  important 2
nd
 important 3
rd
  important 
Economics    
Management of the economy    
Wages, incomes and salaries    
Unemployment    
Poverty/destitution    
Rates and Taxes    
Loans / credit    
Food / Agriculture    
Farming/agriculture    
Agricultural marketing    
Food shortage/famine    
Drought    
Land    
Infrastructure    
Transportation    
Communications    
Infrastructure / Roads    
Government Services    
Education    
Housing    
Electricity    
Water supply    
Orphans/street children/homeless children    
Services (other)    
Health    
Health    
HIV/AIDS    
Sickness / Disease    
Governance    
Crime and Security    
Corruption    
Political violence    
Political instability/political divisions/ ethnic tensions    
Discrimination/ inequality    
Gender issues / women’s rights    
Democracy/political rights    
War (international)    
Civil war (Conflict between communities)    
Other responses    
Other (i.e., some other problem)    
Please specify: _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  
Nothing/ no problems    
No further reply    
Don’t know    
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C16. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say? (Do not read out the don’t know option) 
 Very 
Badly 
Fairly 
Badly 
Fairly 
Well 
Very 
Well 
Don’t 
know 
A.  Managing the economy       
B. Improving the living standards of the poor      
C. Creating jobs      
D. Keeping prices down      
E. Narrowing gaps between rich and poor      
F. Reducing crime      
G. Improving basic health services      
H. Addressing educational needs      
I. Providing water and sanitation services      
J. Ensuring everyone has enough to eat      
K. Fighting corruption in government      
L. 
Resolving violent conflict between 
communities 
     
M. Combating HIV/AIDS      
N. Maintaining roads and bridges      
O. Providing a reliable supply of electricity      
P. Empowering women      
 
C17. When you consider voting for a certain candidate, which of the following things are 
important for your choice. (Do not read out the don’t know option) 
 
 
Very 
unimportant 
Unimportant Important 
Very 
important 
Don’t know 
Character      
Outer Appearance      
Ethnic origin      
Regional origin      
Political knowledge      
Party affiliation      
Past political performance      
Election campaign      
Other (_____________)      
 
  
C18. There is different attitudes vis-à-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one 
which best describes your own opinion. (Do not read out the don’t know option) 
 The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action 
 Our society must be gradually improved by reforms 
 Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces 
 Don’t know 
 
C19. Do you think that if things are not going well in Uganda people like yourself can help 
to bring a change for the better, or not? 
 No, cannot 
 Yes, can 
 Don’t know 
 
C20. In political matters people talk of “Socialist” and “Capitalist”. Do you know the terms 
“Socialist” and “Capitalist” in a political context?  
 No, I don’t know them  Skip to C22 
 Yes, I know them  
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C21. If you know the terms “Socialist” and “Capitalist” in a political context, where would 
you place yourself on this scale? (Do not read out the don’t know option) 
 
C22. Are you yourself or is someone in your household a member of a club, an association 
or an organization and if yes, how active are you as a member? Please also mention 
the name of the organization. 
 Name of 
organization 
Not a 
member 
Member 
but not 
active 
Active 
member 
Leader 
A sport club _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     
An idealistic organization, for 
example Amnesty 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     
A religious association (e.g 
church) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     
A (trade) union _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     
A professional association _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     
A political party _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     
A neighborhood association _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     
A voluntary organization, 
doing voluntary work 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     
A Farmer Based 
Organization (FBO) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     
Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     
Socialist 1 2 3 4 5 Capitalist 
Don’t 
know 
A. Yourself        
B. National Resistance Movement (NRM)        
C. Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)        
D. Democratic Party (DP)        
E. Uganda People’s Congress (UPC)        
F. Yourself        
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PART D.  NETWORKS 
 
D1. In the following question we would like to find out more about your personal social networks, especially your core network. With 
core network we mean those persons that you feel very close to and with whom you would discuss important personal matter (e.g. 
marital problems, other problems within the family etc.) or whom you would ask if you needed to borrow money. 
If you think about your friends and family, who belongs to your core network?  
Nr. Name Relation 
1=family 
2=friend 
3=acquaintance 
4=neighbor 
5=colleague 
999=Don’t know 
Sex 
1=male, 
2=female 
999=Don’t 
know 
Age 
1=<20years 
2=20-30years 
3=30-40years 
4=40-50 years 
5=50-60years  
6=>60years 
999=Don’t 
know 
Education 
1=No formal schooling 
2=informal schooling 
(including koranic) 
3=primary schooling 
4=secondary schoolin/high 
school 
5=Post secondary, other than 
university 
6=University 
999=Don’t know 
 
Occupation 
1=Professional/tech/mgt 
2=Clerical  
3=Sales and Services 
4=Skilled manual  
5=Agriculture 
6=Unskilled manual 
7= Student 
8=Retired 
9=Unemployed 
999=Don’t know 
Place of living 
1=Neighborhood 
2=same region 
3=other region 
4=Outside Uganda 
999=Don’t know 
Meeting 
frequency 
1=frequently 
2=sometimes 
 3=rarely 
999=Don’t know 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
 
D2. Please indicate for all these people the extent to which they know each other, more specifically whether they know each other “not 
at all” (0), “know but not close” (1), “close” (2). 
Nr. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 
2  0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 
3   0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 
4    0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 
5     0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 
6      0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 
7       0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 
8        0 / 1 / 2 0 / 1 / 2 
9         0 / 1 / 2 
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